As per the Korean historical text “SamgukYusa”, Princess Suriratna from Ayodhya came to Korea in the year 48 AD, married King Kim-Suro of the erstwhile Gaya Confederacy in ancient Korea and became Queen Heo Hwang-ok. Many Koreans trace their ancestry to this lineage. Buddhism reached Korea via the maritime route with the arrival of Princess Suriratna and her brother Monk Jangyu. India also played a major role in the Korean peninsula after Korea’s independence in 1945 under Former Indian diplomat Shri K P S Menon, which remains as a foundation of India South Korea relationship.

Introduction

The relationship between South Korea and India, officially established in 1973, has evolved over the decades into a strategic partnership of growing significance within the geopolitical and economic landscape of 21st-century Asia. In this year 2025, as the world navigates the turbulent waters of a shifting international order, these two nations emerge as pivotal players in the Indo-Pacific region—an area now a theatre of intensifying rivalry between established and emerging powers. Their cooperation, rooted in historical convergences and complementary economic ambitions, has expanded over time to encompass economic, strategic, and cultural dimensions while grappling with structural and situational challenges that demand sustained attention. Often described as “special” since its elevation in 2015 under the impetus of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South Korean President Park Geun-hye, this partnership reflects a mutual desire to transcend mere trade exchanges and align with a broader vision of regional stability and shared prosperity.

The historical foundations of this relationship trace back to ancient interactions, notably through Buddhist trade routes connecting the Indian subcontinent to the Korean Peninsula as early as the 4th century. Yet, it is in the contemporary era—marked by India’s rise as an economic power and South Korea’s consolidation as a technological and industrial giant—that their partnership has gained substantial momentum. In 2025, these dynamics are amplified by factors such as the restructuring of global supply chains, Sino-American tensions, and the pursuit of greater strategic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific. As Jagannath Panda observes in his analysis of India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific (2023), “the convergences between Seoul and New Delhi rest on a mutual recognition of their respective roles as middle powers capable of influencing regional balances.” This insight underscores the importance of a partnership that, though underutilized in the past, now stands at a turning point where economic and strategic opportunities could redefine their positions on the Asian chessboard.

Nevertheless, these ties are not without tensions or limitations. Trade imbalances, geopolitical divergences in managing relations with China, and bureaucratic hurdles to mutual investment highlight persistent challenges. Rajiv Kumar, in Economic Convergence and Strategic Divergence: India-South Korea Relations (2022), illuminates this duality: “While India and South Korea share an ambitious economic vision, their strategic priorities, shaped by distinct alliances and threats, sometimes hinder deeper cooperation.” In 2025, these issues crystallize in a context where South Korea seeks to expand its footprint in the Indo-Pacific through its eponymous strategy launched in 2022, while India strengthens its “Act East” policy to counter Chinese influence and bolster ties with Asian powers. Added to this is a cultural dimension—often overlooked but critical—driven by growing people-to-people exchanges in tourism, education, and soft power, which could serve as an unexpected catalyst for a more robust relationship.

This article aims to explore the South Korea-India relationship in 2025 through a forward-looking analysis of the key issues that will shape their shared future. It will examine the economic dynamics, assessing the evolution of bilateral trade, the ongoing negotiations surrounding the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and investment opportunities in strategic sectors like semiconductors and green technologies. It will also delve into strategic and security challenges, focusing on maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, defence collaborations, and the geopolitical tensions tied to their respective stances on China and the United States. Finally, it will explore the cultural and human connections—often relegated to the background but increasingly vital—as a lever for diplomacy in a world where soft power is an indispensable tool. Drawing on recent data, informed projections, and the works of scholars like Panda and Kumar, this study seeks to offer a nuanced and prospective view of the challenges and opportunities awaiting these two nations in 2025, while highlighting their role in building a more balanced and cooperative Indo-Pacific.

Economic Dynamics: A Partnership Seeking Balance

In 2025, the economic relationship between South Korea and India stands at a critical juncture, characterized by both remarkable progress and persistent challenges that demand innovative solutions. The bilateral trade volume, which reached approximately 27.52 billion dollars in the fiscal year 2023-24, reflects a steady upward trajectory fueled by complementary strengths—India’s export of petroleum products, chemicals, and textiles, and South Korea’s dominance in electronics, machinery, and steel. Yet, beneath this growth lies a stubborn trade imbalance that continues to favour Seoul, a concern that has lingered since the implementation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2010. Jagannath Panda, in his incisive study India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific (2023), notes that “the CEPA, while a milestone, has failed to address structural asymmetries, leaving India with a perennial deficit exacerbated by limited market access for its goods.” This observation rings true in 2025, as India pushes to renegotiate the agreement to include new sectors like digital trade and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), aiming to rectify disparities and unlock untapped potential.

The ongoing CEPA negotiations, which saw their tenth round in January 2024 in New Delhi, are poised to reach a pivotal stage in 2025. Indian policymakers view this as an opportunity to modernize the agreement, aligning it with the realities of a digital economy where e-commerce and technology services are increasingly vital. South Korea, meanwhile, seeks to maintain its competitive edge in high-value industries while gaining better access to India’s vast consumer market. The stakes are high: the ambitious target of 50 billion dollars in bilateral trade by 2030, set during the 2018 India-Korea Business Summit, remains distant, with only 48% achieved by 2021. Data from the India Brand Equity Foundation’s report Exploring India-Korea Trade and Economic Relations (2024) suggests that a successful CEPA update could boost trade by an additional 10-15 billion dollars within five years, provided barriers such as tariffs and logistical inefficiencies are addressed. For instance, India’s exports of zinc and zinc alloys alone have contributed to a deficit of 149.89 million dollars between April and November 2021-22, a microcosm of broader imbalances that the revised agreement must tackle.

Investment flows offer a brighter picture, though they too fall short of their potential. South Korea’s cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in India reached 6.35 billion dollars from April 2000 to September 2024, concentrated in metallurgy, automotive, electronics, and healthcare sectors. Companies like Hyundai and Samsung have become household names in India, yet the total FDI represents just 0.87% of India’s overall inflows—a figure Rajiv Kumar critiques in Economic Convergence and Strategic Divergence: India-South Korea Relations (2022) as “disappointing given the economic synergies at play.” Indian investments in South Korea, totalling 0.91 billion dollars from 2009 to 2019, are similarly modest, hampered by high transaction costs and cultural distance. In 2025, however, emerging opportunities in high-tech industries—particularly semiconductors and green technologies—could shift this narrative. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in December 2022, emphasizes economic security and regional stability, aligning with India’s push to become a global hub for semiconductor manufacturing. Collaborative ventures in these fields could see investments double by the end of the decade, provided regulatory hurdles and infrastructure gaps in India are addressed.

The challenges are not insignificant. South Korean firms frequently cite weak industrial bases, inadequate infrastructure, and a complex legal system as deterrents to deeper engagement, while Indian businesses struggle with South Korea’s highly competitive market. Yet, the potential rewards are compelling. As Panda argues, “the economic partnership between Seoul and New Delhi could serve as a linchpin for supply chain resilience in Asia, especially amid global disruptions” (India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, 2023). In 2025, the success of this economic axis will hinge on the ability of both nations to bridge their asymmetries—through a revitalized CEPA, targeted investments, and a shared commitment to innovation—setting the stage for a partnership that transcends its current limitations and fulfils its long-promised potential.

Cultural and Human Connections

In 2025, the cultural and human connections between South Korea and India stand as a vibrant and increasingly pivotal pillar of their bilateral relationship, weaving a fabric of mutual understanding that extends far beyond the confines of economic transactions or strategic alignments. This dimension, often overshadowed by the more tangible metrics of trade balances and defence agreements, is quietly reshaping the contours of their partnership, offering a reservoir of goodwill that could prove transformative in an era where diplomacy hinges as much on hearts and minds as on policy papers and treaties. These ties, rooted in centuries-old exchanges along Buddhist trade routes and revitalized by modern phenomena like K-pop and Bollywood, represent a form of soft power that both nations are beginning to harness with deliberate intent. As Jagannath Panda eloquently frames it in India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific (2023), “cultural exchanges serve as a quiet enabler, amplifying the strategic narrative through shared human experiences that resonate across borders.” In this pivotal year, these experiences are not just supplementary—they are becoming a cornerstone of how South Korea and India perceive and engage with one another, fostering a bond that promises to endure beyond the fluctuations of geopolitics.

Tourism, perhaps the most visible manifestation of this growing closeness, has blossomed into a powerful conduit for cultural exchange by 2025. South Koreans, long captivated by India’s kaleidoscope of history and spirituality—from the marble splendour of the Taj Mahal to the serene monasteries of Bodh Gaya and Sarnath—have steadily increased their presence on Indian soil. In return, Indian travellers, lured by the sleek modernity of Seoul, the tranquil beauty of Jeju Island, and the allure of K-drama filming locations, are venturing to South Korea in unprecedented numbers. Official projections for 2025 suggest that combined annual tourist visits could surpass half a million, a leap from pre-pandemic figures, buoyed by streamlined visa processes, joint marketing campaigns, and a post-COVID travel boom. The Indian Ministry of Tourism’s “Incredible India” initiative has found a receptive audience in South Korea, while Seoul’s “Visit Korea” promotions, featuring Hindi-language guides and Bollywood-inspired itineraries, have struck a chord with Indian adventurers. Yet, this is more than a numbers game. As the Vivekananda International Foundation notes in 50 Years of Diplomatic Ties: Convergence and Challenges in India-South Korea Relations (2023), “each tourist becomes an informal ambassador, carrying stories and impressions that shape national perceptions in ways diplomacy alone cannot.” These journeys—whether to meditate at a Himalayan retreat or to dance at a K-pop concert—build bridges that endure long after the suitcases are unpacked.

Education, too, is forging enduring links, knitting together a generation of young minds attuned to the possibilities of this partnership. South Korean universities, globally acclaimed for their prowess in technology and engineering, have become magnets for Indian students seeking cutting-edge knowledge in fields like artificial intelligence, robotics, and renewable energy. By 2025, over 12,000 Indian students will be enrolled in South Korean institutions, a figure reported by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in late 2024 and projected to climb further with expanded scholarship programs like those offered by the Korea Foundation. Conversely, South Korean students are increasingly drawn to India’s institutes of technology and management, such as the IITs and IIMs, as well as its rich offerings in humanities and Sanskrit studies. Programs like India’s “Study in India” initiative and South Korea’s Global Korea Scholarship have facilitated this two-way flow, creating a vibrant academic ecosystem. Joint research projects—on topics ranging from climate change solutions to historical linguistics—have proliferated, with universities like Seoul National University and Jawaharlal Nehru University leading the charge. Rajiv Kumar, in Economic Convergence and Strategic Divergence: India-South Korea Relations (2022), argues that “this educational nexus is planting seeds for a future where collaboration transcends borders, driven by professionals who understand both nations’ strengths.” In 2025, these seeds are sprouting, as alumni networks and academic partnerships lay the groundwork for innovation and mutual respect that could ripple into other spheres of the relationship.

The cultural industries—spanning music, film, and television—form the beating heart of this soft power surge, captivating audiences and igniting imaginations in ways that defy geographic distance. South Korea’s Hallyu wave has crashed onto Indian shores with unstoppable force, with K-pop sensations like BTS, BLACKPINK, and EXO commanding legions of fans from Mumbai to Manipur. Concerts, fan meets, and dance cover competitions have become fixtures in Indian cities, while Korean dramas like Crash Landing on You and Squid Game dominate streaming platforms, dubbed into Hindi and Tamil to reach wider audiences. This phenomenon is not one-sided. Bollywood, with its infectious melodies and larger-than-life storytelling, has carved a niche in South Korea, where films like 3 Idiots and RRR have won hearts and sparked discussions on social media. A standout moment came in 2023 when the Indian Embassy in Seoul hosted the Festival of India, featuring a viral performance of “Naatu Naatu” by diplomats—a gesture that symbolized the fusion of these cultural giants. Beyond entertainment, these exchanges carry diplomatic weight. Kumar notes that “cultural affinity reduces the psychological distance between nations, paving the way for trust in other domains” (Economic Convergence and Strategic Divergence: India-South Korea Relations, 2022). By 2025, this trust manifests in initiatives like co-produced films, K-pop-Bollywood fusion music projects, and even culinary exchanges, such as Seoul’s K-Food Fair in Delhi pairing kimchi with chaat.

Institutional efforts amplify these grassroots connections, embedding them into the fabric of bilateral diplomacy. The Indian Cultural Centre in Seoul, established to showcase India’s dance, yoga, and cuisine, has become a hub for cultural immersion, hosting events like Diwali celebrations and Kathak workshops that draw South Korean enthusiasts. Similarly, South Korea’s King Sejong Institutes in India teach Korean language and culture, with enrollment spiking as K-pop fans and job-seekers alike seek fluency—over 5,000 learners were registered across cities like New Delhi and Chennai by 2024. Language programs extend the other way, too, with Hindi and Tamil courses gaining traction in South Korean universities, reflecting a curiosity about India’s diversity. Panda emphasizes this reciprocity, writing that “people-to-people ties are the glue that holds strategic partnerships together when economic or political winds shift” (India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, 2023). In 2025, this glue is evident in small but telling details: South Korean students reciting Tagore’s poetry, Indian teens mastering BTS choreography, and retirees swapping recipes for bibimbap and biryani at cultural fairs.

Yet, for all its promise, this cultural bridge is not without its cracks. Linguistic barriers remain a formidable obstacle—few South Koreans speak Hindi, and fewer Indians speak Korean beyond basic phrases learned from dramas. Direct flight connectivity, though improving, lags behind demand, with only a handful of routes linking major cities, forcing travellers to endure layovers in hubs like Singapore or Dubai. Awareness of each other’s modern cultures also remains patchy—South Koreans may associate India solely with curry and yoga, while Indians might reduce South Korea to K-pop and Samsung. The Vivekananda International Foundation warns that “without a deliberate strategy to elevate cultural ties to the level of economic and strategic engagement, their potential will remain underutilized” (50 Years of Diplomatic Ties: Convergence and Challenges in India-South Korea Relations, 2023). Addressing these gaps will require bold steps in 2025: more direct flights, subsidized exchange programs, and media campaigns that showcase the breadth of each nation’s identity—perhaps a documentary series on South Korea’s hanbok tradition airing in India, or a podcast on India’s regional festivals finding listeners in Busan.

The stakes are high, for these cultural and human connections could redefine the South Korea-India partnership in ways that economic deals and military pacts cannot. They offer resilience—a buffer against the inevitable ebb and flow of international relations. Imagine a future where a South Korean diplomat, raised on Bollywood films, negotiates with an Indian counterpart fluent in Korean from years at Yonsei University; or where tourists turned friends lobby for stronger ties in their home countries. In 2025, this vision is within reach, if both nations invest in the infrastructure of culture—more festivals, more scholarships, more shared stories. As Panda suggests, “a partnership rooted in the people has the power to endure, transcending the transactional to become truly transformative” (India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, 2023). By nurturing this soft power, South Korea and India could not only strengthen their bilateral bond but also project a model of cooperation that inspires the broader Indo-Pacific, proving that culture, in all its messy, beautiful complexity, is a force as potent as any army or economy.

Conclusion

As 2025 draws the relationship between South Korea and India into sharper focus, their partnership emerges as a multifaceted endeavour, blending economic ambition, strategic necessity, and cultural richness into a tapestry that holds both promise and complexity. This year, poised at the midpoint of a transformative decade, reveals a bilateral dynamic that is no longer a peripheral footnote in Asian geopolitics but a burgeoning force with the potential to shape the Indo-Pacific’s future. The economic ties, bolstered by a trade volume nearing 30 billion dollars and a revitalized CEPA negotiation process, underscore a mutual commitment to overcoming structural imbalances and seizing opportunities in high-tech sectors like semiconductors and green energy. Strategically, their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific—through naval exercises, defence collaborations, and a shared interest in maritime security—positions them as middle powers navigating a multipolar world, even as divergences over China and the United States test their alignment. Yet, it is the cultural and human connections—forged through tourism, education, and the soft power of K-pop and Bollywood—that provide the most enduring glue, knitting together societies in ways that transcend the transactional and hint at a deeper, more resilient bond.

This confluence of strengths is not without its fault lines. The persistent trade deficit favouring South Korea, the hesitancy to fully align on geopolitical flashpoints, and the logistical barriers to cultural exchange—be it limited flights or linguistic divides—remind us that potential alone does not guarantee progress. Jagannath Panda, in India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific (2023), captures this duality succinctly: “Seoul and New Delhi stand at a crossroads where convergence is evident, but the depth of their partnership hinges on their ability to bridge strategic and structural gaps.” In 2025, this crossroads demands bold action—finalizing an updated CEPA to balance trade, institutionalizing defence dialogues to match maritime ambitions, and investing in direct connectivity to unleash the full power of people-to-people ties. The stakes extend beyond their borders; as Rajiv Kumar argues in Economic Convergence and Strategic Divergence: India-South Korea Relations (2022), “a robust India-South Korea axis could anchor supply chain resilience and regional stability in Asia, countering the volatility of great power rivalries.” Their success could thus ripple across the Indo-Pacific, offering a model of cooperation rooted in mutual benefit rather than hegemonic dominance.

Looking ahead, the trajectory of this relationship in 2025 hinges on a delicate balance of pragmatism and vision. Economically, achieving the 50-billion-dollar trade target by 2030 will require policy tweaks and a leap toward co-innovation in fields like artificial intelligence and renewable energy, where South Korea’s technological edge and India’s vast market could redefine global standards. Strategically, navigating the China question—whether through quiet diplomacy or a bolder stance within frameworks like the Quad—will test their ability to harmonize divergent priorities while amplifying shared goals, such as a free and open Indo-Pacific. Culturally, the momentum of tourism, education, and media exchanges must be sustained with deliberate investment—more cultural centres, more scholarships, more co-productions—to cement a bond that withstands political shifts. The Vivekananda International Foundation’s reflection in 50 Years of Diplomatic Ties: Convergence and Challenges in India-South Korea Relations (2023) rings true here: “A partnership that resonates with the people is a partnership that endures.” In 2025, this resonance is palpable—from Indian students mastering Korean at Delhi’s language institutes to South Korean tourists tracing Buddhist trails in Bihar—yet it must be nurtured to reach its full stature.

Ultimately, the South Korea-India relationship in 2025 is a microcosm of Asia’s evolving landscape—a blend of opportunity and challenge, tradition and modernity, ambition and restraint. For a researcher trained at Seoul National University, steeped in the nuances of East-West interactions, this partnership offers a compelling case study of how middle powers can carve out agency amid global uncertainty. It is not merely about what these nations can gain from each other, but what they can build together—a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific where economic growth, security, and cultural harmony coexist. As Panda envisions, “their alliance could exemplify a new paradigm for cooperation, one that balances power with purpose” (India-Korea Relations in the Emerging Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, 2023). Whether they seize this moment—bridging their differences to unlock their collective potential—will determine if 2025 marks the dawn of a truly special partnership or merely another chapter in a story of unrealized promise. The choice, and the future, rests with them.

Title image courtesy: Business World

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies