The strategic autonomy of West Asia is defined by a balancing act, where the countries in the region maintain pragmatic relationships with global powers like the United States, China, and Russia and to avoid conflicts.

The Shifting Sands of West Asia

In the last few years, West Asia has witnessed a remarkable transformation in its strategic and political landscape. The Abraham Accords (2020) helped Israel and several Arab states diffuse decades of hostility and open a path for economic cooperation and security adjustments. Following the Accords, Israel signed normalisation agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Bahrain, signalling a move from confrontation to pragmatic coexistence.

Similarly, in 2023, China brokered a historic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, bridging the long-standing sectarian and ideological divide between the two regional powers. This diplomatic reset has lowered regional tensions and created space for new cooperative mechanisms.

China’s growing engagement in West Asia—through mediation, economic investment, and infrastructure development—has allowed regional countries to diversify their foreign policy and reduce dependence on the U.S.-dominated security architecture, which now seems more concentrated on the Indo-Pacific.

In this evolving landscape, India faces both challenges and opportunities. New frameworks such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) signal Delhi’s intent to strengthen connectivity, defence cooperation, and energy partnerships. However, to secure its interests, India must act swiftly to counter the emerging China–West Asia alignment, or risk being sidelined in the region’s strategic and economic supply chains that link West Asia to South Asia.

The New Architecture of Power: From Bipolar Rivalries to Multipolar Bargains

West Asia’s geopolitical order is undergoing a paradigm shift—from bipolar confrontation to multipolar cooperation. The region, once marked by endless rivalries and wars, is now pivoting towards strategic pragmatism. States are increasingly prioritising economic diversification, connectivity, and technological advancement over ideological conflicts.

For the first time in decades, regional actors no longer view the United States as the sole security provider. Instead, they are diversifying partnerships through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, deepening economic ties with China, Russia, and India.

The normalisation of relations between Israel and several Arab states is a cornerstone of this new order. Diplomatic missions have reopened, direct flights have resumed, and trade channels are expanding—indicating a regional shift toward mutual economic benefit. Meanwhile, the Iran–Saudi rapprochement, facilitated by China, has reduced sectarian tensions and reopened channels for investment and regional cooperation.

These developments are driven by three defining forces:

• Chinese Economic Diplomacy: Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has established a network of investments and infrastructure projects that extend China’s influence and position it as a peace guarantor.
• Normalisation in Arab–Israel Relations: The Abraham Accords marked a new chapter, signalling a move from ideological divisions to pragmatic collaboration.
• Iran’s Diplomatic Re-engagement: Following its reconciliation with Riyadh, Tehran has sought to reassert its regional diplomacy and reintegrate into regional and global frameworks.

The new power dynamics in West Asia are no longer built on military alliances or ideological blocs, but on control of supply chains, energy security, and advanced technology access. The region’s strategic maritime chokepoints—the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal—remain vital arteries of global trade, reinforcing West Asia’s centrality to global energy and economic systems.

Today’s great power rivalries are defined not by ideological contestation, as in the Cold War, but by technological, logistical, and energy dominance. Accordingly, countries like the United States, Russia, and China now prefer partnership-based competition to confrontation.

Within this context, the United States is seeking to balance China’s growing influence by strengthening its regional partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and India, most notably through the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), envisioned as a counterweight to the BRI.

China’s Entry and the Strategic Vacuum: Redefining External Influence

China’s engagement in West Asia is neither abrupt nor opportunistic—it is the outcome of a carefully calibrated long-term strategy. Beijing’s mediation in the Iran–Saudi peace agreement in 2023 was the culmination of over a decade of economic and diplomatic groundwork.

As early as 2016, China and Saudi Arabia elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, deepening cooperation in energy, railways, and port development. The Gulf states—long dependent on U.S. security guarantees—now view China as a dependable partner for economic modernisation and energy demand.

Through its network of BRI-linked ports—from Gwadar (Pakistan) and Duqm (Oman) to Jizan (Saudi Arabia), Piraeus (Greece), and Venice (Italy)—China is building a transcontinental supply chain that anchors its influence across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Supported by state institutions like the China Development Bank, Silk Road Fund, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Beijing is transforming commercial ports into hubs of strategic presence.

This maritime architecture not only consolidates China’s energy security but also extends its potential dual-use (civil–military) infrastructure, creating unease in Washington and Delhi alike. Moreover, China’s strategic focus on West Asia coincides with its intent to divert U.S. attention toward the Indo-Pacific, thereby exploiting a security vacuum in the Gulf.

For the Gulf states, diversification has become a survival strategy. Even Saudi Arabia, long regarded as Washington’s closest regional ally, has deepened ties with Beijing through energy contracts, yuan-based oil trade, and investment in Vision 2030 projects. This multipolar engagement marks the decline of the U.S.-centric security order and the rise of economic pluralism.

For India, this evolving structure presents both a challenge and an opportunity—to either passively observe or redefine its role as an active stakeholder in West Asia’s emerging order.

India’s Stakes in the New West Asia

West Asia remains indispensable to India’s strategic and economic calculus. Three key factors define India’s stakes in the region:

• Energy Security: Over 60% of India’s crude oil imports come from West Asia, particularly Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the UAE. Any instability in this region directly affects India’s energy costs and economic stability.
• Diaspora and Remittances: More than 8 million Indians live and work across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, collectively remitting over $50 billion annually, making them a vital contributor to India’s foreign exchange reserves.
• Maritime Security: The Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz form the lifelines of India’s trade and energy routes. Any disruption here—due to conflict or piracy—poses serious economic and security risks.

Over the last decade, India’s approach has shifted from reactive diplomacy to proactive strategic engagement. Through its “Link West” policy, New Delhi has institutionalised regular high-level exchanges, expanded defence partnerships, and integrated West Asia into its Indian Ocean maritime strategy.

Defence exercises like Zayed Talwar (with the UAE) and Al-Mohed Al-Hindi (with Saudi Arabia) reflect India’s growing security cooperation with Gulf nations. The region’s perception of India has also evolved—from a labour-exporting country to a defence, technology, and investment partner.

By participating in multilateral platforms such as I2U2 (India–Israel–UAE–U.S.) and by engaging in new connectivity initiatives such as IMEC, India is positioning itself as a responsible stakeholder in shaping the region’s future.

Energy Security in Flux: From Oil Dependency to Strategic Diversification

Energy has long been the backbone of India’s engagement with West Asia, but the contours of this relationship are rapidly changing. As the world moves toward renewable energy and hydrogen-based solutions, India’s energy diplomacy is evolving from transactional trade to strategic collaboration.

India has begun forging long-term energy partnerships with Gulf countries—such as the ADNOC–IOC agreement and Aramco’s participation in the Ratnagiri refinery project—to ensure stability in oil supply. Simultaneously, it is exploring green hydrogen collaborations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, aligning with global decarbonization goals.

However, the rise of China as a dominant player in Gulf energy markets poses risks to India’s access and pricing leverage. With Chinese firms investing heavily in refineries, LNG terminals, and energy transport networks, Beijing is positioned to exert greater influence over global oil trade. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, India must expand its strategic petroleum reserves, diversify energy sourcing from Africa, the U.S., and Latin America, and enhance naval protection of energy sea routes.

Ultimately, India’s energy diplomacy must shift from short-term procurement to long-term strategic planning, emphasising co-production, technology sharing, and supply chain security with Gulf partners.

Defence Diplomacy and Security Architecture: From Buyer to Partner

India’s defence diplomacy in West Asia has evolved significantly in the past decade. It now involves joint military exercises, high-level visits, defence attaché postings, and maritime logistics agreements. India’s cooperation extends beyond conventional defence to cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and intelligence sharing, ensuring that its military presence complements its energy and trade interests.

A promising avenue for India lies in becoming a net security provider in the Western Indian Ocean. Through coordinated patrols with the UAE and Oman, and expanding its naval presence in Duqm, India can enhance maritime domain awareness and ensure freedom of navigation. Moreover, leveraging its Chabahar port in Iran could enable India to project connectivity toward Central Asia and counterbalance China’s BRI presence in Gwadar.

However, this shift requires a doctrinal transformation—from bilateral cooperation to regional defence frameworks. The proposed Indo-Abrahamic corridor, connecting India with Israel, the UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia, could provide a blueprint for this integrated security framework.

Conclusion: Towards a West Asia Strategy Doctrine

The security architecture of West Asia is no longer defined by rigid alliances or ideological divides. Instead, it is shaped by fluid coalitions, economic pragmatism, and technological interdependence. India’s strategic challenge is to preserve its autonomy while deepening defence, energy, and technological cooperation with multiple, and often rival, partners. What India needs is a coherent “West Asia Strategy Doctrine” built upon three pillars:

• Defence Diplomacy: Transitioning from a buyer to a security partner.
• Energy Resilience: Reducing dependence through diversification and renewables.
• Strategic Corridors: Leveraging IMEC and I2U2 to connect South Asia with Europe and Africa.

In the emerging world order, India’s future energy and security frontlines lie not along its borders but across the Arabian Sea. The ability to engage West Asia strategically will determine whether India remains a regional player—or emerges as a global power with true strategic autonomy.

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Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and the Defence Research and Studies