On the Victory Day Parade, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, China showcased its military strength on September 3, 2025, at Chang’an Avenue, Beijing. During the 90-minute parade, the Chinese military demonstrated fighter jets, bombers, hypersonic missiles, and aerial and undersea drones. Military parades have often sparked global interest among weapons analysts for decades. In the case of China, it’s important to correctly decode and analyse different weapon systems and platforms, as it gives us an idea about the modernisation of the Chinese military and thereby helps us to recalibrate India’s strategy and preparedness in future.
Chinese Claims
Chinese military officials had announced that equipment formations would consist of combat-oriented joint operational groups, such strategic strike group, land operations group, maritime operations group, air and missile defence group, information operations group, unmanned operations group, etc. They claimed these essentially cover the Chinese military’s primary active-duty aircraft types, and some were making their first public appearances. They further claimed that the military parade will feature only locally manufactured active-duty primary fighting equipment and weapons.
Some analysts believe that middle powers like Indonesia, South Africa, which are struggling to build military capabilities for a globalised world without getting caught up in the current Cold War, may be the parade’s most important audience rather than the US. ICBMs and carrier-based aircraft provide these countries with a model for strategic ambiguity. China’s strategy implies that nations like Nigeria, defending offshore installations or Indonesia, safeguarding archipelagic waters, don’t have to choose between capacity and non-alignment. Facing Western semiconductor restrictions, China’s focus on domestic innovation conveys a message about technical independence. Every domestically developed system serves as evidence that China can innovate in containment.
Weapons and Platforms: An Assessment of Victory Parade Videos
China’s heaviest multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS), PHL-191, with two loadouts, was displayed. One had eight precision-guided 370 mm missiles that were likely to fly 300 km or more. That essentially places 90 percent of Taiwan within reach. Two large cartons were visible in another loadout. They carried ballistic missiles that were 750 mm in diameter and could likely travel 500 km or more. Those appeared to be cheaper land strike missiles as well as anti-ship missiles. They could be larger versions of the US Prism missile. PHL-191 could enable the PLA with short-range ballistic missile barrage missions. The naval assets display began with the naval air-defence (AD) missile HHQ-9C. The booster that HHQ-9C possessed was absent from standard HQ-9C, which may indicate an enlarged mission. This new missile could probably be multi-stacked in shipboard VLS cells because of its small size. The HQ-16C came next. It should outfit some of PLAN’s older destroyers as well as the 054-A frigate. It could be comparable to the most recent Russian book missiles. A laser system on a big truck then appeared, which would aid in defending naval stations. Long-range focusing is suggested by its enormous lens, and a 60–100 kW laser may be possible with its power plant.
Mock-ups of anti-ship missiles for the first time followed. The YJ-15 appeared to be a ramjet-powered supersonic missile, small enough to be launched from tactical aircraft, such as J-15 flankers, or, with the addition of a rocket booster stage, it could be launched from ships. The YJ-19 appeared to be a booster-equipped hypersonic cruise missile that could be launched from bomber planes or submarine torpedo tubes. On top of a massive rocket, YJ-17 was a hypersonic glider that appeared to be small enough to fit inside Chinese universal VLS cells that are present on the majority of their destroyers. China now produces many hypersonic glider versions, including ones specifically designed to evade ships. The only previously known missile was YJ-20. It’s a ballistic missile with a sizable booster that is most likely sized for a universal VLS system and is mostly utilised for ground strike and anti-ship missions.
Then appeared the latest generation of lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, potentially named U-12. Surface ships, helicopters, and aircraft use these tiny torpedoes in their anti-submarine operations. A rocket-assisted anti-submarine torpedo, which ships employ to swiftly airdrop, typically up to 30 km away, came next. Although similar systems have been in use in China for ten years, it is unclear if this is a novel variation. The U-10 could be the next heavy torpedo. Then came a system that resembled a torpedo and was actually a self-governing sea mine that could be released from torpedo tubes. A few anti-air assets from PLAAF followed. HQ-20 was unveiled for the first time. Not much is known about it, although it appeared to be a medium-range system. Potential applications may include a general-purpose SAM similar to Russian S-350 or an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)-focused system like a more specialised Chinese PAC-3 counterpart. They also showed HQ-22A. To bridge the gap between more costly HQ-9s, the HQ-22 family is a medium-range SAM that is mass-produced at a lower cost. HQ-9C launchers came next. C stands for a new slim-form missile that is most likely deployed in conjunction with larger HQ-9 missiles. It appeared that the HQ-9C missile wasn’t designed with ABM missions in mind. Next was HQ-19. Its missiles are somewhat bigger than American THAAD. It appeared to be made to withstand ballistic missiles with a medium to intermediate range. HQ-29 was also displayed. For the first time, its missile containers were visible. HQ-29 make the top tier of China’s defences against ballistic missiles. Its Containers appeared to be sized between Russian S-500 missiles and US Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles. The HQ-29 will essentially be deployed against ballistic missiles of intermediate and intercontinental range.
Large unmanned aircraft were present in the final unmanned phase. The GJ-21 came first. That drone could perform a stealthy subsonic ground strike. It appeared that this was a significantly different naval version. GJ-3, a medium-sized reconnaissance drone that could carry weaponry akin to the US Reaper, came next. Then came four brand-new, uncrewed fighter jets or mock-ups that had never been seen before. With two of them lacking tails, they all seemed to have stealthy features, which could indicate extremely covert airframes made for supersonic flight. They were between 10-16 meters long, and their varied configurations clearly indicate a wide range of missions and application scenarios. The final vehicle formations included a variety of strategic missiles. CJ-28 cruise missile prototype, which is launched from H-6 bombers, was the first to appear. It resembles a somewhat bigger Tomahawk missile, but is launched from the air. A brand-new cruise missile with the designation YJ-18C was displayed. It’s nearly as long as CJ-20 and has stealthy shape. It’s a heavy missile similar to the now-retired American AGM-129. The rest of the YJ-18 family, which PLAN uses from ships, doesn’t look anything like this, and therefore, its classification was odd. The CJ-1000 also made its debut. These are probably larger but comparable hypersonic cruise missiles, apart from naval hypersonic cruise missiles. CJ-1000 most likely replaced CJ supersonic cruise missile displayed in 2019. A YJ-21 ballistic missile model was displayed. The aforementioned missile has been seen on H6 bombers. It is considered similar to the Russian Kinzhal’s Chinese equivalent. Then came DF-17, a hypersonic glider missile that was initially shown six years ago and reportedly had a range of nearly 3218 km. Probably, it’s still one of the most difficult non-ICBM missiles to intercept worldwide.
The DF-26D, a precision ballistic missile with an intermediate range, came next. Not much is known about the D version, but it’s new. DF-26 is one of China’s most significant missiles, and its production rate has increased significantly in recent years. Next came trucks displaying JL-1 nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. H6-N bombers with a single missile under their belly could launch them. Such a missile could theoretically be launched thousands of kilometres from China and travel an additional thousand or two kilometres due to mid-air refuelling. JL-3 was also displayed. It is the most recent generation of SLBMs with nuclear warheads. Type 094 strategic strike submarines employ it. Despite being the same size, it appeared to have a greater range than the JL-2. Its ability to store multiple warheads is neither verified nor likely. Next was DF-61, a large road-launched ICBM that essentially appeared to be a DF-41 derivative. The DF-41, which has several warheads and a long range, is the cornerstone of Chinese strategic strikes, but the DF-61 is entirely new and unknown. The silo-based ICBM DF-31BJ was another major surprise. It is significantly larger than other DF-31 missiles and most likely comparable in size to DF-41. Although it has been in China’s ICBM silos for a year or two, this was the first time it was displayed clearly. Lastly, other parts of the enormous DF-5C ICBM were also seen with warhead bus stage and liquid rocket motor stages. It’s the latest and never-before-seen variant of the old 1970s design.
The PLAAF aerial display started with KJ-500A, one of China’s most advanced AWACS-like aircraft and arguably one of the most powerful platforms of its kind worldwide. As it can be refuelled in the air, it’s the only Chinese AWACS that can conduct surveillance missions for a few more hours. The KJ-600 carrier-born AWACS-like aircraft followed. It is the Chinese equivalent of the American E-2D Hawkeye. Chinese aircraft carriers could be able to see threats hundreds of kilometres away with this. K and J versions of the H-6 bomber followed. The first modified H-6 to get modern engines was K. The vintage Tupolev 16 served as the basis for the H-6 airframe, which has undergone significant modernisation over the past 70 years. It could be considered as a significantly scaled-down version of the American B-52 bomber. The K variant has a central bomb compartment but also carries small ballistic and cruise missiles. It was also seen with anti-ship missiles on board. The J variant is somewhat more modern and started as an anti-ship missile bomber.
Assessment by the West
Many experts believe that China’s concept of future warfare, in which victory hinges on cyber domination, information intervention, and seamless coordination across many domains, was highlighted by the march of the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force as autonomous units. They perceive PLA shifting towards ‘information weaponisation,’ from conventional firepower competitions. According to this theory, the key to success is managing communications, reconnaissance, and strike corridors to prevent an adversary from retaliating. Analysts praised the parade’s eye-catching spectacle but warned that it’s still unclear how prepared many of technologies on display, like torpedo drones and laser weapons, really are.
Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with the Pacific Forum, doubts that integration of China’s modern weapons systems will be difficult. He believes that, in essence, the tank and weaponry display served as a massive sales pitch for Chinese weapons to prospective customers. Michael Raska, assistant professor in the military transformations programme at Nanyang Technological University of Singapore, argues that the US continues to have an operational advantage because, as the situation changes, forces on the ground can decide and change their tactics, which is not the case with China because they have to take orders from political leaders in Beijing.
Mick Ryan at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies said that China’s new military hardware hasn’t been tested in Iraq, Ukraine, or any other place, yet the majority of Western military hardware has been tested. Parades don’t measure the effectiveness of warfighting. According to reports, a number of Western political figures objected to the parade’s martial tone and questioned whether such a large-scale demonstration of power had other purposes. The parade takes place in spite of President Xi’s continuous attempts to maintain political control over the PLA in order to balance conflicting demands and fortify an organisation vital to realising his global goals without compromising his ultimate authority inside the CCP.
Implications for India and Conclusion
The PHL-191 MRLS could pose a challenge for India’s land forces near the disputed border in Ladakh or Arunachal during any conflict situation. In the naval domain, the YJ series of anti-ship missiles could pose a challenge for India’s navy, especially the YJ-15/17, as they are said to be designed with hypersonic flight properties and are air-launched. In terms of PLAAF capabilities, the HQ-29 AD system could be a challenge, and its detection is being compared to the Russian S-500 Prometheus systems, but its strike velocity should be further investigated as it’s being displayed for the first time. The four brand-new UCAV-like aircraft could be a subject of further debate because of how stealthy they could be, and what weapons and sensors they carry is still unknown.
As far as strategic missiles are concerned, the majority of those are made by China, keeping in mind hitting US areas near Guam or mainland America, but India should be cautious with air-launched cruise missiles like CJ-28, and ballistic missiles like YJ-21, nuclear-tipped JL-1, which could be launched from H-6/N bombers. To conclude, China is progressing rapidly to increase and improve its kinetic strike capabilities, and India should work hard to improve its AD, ISR and detection capabilities, as most future contemporary conflicts are projected to be fought with emphasis on long-range advanced kinetic strike weapons/hardware as compared to corresponding parent launch platforms.
Title Image Courtesy: CNN
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and the Defence Research and Studies
