The election of Sanae Takaichi as leader of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party on October 4, 2025, and her confirmation as Prime Minister on October 15, 2025, ushers in a key juncture in the postwar evolution of Japanese politics. As the first woman to assume the office, Takaichi’s ascent marks a historical breach in the thick wall of male-dominated dynasties and conservative networks that have characterised Japanese politics for generations. But more than symbolic significance, her premiership heralds an epochal ideological shift within the LDP itself, amplifying the assertive nationalism championed by her political mentor, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, into a decidedly hawkish recalibration of Japan’s foreign policy. This transition in power coincides with the mounting domestic political turbulence and regional tensions that have exposed the increasing vulnerabilities of Japan’s post-war liberal internationalism and underlined the need for a far more robust strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific.
Takaichi’s elevation to the top is linked to the cascading crises that saw her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, resign from his position. Ishiba had assumed the premiership in September 2024 following the sudden departure of Fumio Kishida, whose administration had unravelled under the weight of a prolonged political funding scandal that engulfed senior LDP figures. Emerging in late 2023, this controversy exposed illicit slush fund operations designed to circumvent electoral finance regulations, implicating prominent party members and eroding public trust in the LDP’s governance. The scandal reinforced perceptions of systemic corruption within the party establishment, compounding broader economic discontent driven by persistent inflation, a weakening yen, and rising household costs amid global supply chain disruptions and energy price volatility. As public support for the LDP slumped to historic lows by mid-2024, voter frustration propelled anti-establishment parties—including far-right groups that capitalised on anxieties over immigration and Japan’s demographic decline.
The 2024 general election for the House of Representatives dealt a severe blow to the LDP-Komeito coalition as it lost its majority in the lower house for the first time since 2009. Ishiba’s centrist agenda, which underlined fiscal restraint and cautious diplomatic engagement, failed to assuage the general public. While his administration clinched a tariff mitigation deal with the incoming U.S. administration in 2024, averting punitive trade measures, domestic backlash over perceived concessions on Japanese investments abroad overshadowed this achievement. The July 2025 upper house elections further weakened the coalition, with heavy seat losses going to opposition parties, including the Democratic Party for the People and emerging populist movements. Confronted with growing dissent from the LDP’s ultra-conservative factions—who criticised Ishiba’s moderation as a betrayal of the party’s nationalist roots—and a fragmented Diet, Ishiba resigned on September 18, 2025, having served less than a year in office. His departure, the fifth prime ministerial change in as many years, underlined the instability that has gripped Japanese leadership since Shinzo Abe’s assassination in 2022, raising existential questions about the LDP’s seven-decade dominance.
Into this political void stepped Sanae Takaichi, a self-made politician whose career blends ideological conviction with strategic opportunism. Born in 1961 in Nara Prefecture to a police officer mother and an automotive engineer father, Takaichi rose without the hereditary privileges that define many LDP elites. A Kobe University graduate with an unconventional early affinity for heavy metal music and motorcycles, she worked briefly as a television broadcaster before delving into trans-Pacific policy analysis. In 1987, as a Matsushita Institute fellow, she served in the office of U.S. Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, gaining critical exposure to American perspectives on Japan during a period of trade tensions—a formative experience which shaped her commitment to asserting Japan’s distinct identity in Asia. Elected to the House of Representatives as an independent in 1993, she joined the LDP in 1996, swiftly allying with Abe’s emerging conservative faction.
Mentored by Abe, whom she viewed as a paternal figure, Takaichi became a leading voice in the LDP’s ultranationalist wing, closely tied to the Nippon Kaigi, a lobby advocating constitutional revision and historical reinterpretation. Her tenure in key portfolios, including Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications (2014–2016) and Minister of State for Economic Security (2022–2024 under Kishida), saw her champion policies to bolster supply-chain resilience against perceived Chinese dependencies. Her persistent leadership bids, first in 2021 to Kishida, then in 2024, leading the first round but finally falling to Ishiba, and decisively in 2025, underlined tenacity and appeal to the LDP’s conservative base. In the 2025 contest for party president, she defeated Agriculture Minister Shinjiro Koizumi in a runoff with 55 percent of the intraparty vote, having united the Abe loyalists and grassroots conservatives who had been disenchanted by Ishiba’s centrism. Sanaenomics, her version, varies little from Abenomics: it promises expansionary fiscal policies, crisis-driven spending, and strategic investments into the growth sectors with softened protectionist rhetoric as an attempt to reassure global markets.
The Abe Legacy: Foundations of a Nationalist Foreign Policy
Sanae Takaichi’s premiership, inaugurated on October 15, 2025, represents a direct continuation and intensification of the ideological and strategic framework cemented during the term of Shinzo Abe, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister (2006–2007, 2012–2020). Abe’s premiership fundamentally reshaped Japan’s postwar trajectory, transitioning the nation from a pacifist, low-profile actor to an aspiring “normal” great power capable of asserting strategic autonomy in a volatile Indo-Pacific.
His vision was anchored in a nationalist aspiration to emancipate Japan from the shackles of its 1947 Constitution, particularly Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces. Abe’s 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9, authorised by his cabinet and later ratified by the Diet, marked a seismic shift, opening the door for the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) to engage in collective self-defence with allies, especially the United States. This development inverted decades of rigid non-interventionism, permitting Japan to join limited overseas military missions for the sake of protecting national interests or supporting allied missions. The reinterpretation was not merely legalistic; it symbolised a broader reimagining of Japan’s role in global security, reflecting Abe’s conviction that a strictly passive defence posture was unsustainable against burgeoning regional threats, above all the maritime expansion of China and nuclear brinkmanship by North Korea.
Abe’s foreign policy was pegged to the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, first elaborated in 2016, designed to contest China’s gains through a rules-based regional order. The FOIP placed a strong emphasis on maritime security, freedom of navigation, and economic connectivity, positioning Japan as the indispensable player within a coalition of democratic states resisting authoritarian revisionism. Central to this agenda was the revitalisation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, comprising Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. Under Abe’s guidance, the Quad transformed from a loose consultative forum to a robust minilateral framework that conducted joint naval exercises and coordinated on such matters as supply-chain resilience and infrastructure development to rival the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
Abe’s diplomacy also deepened bilateral ties with the United States, developing the U.S.-Japan alliance into greater interoperability between the JSDF and U.S. forces, as well as a common commitment to deter aggression in the East and South China Seas. His administration built up the partnerships that would be needed with other Indo-Pacific powers, including India, Australia, and ASEAN nations, to give this networked security architecture some balance against China’s regional dominance.
Abe’s strategic vision was substantiated in history by the largest-ever expansion of Japan’s defence capability. His government gradually increased defence budgets, breaking through the informal 1 percent GDP cap that had constrained military spending since the 1970s. By 2022, Abe’s successors, under his lingering influence, committed to raising defence expenditure to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, a target encompassing investments in missile defence systems, cyber warfare capabilities, and advanced fighter jets. This shift in strategy came due to a deteriorating security environment: the repeated missile launches over Japanese territory by North Korea and the aggressive territorial claims by China in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Abe championed domestic legislation aimed at bolstering national security, such as the 2013 State Secrecy Law, which clamped tighter control on sensitive information, and the security bills passed in 2015, expanding the scope within which the JSDF could operate. Though these measures have been controversial among Japan’s pacifist constituencies, they laid the legal underpinning for a more proactive defence posture—a requirement for great-power status.
Economically, Abe’s legacy is inseparable from Abenomics, a three-headed arrow of monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms intended to reverse Japan’s decades-long economic stagnation. Launched in 2012, Abenomics was designed to rev up growth through aggressive quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan, large-scale public investments, and reforms aimed at improving the competitiveness of corporations and labour markets. While it generated mixed results—most notably boosting stock markets and corporate profits without seriously igniting wage growth or curbing deflation—it helped frame one template for economic revitalisation properly intertwined with strategic goals.
Abe spoke frequently of the links between economic strength and national security; he said a robust economy was necessary to fund the modernisation of the defences needed to project soft power. His various initiatives on trade, such as Japan’s leadership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership after the U.S. pull-out in 2017, placed Japan as a leader in free trade, often contrasting China’s enormous economic influence within Asia.
His protégée, Sanae Takaichi, thus absorbed all those priorities and emerged to carry the torch of Abe’s nationalism. Born in 1961 in Nara Prefecture, Sanae Takaichi had her political rise marked by her allegiance to the ideological camp of Abe. She was particularly associated with Nippon Kaigi, a powerful nationalist lobby that supports the revision of the constitution and a revisionist interpretation of Japan’s wartime history. The Nippon Kaigi, whose influence spans far-reaching depth within the LDP, projects a narrative portraying Japan’s glorious imperial past while renouncing what they perceive as excessive post-war guilt placed by the Allied occupation on the country’s conscience.
The membership of Takaichi in that group, along with Abe and many LDP heavyweights, shaped her view of the world: national pride, the importance of traditional values, and refutation of the constraints of pacifism. Her stint as Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications under Abe from 2014 to 2016 saw her advocate for policies aimed at instilling those values, from revising education curricula to underscore the cultural heritage and historical contributions of Japan.
She also strongly supported visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Tokyo memorial for Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class-A war criminals who were convicted by the Allied tribunals, something she has done every year. Such visits strike deep chords among conservative voters, who see these acts as patriotism personified, and draw sharp condemnation from China and South Korea as an attempt to laud Japan’s militaristic past.
Loyal to the very end, Takaichi’s outspokenness for changes in the constitution is one thing that placed Abe near and dear to her heart. Throughout her career, she had sought to change Article 9 to explicitly recognise the JSDF as a national military. Her stint as Minister of State for Economic Security, under the Fumio Kishida administration from 2022 to 2024, further aligned her with Abe’s strategic priorities in pushing for policies that secure critical supply chains, particularly on semiconductors and rare earths, against vulnerabilities linked to Chinese dominance. The focus reflected Abe’s larger goal of economic security as a constitutive element of national power, ensuring Japan’s resilience in an economising world so starkly defined by great-power competition.
Inheriting and adapting Abe’s legacy of strategic autonomy, alliance-building, and economic revitalisation, Takaichi has an economic program called “Sanaenomics,” which is an evolution of Abenomics. By emphasising fiscal stimulus that responds to any impending crisis, investing in emergent technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and policies aimed at ensuring that Japan takes bold steps against its demographic crisis through workforce innovation.
Moreover, unlike Abe, who enjoyed a fairly stable domestic political environment during his second term, Takaichi operates amidst accentuated instability, wherein the LDP is weakened due to recent electoral losses and public discontent over economic and governance issues. How far she can channel Abe, therefore, gets caught in her urge to rebuild the coalition with Komeito and address voter anxieties over inflation and ageing demographics. But her commitment to Abe’s foreign policy nationalism remains undimmed, as she endeavours to accelerate Japan’s remilitarization, deepen its integration within Indo-Pacific security frameworks, and assert a leadership role vis-à-vis regional threats. The premiership of Takaichi represents not only mere continuity but also an attempt to amplify Abe’s more aggressive elements in positioning Japan as an active player within a region marked by increasing geostrategic rivalries.
The Takaichi Vision: A Hawkish Turn in Foreign Policy
Sanae Takaichi’s premiership, inaugurated in October 2025, heralds a pronounced shift toward a more robust, assertive foreign policy, developing further Shinzo Abe’s nationalist framework while adding a confrontational edge suited to the Indo-Pacific’s escalating geopolitical tensions. Nicknamed Japan’s “Iron Lady,” echoing Margaret Thatcher’s firmness, Takaichi envisions Japan as a proactive great power, no longer constrained by its pacifist postwar constitution and ready to face regional threats with both military strength and diplomatic resolve.
At the core of her foreign policy are three priorities:
- Accelerating Japan’s remilitarization through constitutional reform and modernising its defence posture.
- Taking a hardline approach toward perceived adversaries like China and North Korea.
- Deepening strategic alliances, particularly with the United States, to reinforce Japan’s role in Indo-Pacific security.
Though rooted in Abe’s legacy, Takaichi’s agenda reflects her own focus on direct deterrence and unapologetic nationalism, pushing Japan further toward achieving true strategic autonomy.
Constitutional Reform and Military Expansion
Takaichi’s most urgent goal is to revise Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution. Unlike Abe’s reinterpretation in 2014, which permitted collective self-defence, Takaichi seeks a formal amendment to officially designate the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) as a national military. She argues that only by doing so can Japan normalise its security posture in the era of great-power competition and effectively counter threats from North Korea and China.
Her administration is moving to increase defence spending beyond the 2% of GDP target set in 2022, aiming to hit the benchmark well ahead of the original 2027 deadline. Planned investments include advanced missile defence systems, hypersonic weapons, and enhanced cyber and space capabilities. Equally central to her agenda is developing domestic industrial capacity by boosting Japan’s defence manufacturing sector, with global partnerships to build next-gen fighter jets and autonomous systems. For Takaichi, a strong military isn’t just about defence—it’s a marker of sovereignty in an increasingly competitive region.
Confrontation with China
Takaichi’s foreign policy is most sharply defined by her stance on China, which she calls Japan’s top strategic threat. Drawing on her time as Minister of State for Economic Security (2022–2024), she has made it a priority to reduce Japan’s reliance on Chinese-controlled supply chains—particularly in semiconductors, rare earths, and other critical technologies. Her approach centres on “friend-shoring” and forming regional alliances, such as within the Quad, to ensure economic resilience against coercive Chinese tactics.
Her language on China is among the toughest of any Japanese leader. She has warned of Beijing’s growing military and economic influence and expressed suspicion toward Chinese diaspora communities in Japan, suggesting they may serve as conduits for espionage—comments that drew domestic backlash for xenophobic undertones but resonated with nationalist audiences.
In the East China Sea, she has called for more JSDF patrols around the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and endorsed joint naval drills with the United States. Her administration’s 2025 defence white paper bluntly labels China’s maritime behaviour as a “grave concern,” pushing for preemptive security measures to protect Japan’s sovereignty.
Addressing the North Korean Threat
North Korea is another pillar of Takaichi’s foreign policy. Pyongyang’s missile launches—some capable of reaching Japanese territory—have reinforced her case for expanding Japan’s missile defence network. She has advocated for deploying additional PAC-3 systems and exploring offensive counterstrike capabilities, a notable break from Japan’s traditionally defensive stance.
Intelligence-sharing with the U.S. and South Korea is also a priority, reinforcing trilateral deterrence. However, her annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan’s war dead, including Class-A war criminals, complicate relations with Seoul, where such acts stir deep resentment.
While Takaichi remains open to talks with North Korea on the issue of abducted Japanese citizens, she insists that any diplomatic engagement must be backed by credible military readiness.
Tensions with Russia
Though not as central as China or North Korea, Russia still plays a role in Takaichi’s strategic calculus. Increased Russian military activity near Japanese airspace and joint operations with Chinese forces have prompted calls for stronger northern defences. Takaichi’s administration has taken a tougher stance on the Kuril Islands dispute, rejecting Russia’s claims and calling for renewed diplomatic pressure. This fits with her broader theme of defending Japan’s sovereignty but risks exacerbating tensions at a time when Moscow and Beijing are increasingly aligned.
Reinforcing Strategic Alliances
Takaichi’s diplomacy emphasises deeper integration into Indo-Pacific security frameworks. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the core, she has pledged to contribute more to joint defence efforts, including hosting more American troops and collaborating on weapons development. Her stance is shaped by the uncertainties of a possible second Trump administration, which has stressed transactional partnerships and burden-sharing.
Takaichi also supports stronger ties with Taiwan, advocating for defence and economic cooperation. She has publicly declared that Taiwan’s security is vital to Japan’s own—a view aligned with U.S. policy but likely to anger Beijing. In addition, she has pushed for an expanded and revitalised Quad, including new military exercises and infrastructure projects to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. She also signals interest in working more closely with ASEAN, the UK, and Australia through frameworks like AUKUS, intending to build a networked security system to balance China’s influence.
Risks and Criticism
Takaichi’s hardline agenda is not without its liabilities. Her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, including a highly publicised one in October 2025, have provoked condemnation from China and South Korea, complicating diplomatic efforts and weakening Japan’s position in regional security talks. Critics at home accuse her of stoking division through inflammatory rhetoric on China and immigration to appeal to nationalists.
Her economic security vision also faces practical challenges. Despite her efforts to decouple from China, Japan remains heavily reliant on Chinese trade—over 20% of its exports go there. Balancing economic interdependence with strategic decoupling will be a major test of her administration’s credibility and capacity.
Regional Implications
A More Assertive Japan in a Tense Asia Sanae Takaichi’s ascent to the premiership in October 2025 heralds a more assertive Japanese foreign policy that promises to reshape the geopolitical dynamics of Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Her hawkish vision, characterised by military modernisation, a confrontational stance toward China, and deepened integration into minilateral security frameworks, positions Japan as a central player in countering regional threats. However, this assertive posture also risks exacerbating tensions with historical adversaries, complicating alliances, and testing Japan’s ability to balance strategic ambition with diplomatic pragmatism. The regional implications of Takaichi’s policies are profound, affecting Japan’s relations with China, South Korea, Taiwan, and broader Indo-Pacific partners, while influencing the delicate balance of power in a region marked by great-power rivalry, historical grievances, and economic interdependence. Her leadership will determine whether Japan can emerge as a stabilising force or inadvertently escalate Asia’s already volatile security environment.
Japan-China Relations: A Trajectory of Escalation
Takaichi’s hardline stance toward China, rooted in her view of Beijing as Japan’s primary strategic rival, sets the stage for heightened tensions in bilateral relations. The long-standing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, a flashpoint for Sino-Japanese friction, has intensified under her leadership. Takaichi has advocated for increased JSDF patrols and surveillance operations around the islands, where Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing fleets have escalated incursions in recent years. Her administration’s 2025 defence white paper explicitly labels China’s maritime activities as a “direct threat” to Japan’s sovereignty, signalling a shift from diplomatic hedging to overt deterrence. Joint naval exercises with the United States, including large-scale drills planned for early 2026, aim to reinforce Japan’s claim to the islands and counter China’s regional assertiveness. These actions, while bolstering Japan’s strategic credibility, raise the risk of miscalculation, as military encounters in contested waters could spiral into broader conflict. Beyond territorial disputes, Takaichi’s economic security policies challenge China’s regional influence. Building on her tenure as Minister of State for Economic Security (2022–2024), she has prioritised decoupling critical supply chains—particularly semiconductors, rare earths, and advanced technologies—from Chinese dominance. Her government has proposed incentives for Japanese firms to relocate manufacturing to allied nations, such as India and Australia, while strengthening domestic production through partnerships with global tech leaders like TSMC. These measures align with the broader U.S.-led effort to curb China’s technological ascendancy but risk provoking economic retaliation from Beijing, which accounts for over 20 percent of Japan’s exports and remains a vital trading partner. Chinese state media have already warned of potential trade restrictions on Japanese goods, such as automobiles and electronics, in response to Takaichi’s policies, testing her ability to balance strategic decoupling with economic stability. Takaichi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, including a high-profile appearance in October 2025, further strain Japan-China relations. The shrine, which honours Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class-A war criminals, is viewed by Beijing as a symbol of Japan’s unrepentant militarism. China’s foreign ministry condemned Takaichi’s visit as “an affront to historical justice,” signalling potential diplomatic and economic repercussions. These gestures, while galvanising nationalist support at home, undermine Japan’s efforts to engage China in regional dialogues, such as those on maritime safety or economic cooperation. Takaichi’s rhetoric, including her controversial remarks on the Chinese diaspora as a potential security risk, adds another layer of friction, amplifying perceptions of Japan as adopting an exclusionary posture. The cumulative effect of these policies risks isolating Japan diplomatically, as Beijing may leverage its economic clout to pressure Tokyo into moderation.Japan-South Korea Relations: Historical Sensitivities and Strategic Alignment.
Takaichi’s leadership also complicates Japan’s relationship with South Korea, a critical U.S. ally and partner in countering North Korean aggression. While her administration has endorsed trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation, emphasising joint missile defence and intelligence-sharing, her historical revisionism undermines these efforts. Her Yasukuni visits and reluctance to address unresolved wartime issues—such as compensation for Korean forced labourers and “comfort women”—have reignited tensions with Seoul. South Korean leaders, sensitive to domestic public opinion, have publicly criticised Takaichi’s actions, with President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration warning that historical disputes could jeopardise trilateral initiatives. This friction threatens to weaken the 2023 Camp David summit framework, which aimed to institutionalise U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation, particularly in response to North Korea’s missile tests and China’s regional ambitions. Takaichi’s hawkish policies, however, offer opportunities for alignment with South Korea on security matters. Both nations face shared threats from Pyongyang’s nuclear program and Chinese maritime activities, creating incentives for collaboration. Takaichi has signalled willingness to expand joint military exercises and intelligence-sharing, building on agreements like the 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Yet, her refusal to moderate her nationalist rhetoric or engage in meaningful historical reconciliation risks alienating Seoul, where public sentiment remains deeply sceptical of Japan’s intentions. South Korea’s domestic political volatility, with opposition parties leveraging anti-Japan sentiment, further complicates Takaichi’s efforts to forge a united front. Without diplomatic concessions, Japan’s ability to strengthen trilateral cooperation may falter, undermining its strategic objectives in Northeast Asia. Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific: A Bold but Risky Alignment
Takaichi’s vocal support for Taiwan marks a significant departure from Japan’s traditionally cautious approach to cross-strait relations. She has advocated for enhanced Tokyo-Taipei ties, including potential defence dialogues, economic partnerships, and Japan’s inclusion in multilateral frameworks supporting Taiwan’s security. Her public statements framing Taiwan’s stability as integral to Japan’s own—echoing Abe’s 2021 remark that “a Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency”—signal a willingness to challenge China’s red lines. This stance aligns Japan closely with U.S. efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defences, particularly through initiatives like the Chip 4 Alliance, which includes Japan, the U.S., South Korea, and Taiwan to secure semiconductor supply chains. Takaichi’s government has also explored humanitarian contingency plans for a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, including refugee evacuation protocols, reflecting a proactive approach to regional stability. While this pro-Taiwan posture strengthens Japan’s role in U.S.-led containment strategies, it significantly escalates tensions with China. Beijing views any move to legitimise Taiwan’s international status as a violation of its One China policy, and Takaichi’s policies risk provoking military or economic retaliation. Chinese naval exercises near Taiwan and Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, intensified in 2025, underscore the potential for escalation. Moreover, Japan’s economic interdependence with China complicates Takaichi’s strategy, as punitive measures from Beijing could disrupt critical trade flows. Balancing support for Taiwan with the need to avoid confrontation will test Takaichi’s diplomatic acumen, particularly as domestic constituencies demand economic stability alongside strategic assertiveness. Indo-Pacific Alliances: Strengthening the Quad and Beyond
Takaichi’s leadership bolsters Japan’s role in minilateral frameworks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which she views as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific security. Her administration has prioritised expanding the Quad’s scope beyond maritime security to include technology-sharing, climate resilience, and infrastructure development to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Joint naval exercises, such as the 2025 Malabar drills, have been scaled up under her leadership, with Japan advocating for greater Indian Ocean presence to secure critical sea lanes. Takaichi has also pushed for deeper economic integration within the Quad, promoting initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to rival China’s regional trade networks. Beyond the Quad, Takaichi seeks to expand Japan’s partnerships with ASEAN nations, Australia, and the United Kingdom, leveraging frameworks like AUKUS to enhance technological and defence cooperation. Her government has prioritised capacity-building programs for Southeast Asian nations, offering maritime security training and infrastructure investments to counter Chinese influence in the South China Sea. These efforts align with Japan’s broader goal of fostering a networked security architecture, but they face challenges from ASEAN’s preference for non-alignment and wariness of great-power rivalries. Takaichi’s assertive rhetoric, particularly on China, may also deter some regional partners wary of being drawn into U.S.-China tensions. Navigating Risks and Opportunities
Challenges and Critiques
The Limits of Takaichi’s ApproachSanae Takaichi’s hawkish foreign policy, while ambitious in its aim to reposition Japan as a proactive great power in the Indo-Pacific, faces significant domestic and international constraints that threaten to undermine its efficacy. Her vision of constitutional reform, military modernisation, and assertive diplomacy must navigate a complex landscape of internal political divisions, regional diplomatic backlash, and structural economic and demographic challenges. Domestically, opposition from pacifist factions, coalition tensions, and public scepticism over economic priorities pose formidable hurdles. Internationally, her provocative stances—particularly on historical issues and China—risk isolating Japan diplomatically, while economic interdependence with Beijing complicates her strategic decoupling efforts. These challenges, combined with the broader geopolitical uncertainties of a second Trump administration and a volatile Indo-Pacific, test Takaichi’s ability to translate her ideological convictions into sustainable policy outcomes, raising questions about the long-term viability of her assertive approach. Domestic Constraints: Political Divisions and Coalition Fragility
Takaichi’s push for constitutional revision, particularly the amendment of Article 9 to formalise the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) as a national military, encounters significant domestic resistance. Japan’s postwar pacifist ethos, deeply ingrained in public consciousness and institutionalised through the 1947 Constitution, remains a powerful counterforce to her nationalist agenda. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the main opposition, has vocally criticised her proposals as reckless, arguing that remilitarization risks entangling Japan in regional conflicts and eroding its moral standing as a pacifist nation. Public opinion is similarly divided: while nationalist segments of the electorate, galvanised by Takaichi’s rhetoric, support a stronger military posture, polls indicate that a significant portion of Japanese citizens—particularly younger and urban demographics—favour maintaining constitutional constraints to avoid escalation in Asia’s tense security environment. This ambivalence poses a political challenge, as Takaichi must balance her ideological base with broader voter anxieties to maintain the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) electoral dominance. The LDP’s coalition with Komeito, a pacifist-leaning party rooted in Buddhist principles, presents another critical obstacle. Komeito, a junior partner in the ruling coalition since 1999, has historically acted as a brake on the LDP’s militarist ambitions, advocating restraint in defence policy and prioritising social welfare. Takaichi’s accelerated push for defence spending and constitutional reform has strained this alliance, with Komeito leaders expressing concerns over the pace and scope of her proposals. In early 2025, Komeito briefly threatened to withdraw from the coalition amid fallout from the LDP’s political funding scandal, highlighting the fragility of their partnership. While Takaichi has sought to placate Komeito with assurances of continued social spending, her reliance on ultraconservative factions within the LDP—many aligned with the Nippon Kaigi lobby—risks alienating her coalition partner. Should Komeito defect or demand significant concessions, Takaichi may be forced to seek support from far-right parties like Sanseito, a move that could further polarise Japanese politics and undermine her government’s stability. Economic and demographic challenges further complicate Takaichi’s agenda. Japan’s economy, burdened by persistent inflation, a depreciating yen, and rising energy costs, faces mounting pressure to deliver tangible relief to households. Her “Sanaenomics” platform, which builds on Shinzo Abe’s fiscal stimulus and structural reforms, prioritises investments in technology and defence but struggles to address immediate voter concerns like wage stagnation and cost-of-living increases. Japan’s ageing population and shrinking workforce, with over 29 percent of citizens aged 65 or older in 2025, exacerbate these challenges, straining pension systems and limiting economic growth potential. Takaichi’s emphasis on defence spending and strategic decoupling from China risks diverting resources from social programs, alienating voters who prioritise economic security over geopolitical ambition. Her controversial rhetoric on immigration, including warnings about the Chinese diaspora as a security risk, has also drawn criticism for undermining efforts to address labour shortages through foreign workers, further complicating Japan’s demographic crisis. International Critiques: Diplomatic Isolation and Regional Tensions
On the international stage, Takaichi’s policies risk isolating Japan diplomatically, particularly in East Asia. Her regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, including a prominent appearance in October 2025, have provoked sharp rebukes from China and South Korea, where the shrine’s association with Japan’s wartime atrocities remains a potent symbol of unresolved historical grievances. Beijing’s foreign ministry labelled the visit a “deliberate provocation,” while South Korea’s government issued formal protests, warning that such actions undermine trust in trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. These reactions threaten to derail Takaichi’s efforts to strengthen regional security frameworks, as historical sensitivities limit South Korea’s willingness to deepen military coordination. China, meanwhile, has hinted at economic retaliation, such as targeted tariffs on Japanese exports, which could exacerbate Japan’s economic vulnerabilities given its reliance on Chinese markets. Takaichi’s strident anti-China rhetoric and pro-Taiwan stance further complicate Japan’s regional diplomacy. Her advocacy for enhanced Tokyo-Taipei ties, including potential defence dialogues, aligns Japan with U.S. containment strategies but invites Beijing’s ire, risking military escalation in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese naval exercises near Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and increased coast guard activity around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2025 underscore the potential for conflict, particularly as Takaichi’s government ramps up JSDF patrols. While her policies bolster Japan’s strategic credibility within the U.S.-led alliance system, they strain relations with ASEAN nations, many of which prioritise non-alignment and economic ties with China. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, wary of being drawn into U.S.-China rivalries, may resist Japan’s push for deeper security cooperation, limiting the effectiveness of Takaichi’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States, Japan’s most critical ally, presents both an opportunity and a challenge. Takaichi’s commitment to increasing defence contributions and aligning with U.S. priorities strengthens the bilateral alliance, particularly under a second Trump administration that demands greater burden-sharing. However, Washington’s transactional approach to alliances, coupled with pressures for Japan to open its markets further or align on technology restrictions against China, creates friction. Takaichi’s emphasis on economic security, including protecting Japan’s industrial base, may clash with U.S. expectations, risking tensions within the alliance. Moreover, her hardline rhetoric on immigration and diaspora communities has drawn international criticism for undermining Japan’s soft power, particularly among Asian neighbours who view such policies as exclusionary. Balancing Ambition with Pragmatism.
Takaichi’s hawkish vision, while galvanising nationalist support, faces a delicate balancing act. Domestically, she must navigate coalition dynamics, public scepticism, and economic pressures to sustain her government’s legitimacy. The LDP’s weakened position after the 2024 and 2025 electoral losses, combined with ongoing fallout from the funding scandal, limits her political capital, requiring careful coalition management to avoid further fragmentation. Internationally, her provocative stances risk alienating key partners and escalating tensions in an already volatile region. Japan’s economic interdependence with China, which accounts for a significant share of its trade, constrains her ability to pursue outright confrontation, necessitating pragmatic diplomacy to mitigate economic fallout. The broader geopolitical context, including the Russia-Ukraine conflict and uncertainties in U.S. policy, further complicates her agenda, as Japan must avoid entrapment in great-power rivalries while asserting its strategic autonomy. Takaichi’s ability to overcome these challenges will determine whether her premiership can fulfil its promise of transforming Japan into a “normal” great power. Her success hinges on reconciling ideological ambition with practical governance, forging consensus within a fractious political landscape, and navigating Asia’s complex security environment without precipitating unintended escalation. The following conclusion will assess the broader implications of her leadership for Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific order, weighing the potential for strategic renewal against the risks of regional instability.
Conclusion
Sanae Takaichi’s ascension to the premiership in October 2025 marks a defining moment in Japan’s postwar trajectory, positioning the nation at a crossroads between its pacifist past and an assertive future as a “normal” great power. Her hawkish vision, rooted in Shinzo Abe’s nationalist legacy, seeks to transform Japan into a proactive leader in the Indo-Pacific, with a robust military, strengthened alliances, and a resolute stance against regional adversaries like China and North Korea. Yet, her leadership faces formidable challenges—domestic political divisions, coalition fragility, economic pressures, and diplomatic tensions—that test her ability to translate ideological ambition into sustainable policy outcomes. Amid these obstacles, Takaichi’s deep attachment to traditional Japanese culture and the concept of honour, exemplified by her reverence for institutions like the Yasukuni Shrine and her commitment to national pride, offers a compelling foundation for her leadership, resonating with a populace seeking identity and resilience in a turbulent global order. Whether she can harness these cultural strengths to navigate Japan’s complex challenges will determine her legacy and the nation’s trajectory in an increasingly contested Asia.Takaichi’s premiership confronts a multifaceted domestic landscape. The push to revise Article 9 and accelerate defence spending, while appealing to nationalist factions, faces resistance from pacifist constituencies and the LDP’s coalition partner, Komeito, whose reluctance to endorse rapid remilitarization threatens government stability. Public opinion, shaped by decades of pacifist norms, remains sceptical of policies that risk regional escalation, particularly as economic challenges—persistent inflation, a depreciating yen, and a shrinking workforce—demand immediate attention. Takaichi’s “Sanaenomics,” with its focus on crisis-responsive spending and technological innovation, must balance defence priorities with voter demands for economic relief, a task complicated by Japan’s ageing demographic and labour shortages. Her controversial rhetoric on immigration, framing diaspora communities as potential security risks, further polarises domestic discourse, undermining efforts to address demographic decline through inclusive policies. These internal constraints require Takaichi to forge a delicate consensus within a fractious political system, where the LDP’s weakened electoral position and lingering fallout from funding scandals limit her political capital.Internationally, Takaichi’s assertive posture risks diplomatic isolation. Her regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a symbol of Japan’s wartime past, have drawn sharp condemnation from China and South Korea, jeopardising historical grievances and tensions that undermine trilateral security cooperation with the United States. Her hardline stance on China, including intensified patrols around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and advocacy for Taiwan, aligns Japan with U.S. containment strategies but invites economic and military retaliation from Beijing, testing Japan’s resilience given its trade dependence on China. The broader Indo-Pacific landscape, marked by ASEAN’s non-alignment and uncertainties in U.S. alliance dynamics under a transactional second Trump administration, further complicates her efforts to position Japan as a regional leader. Balancing these diplomatic challenges with her commitment to deepening frameworks like the Quad and fostering partnerships with ASEAN and Australia requires a pragmatism that her hawkish rhetoric may struggle to sustain.Yet, amidst these challenges, Takaichi’s attachment to traditional Japanese culture and the concept of honour provides a powerful anchor for her leadership. Her reverence for the Yasukuni Shrine, while controversial abroad, resonates deeply with conservative voters who view it as a tribute to Japan’s historical sacrifices and a reaffirmation of national dignity. This commitment to honour, rooted in values of duty, resilience, and cultural continuity, reflects a broader vision of Japan as a nation that draws strength from its heritage. Takaichi’s emphasis on traditional values—evident in her past support for educational reforms promoting national pride—offers a unifying narrative in a society grappling with economic uncertainty and demographic decline. By framing Japan’s strategic ambitions within this cultural context, she taps into a sense of collective identity that bolsters domestic support for her policies, particularly among nationalist constituencies. Her invocation of honour also informs her foreign policy, casting Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy as a moral imperative to safeguard sovereignty and contribute to a rules-based Indo-Pacific order.This cultural grounding, however, must be wielded with nuance to avoid exacerbating regional tensions. Takaichi’s ability to channel traditional values into a forward-looking agenda—bridging nationalist fervour with inclusive governance—will be critical to overcoming domestic divisions. Internationally, her leadership must navigate the fine line between asserting Japan’s identity and fostering cooperation with neighbours sensitive to historical wounds. The success of her vision hinges on reconciling these cultural strengths with pragmatic diplomacy, ensuring that her commitment to honour does not alienate key partners or escalate conflicts. For instance, moderating the tone of her Yasukuni visits or engaging in symbolic gestures of reconciliation with South Korea could mitigate diplomatic fallout while preserving her nationalist credentials.
Title Image Courtesy: NBC
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and the Defence Research and Studies
References :
- Asahi Shimbun. 2025. “Takaichi’s Yasukuni Visit Sparks Regional Tensions.” Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 2025.
(Source for Takaichi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits and reactions from China and South Korea.) - Auslin, Michael. 2023. The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
(Source for broader Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics and Japan’s role.) - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2024. “Japan’s Political Instability: The LDP’s Funding Scandal and Electoral Fallout.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 15, 2024.
(Source for LDP vulnerabilities, funding scandal, and coalition tensions with Komeito.) - Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 2025. “Japan’s Defence Modernisation Under Takaichi: Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” CSIS Briefs, October 30, 2025.
(Source for Takaichi’s defence policies, Article 9 revision, and Quad developments.) - Drifte, Reinhard. 2022. Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Columbia University Press.
(Source for Abe’s security legislation and Japan’s evolving defence posture.) - Foreign Affairs. 2025. “ASEAN’s Balancing Act: Navigating U.S.-China Rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2025.
(Source for ASEAN’s non-alignment and Japan’s regional partnerships.) - Green, Michael J. 2020. Line of Advantage: Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Era of Abe Shinzo. New York: Columbia University Press.
(Source for Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and alliance-building.) - Japan Times. 2025. “Takaichi’s China Policy: Escalation in the Senkaku Dispute.” The Japan Times, November 5, 2025.
(Source for Japan-China tensions and Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes.) - Kingston, Jeff. 2024. Japan in Transformation, 1945–2020. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.
(Source for Japan’s postwar political evolution and Abe’s nationalist legacy.) - Nikkei Asia. 2025. “Sanaenomics: Takaichi’s Economic Vision Faces Demographic Headwinds.” Nikkei Asia, October 25, 2025.
(Source for Takaichi’s economic policies and demographic challenges.) - Pyle, Kenneth B. 2022. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York: PublicAffairs.
(Source for Japan’s remilitarization and Abe’s constitutional reform efforts.) - Reuters. 2025. “Japan’s Economic Challenges: Inflation, Yen Depreciation, and Takaichi’s Response.” Reuters, October 18, 2025.
(Source for economic pressures, inflation, and demographic issues.) - Smith, Sheila A. 2021. Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Source for Japan’s defence modernisation and Abe’s security policies.) - The Diplomat. 2025. “Takaichi’s Taiwan Stance: A New Flashpoint in Japan-China Relations.” The Diplomat, November 10, 2025.
(Source for Takaichi’s pro-Taiwan policies and cross-strait dynamics.) - Yomiuri Shimbun. 2025. “Takaichi’s Leadership Victory: The LDP’s Return to Nationalism.” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5, 2025
