Brunei Darussalam displays intriguing behaviour regarding the South China Sea dispute, having never protested China’s expansionist agenda in the region. Concurrently, Brunei’s economic diplomacy with China is on the rise, with significant Chinese investments in some of its largest companies. This research aims to examine Brunei’s attitude towards the South China Sea dispute, specifically whether its silence is influenced by its economic ties with China and the long-term implications of this relationship. A qualitative method based on the behaviour of small states in international relations provides the theoretical framework and justification for Brunei’s actions. Additionally, a comparative analysis method is used to draw out further implications of this economic diplomacy. The findings indicate that while Brunei’s silence may currently work in its favour, such dependency on China might lead to losses on Brunei’s part. Consequently, Brunei needs to seek other alternatives.

Introduction

The South China Sea dispute is a major international conflict involving numerous countries and covering an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometres. This region includes many islands, reefs, rocks, shoals, and cays, and has long been claimed by China through its Nine-Dash Line. China’s military presence and the construction of artificial islands in the region have aggravated several countries whose Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), overlap with the Nine-Dash Line. These countries include Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Taiwan. While many of these nations have taken strong stances against China’s interference, Brunei has maintained a notably quiet and different approach. Despite being a member of UNCLOS and having the Louisa Reef within its EEZ, Brunei has not been vocal about its claims in the South China Sea. The Louisa Reef, part of the Spratly Islands, falls within China’s Nine-Dash Line. Concurrently, Brunei’s bilateral trade with China has been increasing, and China is one of the largest foreign investors in the country. This research aims to explore the potential correlation between Brunei’s silence on China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea and its growing economic diplomacy with China and looks at some of its pitfalls. (Buszynski & Sazlan, 2007; Gao & Jia, 2013; Putra & Read, 2021; US EIA, n.d.)

The working hypothesis developed for the research is: “Brunei’s economic diplomacy with China influences its silence regarding its territorial claims in the South China Sea.” 

Research Questions

The research paper will proceed to keep in mind the following research questions:

• Has China’s economic diplomacy with Brunei affected its non-confrontational stance over the South China Sea dispute?
•  How do the economic relations between Russia and Ukraine before the Crimean War of 2014 compare to the current economic relations between China and Brunei, and what are the implications of these strategies on the respective territorial disputes?
• What are the implications for Brunei in the context of Brunei-China economic diplomacy?
• What kind of small-state behaviour does Brunei display regarding China when it comes to the South China Sea dispute? 

Research Methodology 

The research employs a qualitative method. The theoretical framework focuses on small states’ behaviour in international relations. A case study of Russia-Ukraine economic relations pre-2014 Crimean annexation is given to support a comparative analysis of Brunei-China and Ukraine-Russia relations. The resources include prior publications on Brunei’s economic relations with China and the South China Sea dispute, recent news from The Hindu and Xinhua, and official documents from government websites.

Literature Review

Defining a ‘small state’ involves various criteria. Archer, Bailes, and Wivel (2014) describe them as weaker parties in asymmetric relationships, with limitations in territory, population, economy, or military capacity. Small states need a peaceful international system. They often face external threats, require security guarantees and have limited economic negotiation capacity. Security strategies of small states include neutrality, bandwagoning, soft balancing, hard balancing, appeasement, and strategic hedging (Castro, 2022; Vaicekauskaitė, 2017).

Brunei’s approach to the South China Sea dispute contrasts with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as it has never been vocal about its claims and prefers bilateral negotiations, aligning with China’s approach. It signed the UNCLOS in May 1984 (Roach, 2014; Putra & Read, 2021; Prasetya, 2024). Brunei resolved territorial disputes with Malaysia in 2009 and has pursued economic liberalization, signing the RCEP and maintaining defence ties with the US, UK, and Singapore (Maharup et al., 2021; Izzuddin, 2021). 

Significant Chinese investments, including Hengyi Industries’ refinery and the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor, have boosted local employment. China has also developed Brunei’s digital infrastructure. However, concerns persist about China’s potential dominance over Brunei’s industries and resources, particularly regarding the oil-rich Louisa Reef. (Hamdan & Hoon, 2019; Druce & Julay, 2020; Elleman, 2017; Hoon & Zhao, 2023; Lim et al., 2023)

Link of Brunei’s SCS Strategy to Economic Diplomacy with China

There is no explicit mention in the existing literature that Brunei-China’s evolving economic diplomacy has initiated Brunei’s non-confrontational stance on the South China Sea. This stance aligns with the need for a peaceful international system by small states, as mentioned in the review. Despite being a member of the UNCLOS agreement, as mentioned in the review, Brunei’s silence, as highlighted by Putra (2021), is surprising. Putra, citing Oba (2019), argues that: 

“Brunei’s approach to foreign policy is an anomaly because state actors typically do not remain silent when another state or non-state actor unilaterally claims a significant portion of a state’s EEZ, especially when such claims are not supported by existing international law instruments.”

(Oba, 2019)

 Brunei’s dispute with Malaysia over land and maritime boundaries, resolved peacefully in 2009 (Maharup et al., 2021), reflects its commitment to resolving critical issues through diplomacy. While maintaining diplomatic silence before the settlement, Brunei demonstrated its willingness for sovereignty rights and peaceful dispute resolution. This contrasts with its strategic shift in diplomatic approach toward China, further supporting Oba’s ‘foreign policy anomaly’. On November 16, 2023, Xi Jinping emphasized China and Brunei’s collaboration for joint maritime development and South China Sea stability (Xinhua, 2023), indicating Brunei’s reluctance to diplomatically assert its claims.

On September 2, 2023, Brunei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement advocating a two-step approach in the South China Sea, calling for peaceful dialogue and consultations under international law, including UNCLOS. This method, also favoured by China (MFA, Brunei Darussalam, 2023; Prasetya, 2024), raises questions about whether Brunei’s stance aims to appease China or stems from a belief in bilateral effectiveness. This approach contrasts with other Southeast Asian claimants: the Philippines and Vietnam signed coast guard cooperation agreements on January 30, 2024, while Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim advocated for a multilateral ASEAN approach during a visit to the Philippines on March 1, 2023 (the government of the Philippines, 2023; The Hindu, 2024).

Additionally, Brunei’s willingness to cooperate with China, as reported by Xinhua, reflects its preference for a peaceful, cooperative stance, verifying the MFA’s statement: 

“…all countries concerned need to promote a calm, peaceful and conducive environment, building confidence and enhancing mutual trust in the region.” (MFA, Brunei Darussalam, 2023).

Brunei-China Bilateral Trade 1992-2021 (US$ million). Source: Hoon & Zhao (2023)

Examining the bilateral trade data given in the literature review reveals a consistent upward trajectory, despite occasional downturns, between the two countries. This growth is primarily driven by Brunei’s active engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), apart from FTAs like the RCEP and the ASEAN-China FTA. Chinese investments have strategically aligned with Brunei’s national development goals, particularly under ‘Wawasan Brunei 2035′, focusing on economic diversification and job creation (the Wawasan Brunei was announced to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and promote a sustainable, diversified economy). Notable projects include the establishment of Hengyi Industries’ oil refinery and petrochemical plant, the Muara Port expansion, and initiatives within the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor (BGEC). These efforts have seen substantial Chinese investments in sectors such as agriculture, aquaculture, halal food and digital infrastructure, contributing significantly to Brunei’s economic landscape. The investments promise over ten thousand local jobs. The economic benefits of these initiatives have been acknowledged by Brunei in the Borneo Bulletin Yearbook 2022. (Hamdan & Hoon, 2019; Druce & Julay, 2020; Embassy of the PRC, Brunei Darussalam, 2022; Hoon & Zhao, 2023)

Based on a thorough analysis of Brunei’s conduct in the South China Sea dispute, coupled with the extensive economic diplomacy between Brunei and China—which has evidently brought substantial benefits to Brunei—and considering the behaviour of small states as discussed in the literature review (highlighting their need for security guarantees from great powers and their economic vulnerabilities), it can be safely inferred that Brunei’s economic diplomacy with China significantly influences its silence regarding its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is an ardent proponent of economic liberalisation and hence desires for a peaceful environment in the South China Sea region. Also, the vocal claimants on this issue, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, have faced coercion and alleged espionage from China in the past. It is only pertinent in such cases that the silence can at least stop coercive measures from taking place. (Izzuddin, 2021; Priyandita, 2023)

Case study: Russia-Ukraine’s Economic Relations Before the War

Hirschman’s theory explains Ukraine’s economic relations with Russia, where asymmetric relations give the larger power political benefits. In 2011, Russia comprised nearly 28% of Ukraine’s trade, while Ukraine represented less than 5% of Russia’s trade, primarily in energy. Russia made attempts to integrate Ukraine into economic organisations:  the CIS Economic Union, 1995 CIS Customs Union, where Ukraine faced excise duty pressures on oil and gas imports until it agreed to join the organisation; the Eurasian Economic Community and the 2003 Common Economic Space. But Ukraine with its tactics never applied for full membership in any of them and admitted itself in a way that let it take advantage. However, Ukraine never achieved an FTA with Russia. After two decades of failed strategic economic coercion, Russia shifted to actual coercion with the 2014 Crimean annexation. (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016) 

A Comparative Analysis of the Russia-Ukraine and China-Brunei Cases

Russia-Ukraine economic relations differed significantly from China-Brunei. Russia used economic coercion, imposing excise duties on gas and oil to push Ukraine to join the CIS Customs Union in 1995. This was driven by a desire for deeper integration, influenced by Soviet legacy and countering Western influence (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2016). In contrast, China engages Brunei through bilateral trade and BRI investments, with a softer approach due to geographic proximity and strategic interests in the South China Sea. While both powers have motives, China’s actions are less aggressive compared to Russia’s pre-Crimean War intentions with Ukraine.

The case study suggests that extreme economic coercion may backfire, potentially destabilizing the coerced state and pushing it towards the opposing side. China’s softer approach in Brunei aims to achieve long-term goals, such as expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and fostering cooperation on South China Sea issues. Zhexin (2016) argues that China aims to mitigate the South China Sea disputes’ impact on China-ASEAN relations by refraining from aggressive actions during crises, aiming instead for a ‘community of common destiny’ in the region.

There are clear asymmetries in the economic relationships between Brunei and China: China holds a 20.1% share of Brunei’s exports, while Brunei’s share in China’s exports is only 0.02% (World Bank, n.d.), giving China a political advantage under Hirschman’s theory. Both cases focus on a single commodity: energy in Russia-Ukraine and petroleum products in Brunei-China (OEC, n.d.), highlighting the vulnerability of smaller states. Dragneva & Wolczuk (2016) suggest that Hirschman’s theory may not apply straightforwardly, as small states can manoeuvre through defence deals and trade agreements, as seen with Brunei’s engagements with the US and UK. But ultimately, larger states like Russia, with its actions leading to the Crimean War, and China, leveraging economic investments and soft power tools like digital infrastructure (Hoon & Zhao, 2023), maintain advantageous positions. This means that China has the potential to leverage this economic diplomacy for territorial gains in the South China Sea. 

Potential Implications for Brunei

One implication from the existing literature is the rise of Sinophobia among Bruneian workers. Interviews by Hoon and Zhao (2023) reveal fears that Chinese investments might dominate Brunei’s economy or even lead to territorial encroachment. This fear may stem from a lack of public information, awareness of China’s expansionist policies, or genuine concerns about Chinese actions.

The interview at Hiseaton Fisheries conducted by Lim et al. (2023) highlights that most products are for export. Hengyi Industries employs 1600 Chinese expatriates in the petrochemical plant, potentially affecting local employment (Druce & Julay, 2020). However, the Belt and Road Portal clarifies that this is temporary. Future plans include training Bruneian students at Zhejiang University, China and interning at Chinese petrochemical companies before working at the plant. Unskilled labour is an issue for Chinese industries in Brunei (BRI portal, 2018; Hoon & Zhao, 2023). China’s proposal to train the Bruneians for employment generation in the country highlights its extension of soft power in the country, trying to enhance people-to-people ties. 

Economic ties between Brunei and China are complex. The largest Chinese investment is the Hengyi Industries’ petrochemical plant (Lim et al., 2023). As of 2022, over 95% of Brunei’s exports to China were petroleum products (OEC, n.d.). Although China claims its vision aligns with Wawasan Brunei 2035 (Embassy of the PRC, Brunei Darussalam, 2022), this reliance on petroleum exports contradicts Brunei’s goals of economic diversification and sustainability.

Louisa Reef, a rich source of offshore oil reserves, adds even more complexity. China’s presence in the Spratly Islands (of which Louisa Reef is a part) could jeopardize Brunei’s oil reserves. Considering Beijing claims as much as 43,272 square kilometres of Brunei’s EEZ, based on its current projection of the Nine-dash line (Elleman, 2017), the silence could lead to significant loss of other marine resources, apart from the oil reserves. Other regional examples, such as economic coercion from China faced by the Philippines and Vietnam and cyber espionage allegations by the same against Malaysia (Priyandita, 2023), highlight potential risks. Thus, Brunei’s silence puts it in an advantageous position in terms of national interest, avoiding economic coercion as well. But it also requires careful navigation so that the short-term advantages are not outweighed by long-term negative implications. 

Small State Behaviour of Brunei with Regards to China

Many scholars argue that Brunei employs strategic hedging in its foreign policy, evidenced by its defence agreements with the US, the UK, and Singapore, and its membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (Izzuddin, 2021). However, Brunei has adopted a policy of appeasement toward China. Appeasement involves a state’s efforts to pacify or placate a rising power by making unilateral diplomatic and strategic concessions (Castro, 2022). Brunei’s silence on the South China Sea issue, while benefiting from Chinese investments, infrastructure projects, trade, and employment training, exemplifies such diplomatic concessions. 

Conclusion

Brunei’s silence on the South China Sea dispute is exceptional compared to other Southeast Asian claimants who assert sovereignty and protest Chinese expansion. Although Brunei advocates adherence to UNCLOS laws, it primarily seeks a peaceful environment built on mutual trust. Its economic diplomacy with China advances Brunei’s Wawasan 2035 vision, aiding economic diversification, industry development, employment, and people-to-people ties. This diplomacy influences Brunei’s reticence due to the economic benefits it enjoys and the economic repercussions faced by more vocal claimants, supporting the hypothesis at the start of this paper.

Brunei exemplifies small-state behaviour: preferring a peaceful international system, relying on major powers’ security guarantees, and being vulnerable to economic pressures. Brunei’s stance can be seen as appeasement towards China. However, Brunei’s long-term intentions regarding the South China Sea dispute remain unclear. China gains a strategic political advantage through this diplomacy, potentially leveraging it for territorial gains in the disputed region.

The economic relations between Brunei and China have some long-term negative implications. There is a growing overreliance on petroleum products for trade, overexploitation of existing oil reserves, the risk of finished products being exported and a potential loss of an offshore area of 43,272 square kilometres rich in oil reserves and marine resources. Additionally, there is rising Sinophobia among the Bruneian public. Although it might simply stem from a lack of governmental communication about China’s intentions, concerns over China advancing its interests in other countries, especially through the BRI are always a possibility.

Brunei is in a delicate position, primarily because its major economic sources are highly unsustainable. It needs to develop its economy in a self-sustaining way and reduce its traditional dependence on hydrocarbons. Additionally, Brunei faces a shortage of skilled employment. Focusing on sectors such as tourism, renewable energy, blue economy and vocational training can help mitigate its dependence on China. Diversifying its economic partners and foreign direct investment (FDI) sources to include emerging giants outside the Asia-Pacific region, such as India, which supports multilateralism, would also be beneficial. This diversification would help Brunei reduce its economic dependence on China and enhance its ability to retain sovereignty in the disputed region. It is crucial for Brunei not to put its sovereignty at stake for the sake of economic dependence on a powerful nation.

This paper highlights the importance of balancing the benefits of a nation and maintaining sovereignty, especially in the context of small states. While economic benefits are important, especially for states which are exposed to economic vulnerabilities, sovereignty gives self-determination and political stability in the long run. 

Title image courtesy: Wikipedia Commons

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

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