If Turkey is increasingly establishing itself as a pivotal power capable of bridging the gap between the Ukrainian discussions in Istanbul, the enthronement of Ahmed al-Shara in Syria, and finally the regional realignments that are leading it to reopen the issue of normalisation with Armenia, it is confirming its growing ambition to position itself as the Key player in neighbourhood diplomacy in the Middle East.
The “Sıfır Sorun” Policy with its Neighbours
The strategic doctrine of Sıfır Sorun, literally ‘zero problems’, should not be interpreted as the total abolition of conflicts or tensions. Rather, it refers to Turkey’s expectations regarding its relations with neighbouring countries 1. Founded in 1931 by Atatürk under the slogan ‘Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh’ (Peace at home, peace in the world). The idea that emerged was to limit disputes and prioritise diplomatic, economic and security cooperation. In other words, Ankara aimed to create a stable regional environment that would enable it to play its role as a pivotal power fully 2. The first two signs of this approach appeared in February 1934 with the signing of the Balkan Pact, bringing together Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania, then in July 1934 with the Sadabad Pact, involving Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.
This strategy is implemented in several concrete ways: mediation in regional conflicts, promotion of economic partnerships, and establishment of institutionalised dialogue with its immediate and wider neighbours. Turkey is thus striving to transform its strategic environment into an area of pragmatic cooperation, where neighbourhood diplomacy becomes a central
An Instrument of its Foreign Policy
We can observe a gradual shift in this doctrine, whose meaning and scope evolve with each successive foreign minister. However, it was with the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2009 that a ‘strategic depth’ emerged 3 through the ‘Yeni Dönemde Sıfır Sorun Politikası’ (Zero Problems Policy in the New Era). The communiqué of 21 March 2013, published on the occasion of 4 the Arab Spring, illustrates the turning point reached by Turkey:
Particularly since I took office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the principle of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ has become the most discussed principle in Turkish foreign policy. Literally speaking, this principle was a clear ideal model, but it also represented a notable shift in mentality in Turkish foreign policy. From now on, chronic disputes with its neighbours, which were draining its energy in regional and international relations, no longer dominate the Turkish foreign policy agenda…5
The New Syria: Testing Ground for Turkey’s Regional Strategy (Middle East)
The Syrian theatre provides the most compelling illustration of the mechanisms that structure Ankara’s neighbourhood policy. While Damascus recently celebrated the first anniversary of the fall of the Assad regime on 08 6 December, it should be remembered that interactions between Ankara and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ecosystem are by no means a last-minute phenomenon.
Since the early months following the Syrian uprising in 2013, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been establishing contacts with the opposition, and Ankara believes it can exert decisive influence over a constellation of predominantly Sunni movements with a view to extending its regional reach. 7
Ankara’s role in structuring Sunni rebel coalitions is particularly noteworthy, within which actors close to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have, at various times, found room for operational cooperation. The US Congress has also 8 referred to the existence of a ‘multifaceted relationship’ between Ankara 9 and these groups. This translates into significant material support, including the provision of drones and logistical assistance. This configuration has given Turkey considerable leverage in the Levant.
In short, the intensification of political contacts with the new Syrian authorities, now dominated by HTS, reflects a renewed diplomatic foothold. Following the overthrow of the Assad regime, this development has been reflected in the resumption of Turkish Airlines flights to Damascus, which had been suspended for more than ten years, and the reopening of the Turkish embassy in Damascus after a twelve-year absence.
The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) – Another Lever of Regional Influence (Central Asia)
The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) is now a key institutional10 player in the Turkic world. It originated in the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, created by the Nakhchivan Agreement on 03 October 2009, signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This structure aimed to institutionalise cooperation between states sharing deep linguistic, cultural and historical ties. Since its foundation, the organisation has expanded to include six full members — Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and, since 2022, Turkmenistan — as well as two observer states, Hungary and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
The originality of the OTS lies in its prioritisation of cultural and identity affinities, which form the basis of its cooperation. Compared to other regional organisations, it places less emphasis on purely economic or pragmatic objectives to promote a shared historical memory and a common Turkic identity. This symbolic dimension gives the OTS a unique role in regional diplomacy. As its Secretary General points out, it is ‘the only organisation based on such foundations’, which illustrates its specific 11 focus on consolidating a common cultural and political space.
It plays a major strategic role for Turkey in its regionalisation efforts. From the early 1990s, under the presidency of T. Özal, Ankara engaged in proactive diplomacy to strengthen its ties with the newly independent Turkic republics, based on the idea of ‘Turkic solidarity’. The first summit of Turkic states, held in Ankara in 1992, marked the launch of institutionalised dialogue between these nations and foreshadowed the future structuring of a coordinated regional framework. Through the OTS, Turkey is thus transforming these historical and cultural relations into an instrument of regional influence, capable of promoting economic, geopolitical and identity-related projects.
The organisation allows Ankara to become part of a structured multilateral dynamic, where the affirmation of a common identity serves as a lever to strengthen its position in the Turkic space. Institutional rapprochement with these states offers Turkey a means of securing its strategic interests, stimulating economic cooperation and consolidating stable geopolitical alliances. In this sense, the OTS is one of Turkey’s preferred tools for promoting its regional doctrine.
Armenia: Challenges of Normalisation and Regional Integration (Caucasus)
Although Turkey’s regionalisation initiative is generally appreciated by its neighbours and constitutes an asset for Ankara, one key issue remains unresolved to this day. This issue particularly illustrates the dynamics at work and, in many respects, constitutes a central element of Turkey’s strategy, which is part of a process of increasing regionalisation.
This approach reveals certain structural limitations for Turkey, particularly within the OTS – of which it is the driving force – its inability to fully integrate other so-called ‘Turkic’ countries remains one of the organisation’s major shortcomings. Therefore, when linguistic or ethnic criteria are no longer sufficient, the organisation explores new avenues, seeking to incorporate certain close neighbours. It is in this context that Turkey, driven by a pragmatic approach to regionalisation, is striving to normalise its relations with Armenia, thus opening up new prospects for ensuring unity within the Eurasian space.
For Armenia, this dynamic also represents a strategic opportunity: it allows it to avoid remaining isolated in the face of a historical rival, now positioned as a central player in regional dynamism.
Armenia has clearly understood the benefits of pursuing regional integration with its neighbours. For Erevan, overcoming the stereotypes and perceptions inherited from the Soviet era, which have long shaped Armenians’ view of their neighbours, is essential if it is to move beyond its current state of inertia. On this subject, Nikol Pashinyan stated at the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum: ‘We must free ourselves from the worldview imposed on us by KGB agents. ’ 12
By re-establishing constructive dialogue with Baku and Ankara, Armenia could open borders that have been closed for decades, revive trade and become part of strategic economic and energy corridors for the South Caucasus.
In this sense, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Turkey in the summer of 2025 was described by Erevan as a ‘historic step’ towards normalising bilateral relations. Concrete projects have been put forward, 13 such as the TRIPP Route and the opening of communications between the two countries, which aim to strengthen Eurasian connectivity by linking Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia continuously. Azerbaijan’s lifting of restrictions on the transit of goods to Armenia in October 2025 illustrates the effectiveness of this approach: grain was transported by rail from Kazakhstan to Armenia via Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Armenia declared its readiness to facilitate transit between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Added to this was Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to announce the suspension of Armenia’s campaign for international recognition of the 1915 massacres as genocide, a move seen as a major concession to Turkey and which drew significant domestic criticism. The Prime Minister had already visited Turkey during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inauguration in 2023. At the same time, at the end of 2021, Ankara and Erevan appointed special envoys to lead the normalisation process, one year after Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan. The following year, the two countries resumed commercial flights after a two-year hiatus, marking a new stage in this gradual rapprochement. Thus, the formation of a bloc bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey could form the core of a stabilised South Caucasus capable of playing a lasting role in emerging regional dynamics.
Beyond the economic benefits, this approach would enable Armenia to strengthen its diplomatic sovereignty and reduce its traditional dependence on Russia. By engaging in regional cooperation, Erevan is helping to consolidate a more integrated Eurasian space, while transforming a legacy of historical conflict into a project of shared security and development with its neighbours. Thus, normalisation and cooperation with Baku and Ankara are becoming not only a strategic imperative for Armenia, but also an opportunity to redefine its place in the region.
Conclusion
Whether in the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus, Turkey is gradually extending its diplomatic, economic and cultural tentacles, revealing a strategy of multi-level influence projection. Ankara is thus articulating a coherent set of bilateral initiatives and multilateral organisations, foremost among which is the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), to structure a regional environment favourable to its interests. This dynamic, based on a combination of identity-based soft power, geopolitical pragmatism and economic ambitions, demonstrates Turkey’s desire to position itself as a key player in contemporary Eurasian realignments. In this context, Turkey’s ability to stabilise its immediate neighbourhood and integrate historically distant or antagonistic actors will largely determine the sustainability of this project of regional influence.
Title Image courtesy: http://en.kremlin.ru/
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and the Defence Research and Studies
Reference
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye ; URL : https://www.mfa.gov.tr/la-politique- de-zéro-problème-avec-nos-voisins.fr.mfa
2. KARDAŞ Şaban, The Foreign Policy of Turkey: Neo-Ottomanism and Beyond, in Middle Eastern Studies, n°49(5), p.803–820, 2013.
3. MARCOU Jean, La politique turque de voisinage, in Eurorient, N°35-36, pp. 163-180, 2011.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye ; URL : https://www.mfa.gov.tr/yeni- donemde-sifir-sorun-politikasi.tr.mfa
5. Ibid. “Özellikle de Dışişleri Bakanlığı görevini üstlendikten sonra “komşularla sıfır sorun” prensibi Türk Dış Politikası’nın en fazla konuşulan ilkesi olmuştur. Kelime anlamıyla, bu ilke açıkça ideal bir modeldi — ancak, Türk dış politikasındaki belirgin bir zihniyet değişikliğini de temsil ediyordu. Artık Türkiye’nin dış politika gündemine bölgesel ve uluslararası ilişkilerde enerjisini tüketten komşularıyla olan kronik anlaşmazlıklar hakim değildir…”
6. TRT Français ; URL : https://www.trtfrancais.com/article/6683b9872159
7. LUIZARD Pierre-Jean, Le piège Daech, L’État islamique ou le retour de l’histoire, La Découverte, Cahiers Libres, Paris, pp. 64-68, 2015.
8. Foundation for Defence of Democracies ; URL : https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/02/24/10- things-to-know-about-turkeys-interventions-and-influence-in-syria/
9. Unified Military Council ; URL : https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/ IN12473.web.html
10. ZELKO-YILMAZ Ethan, « L’Organisation des États Turciques (OET) : un acteur régional en devenir ? », n°2, OFB, février 2026.
11. Speech by the Secretary General of the OTS at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in April 2025 in the Turkish daily newspaper Yeni Şafak. ; URL https://www.yenisafak.com/fr/actualites/ lorganisation-des-etats-turciques-met-en-lumiere-le-role-croissant-de-la-turkiye-en-syrie-42001
12. OC Media ; URL : https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-blames-soviet-kgb-for-shaping-armenians- view-of-turks-and-azerbaijanis
13. Le Monde ; URL : https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/06/20/armenia-pm- arrives-in-turkey-for-historic-visit-in-bid-to-mend-ties_6742535_4.html
