This article explores China and U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea focusing on China’s military strategy in the region with regards to the U.S. Drawing from various sources including scholarly literature, reports, and expert analyses, our analysis sheds light on the strategies employed by these powers. The geopolitics of the region, especially the littoral states, are heavily influenced by one state or the other as both powers try to achieve their security goals and national interests through various tactics. By highlighting the complexities of rivalry and military strategies, we aim to contribute to the existing literature on the geopolitical situation in Central Asia from a cultural perspective.

Introduction

The South China Sea is a crucial maritime region, rich in natural resources and vital for global trade, it has become a hotspot for military strategy and geopolitical rivalry, mainly between China and the United States. The SCS is a crucial waterway connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is a major channel for global trade, energy transportation and economic development with over $3 trillion in trade passing through it annually. The SCS is also crucial to China both economically and strategically as it connects China to most of the Asian continent through waters. According to Fangyin (2016), Since 2010 the situation in the South China Sea, which had been calm during the post-Cold War era, has become more volatile. This has happened in the context of China’s rapid rise and the US ‘pivot’ to Asia. The situation in the South China Sea has been affected by a range of factors, including the transformation of regional power structures, the cognitive adjustments made by the countries involved, and the strategic choices made by powers outside the region in deciding how to deal with the changing regional power structure. Not surprisingly, China’s South China Sea policy has been subject to close international scrutiny; in particular, its assertive behaviour has become a fertile source of controversy and has been much criticised. 

The United States has routinely disputed the territorial claims made by China through Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), leading to a complex and often heated military dynamic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (MOFA, 2024) concerning the South China Sea stated that China firmly opposes U.S. attempts to meddle in the South China Sea and sow discord between China and ASEAN. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and their adjacent waters (MOFA. 2024). 

This paper hypothesises that China’s military strategy in the SCS is primarily driven by its need to secure territorial integrity, protect economic interests, and enhance its regional influence and integration, which significantly impacts regional and international security dynamics, particularly in its interactions with the United States.

The paper will attempt to address the following:-

1. What are the primary strategic objectives of China’s military activities in the SCS?
2. On what grounds does China lay its territorial claims in the SCS?
3. What are the implications of China’s military strategy in the SCS for regional and international security and stability?
4. How do the actions and presence of the United States in the SCS impact China’s military strategy and decisions in the region?

Literature Review

China’s military strategy in the SCS has been a hot topic in recent years, especially with the U.S. showing ever-growing interest in the region. Scholars such as Fangyin (2016), have argued that China’s military strategy has been driven by the desire to ensure its security and territorial integrity are not compromised while other scholars such as Erickson (2016), have argued that China’s military desire in the SCS is driven by a desire to challenge U.S hegemony in the region and balance America’s influence in the region and both countries are likely to continue their rivalry in the region to promote their interests.

Methodology

This study will employ a qualitative research approach to investigate China’s military strategy in the SCS concerning the U.S. and its implications, with a special focus on the Scarborough Shoal standoff. This study relies on the qualitative approach primarily because existing studies and literature on this topic are predominantly qualitative.

The data collected in this study relies primarily on secondary data sources such as academic articles and books, government reports and documents, think tank reports and policy briefs, news articles and media sources. It also draws data from primary data sources particularly Interviews with experts and officials as well as observations of military exercises and operations.

This paper aims to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis and seeks to complement existing academic literature on Sino-American rivalry in the SCS.

China’s Strategic Objectives in the South China Sea

China’s activities in the region have suggested that China has four primary strategic objectives which are: regional integration and influence, securing territorial integrity, resource control and enhanced security. 

• Regional Influence and Integration

Regional integration between China and states of Southeast Asia is a priority for China, as part of its overall policy of Peaceful Rise (Dutton, 2011). For this, China has undertaken several steps which include increased bilateral trade investments in the region, and major support for infrastructure projects in the region. One such project is the Nanning Singapore economic corridor which has to do with the construction of an integrated railway transport system that links Nanning to Singapore suggesting that China’s play is reflecting a Ripe Fruit strategy.

• Securing Territorial Integrity

Based on the historical claims backed by the Nine-Dash Line, China asserts sovereignty over most of the SCS, this includes areas claimed by several other countries. China considers the SCS as an integral part of its territory has engaged in extensive historical research and has used archaeological findings to support its narrative and to bolster its claims that help secure its territorial integrity.

• Resource Control

Another one of China’s objectives in the SCS is ensuring its control over most of the natural resources, including the crude oil and natural gas discovered recently, and minerals and things like fisheries, etc to enhance its long-term resource security and economic objectives.

According to Zhou Shouwei, vice president of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, has stated Offshore and especially deep-water oil and gas discoveries have great significance for replenishing China’s and the World’s oil resources (Dutton, 2011). Other powers such as the U.S. also want a piece of the cake making the region’s geopolitical dynamics more complex.

• Enhanced Security

China’s fourth objective is concerned with enhancing its control over the SCS to create a maritime security buffer zone that protects the major population centres, industry, and rich cultural sites of China’s developed eastern coastal area (Dutton, 2011). These include things such as island building, deployment of advanced military equipment, naval patrolling, etc.

Key Components of China’s Military Strategy at SCS

• Island-Building and Fortification: 

In recent decades, China has constructed many artificial islands in the region through the process of land reclamation. One such example would be the Fiery Cross Reef, which was once submerged underwater, now it has a 3-kilometre-long runway, hangars, and other military infrastructure such as radars, missile systems, etc which enable China to monitor and control naval operations from the mainland (AMTI, 2017). 

• Naval Modernization

China has been putting efforts into modernising its naval assets to enhance its ability to operate in the open seas and establish its control over the SCS. Such as the deployment of aircraft carriers like Liaoning and the Shandong.

• Deployment of Advanced Military Technology 

These further enhance China’s naval capabilities, some of these include the deployment of systems like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles as well as Unmanned vehicles (UAVs), surveillance systems and cyber capabilities.

The Nine-Dash Line

Most of the disagreements and territorial disputes between China and the littoral countries in the SCS boils down to this one term which is the Nine-Dash Line which is the backbone of the claims made by China in the SCS. It is a U-shaped dotted line on the map of SCS which states that anything falling in that demarcated area is Chinese territory.

Historical basis

China argues that these waters have been under Chinese control since ancient times citing the records of Chinese fishermen and naval expeditions dating back to the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD). According to Wang (2015), China’s first official South China Sea map showing the interrupted lines was drawn in 1947 for internal purposes and published in 1948 by the ROC’s Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) government. There are also documents reporting that a map created by cartographer Bai Meichu in 1936 used solid lines to encircle the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. This 1936 map marked James Shoal (Zengmu Ansha) in the Spratly Islands as China’s southernmost boundary in the South China Sea. Therefore, maps are one of the foreign policy legacies the Communist government inherited from the Nationalists. 

UNCLOS

According to Wang (2015), The Chinese routine argument has been that the nine-dashed line predates UNCLOS, so zones established under the new treaty could not supplant China’s historical rights. The problem with this is that China both signed and later ratified UNCLOS, and also declared a 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf of its own, without clarifying how these zones would relate to the nine-dashed line.

Security Implications

Chinese military developments in the SCS have created a lot of tensions in the regions and resulted in security implications both regional and international due to the USA’s looming presence in the region.

Regional Security

The South China Sea dispute (1992 to present) is a long-standing and ongoing maritime sovereignty dispute involving China, Taiwan and the ASEAN states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Tensions over the region’s waters have fluctuated since the Cold War period, with instances of conflict linked to a variety of factors, including surging economic growth and corresponding military modernization in China, enhanced competition for maritime resources, China’s status as a rising power, increased great power rivalry with the US, and the consolidation of power under China’s current President Xi Jinping (Southgate, 2019). The military actions in the SCS by China have increased tensions in the region due to overlapping claims that have soured the bilateral relationships between China and the littoral countries.

According to Southgate (2019), ASEAN has failed to reach a consensus on what its role in the South China Sea dispute should be. Significantly, without a credible security commitment from an external power such as the US, ASEAN was unable to provide an effective response to the dispute. Due to the good bilateral ties of some ASEAN members, it has been ineffective in challenging China’s activities as a unified front.

US-China Military Dynamics

The US-China power politics or rivalry in the SCS is core to shaping the regional security dynamics. China feels that its security is threatened due to the ever-looming presence of the United States in the region. The United States frequently conducts its FONOPs challenging China’s territorial claims and considers it crucial in ensuring the free flow of maritime traffic. According to Erikson (2016). Freedom of navigation operations should be pursued proportionally, under the international law, whereby islands and rocks are accorded territorial waters and airspace out to twelve nautical miles, and reefs (features naturally underwater at high tide) are accorded zero nautical miles. Such legal distinctions are important, and we should operate accordingly. 

On 9 March 2015, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that Spratly Garrison “maintenance and construction work” was intended in part for “better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” Hua elaborated that construction was designed in part to “satisfy the necessary military defence needs (Erickson, 2016). China, maintains its stance stating that the Nine-Dash Line predates UNCLOS and responds by shadowing US vessels and issuing warnings for trespassing, etc. The increased militarization of the SCS and the frequent encounters between the US and Chinese forces have resulted in a cold war-like situation where one miscalculation between the two could escalate into a potential conflict.

Scarborough Shoal Standoff – A Case Study

The Scarborough Shoal Standoff serves as an event that demonstrates the complexities and dynamics of China’s approach, in the SCS. This analysis will delve into the incident. China’s military reactions, providing insight into the consequences of China’s activities in the area.

Background of the Standoff

The Scarborough Shoal Standoff was a dispute between China and the Philippines that began on April 8th 2012, when a Filipino aircraft spotted Chinese fishing vessels in Filipino waters, in response, the Philippines sent its vessels to arrest the fishermen.

According to Wong (2024), In April 2012, one of the Philippine Navy’s surveillance planes detected eight Chinese fishing vessels near Scarborough Shoal. The plane found endangered giant clams, corals, and live sharks inside the vessels, believed to be illegally caught by Chinese fishers in violation of Philippine laws. In an attempt to arrest the Chinese fishers, the Philippine government deployed its warship, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, a decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutter. However, the Chinese fishers immediately sent out a distress call to authorities in Hainan Province. Two unarmed China Marine Surveillance (CMS) ships quickly arrived and positioned themselves between the Philippine warship and the Chinese fishing vessels, thus preventing the fishers’ arrest. The next day, the then president Benigno Aquino III (2010–16) recalled the warship and replaced it with a smaller Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol craft in an effort to defuse the tension. Instead of reciprocating the gesture, China dispatched a third CMS ship to the area on the same day.

In May 2012, a month after the interception of China’s fishing vessels, there were 90 Chinese vessels in Scarborough Shoal—10 CMS vessels, 30 fishing boats, and 50 dinghies. Meanwhile, the Philippines had three vessels—two coast guard ships and one ship from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.

In June 2012 the United States brokered what it presumed was a deal for a mutual withdrawal in Scarborough Shoal. After weeks of negotiations, the Philippines pulled out all of its ships, but three Chinese vessels remained. Two days later, China denied the existence of any commitment for a mutual withdrawal and eventually constructed a chain barrier across the mouth of the shoal.6 It had opportunistically seized “full control of Scarborough Shoal by blocking the entrance of the lagoon to prevent Philippine vessels from returning, presenting Manila with a fait accompli.” Since then, China has maintained de facto control and occupation of Scarborough Shoal (Wong, 2024).

An Analysis of China’s Military Response

China demonstrated an assertive stance throughout the standoff insisting that the Philippines was the one who escalated the issue first, this tactic by China was possible due to various reasons causing a domino effect. 

Firstly, the Philippines responded to the Chinese fishing vessels by sending its warship rather than warning them of encroachment or making a case of violation of international law. To begin with, China’s strong response during the 2012 crisis was due to the presence of the Philippines’ warship in Scarborough Shoal. China accused the Philippines of militarizing an incident that should have been a case for law enforcement (Wong, 2024). 

Secondly, the Philippines made it into a public issue by making a public announcement rather than trying to solve it through private bilateral channels. According to Wong (2024), The secretary of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to the media and announced that he was summoning the Chinese ambassador to file a diplomatic protest regarding the incident.

Another reason was that failure to stand up against a small country like the Philippines could lead to a domestic backlash. Images of the arrested Chinese fishers made headlines in Chinese media and triggered public outrage (Wong, 2024). 

Lastly, the Mutual defence treaty between the US and the Philippines made China quite nervous. As tensions escalated, the Philippines sought clarity on the conditions under which the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty would trigger U.S. military intervention. But the United States cautiously maintained its “strategic ambiguity,” without clarifying whether the treaty covered the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea (Wong, 2024). 

The Aftermath

China regards maritime sovereignty as a firm priority, According to Wong (2024), Hawkish groups under Xi argued that China’s maritime affairs must be subject to a “rethinking.” They claimed that Deng’s claim of “keeping a low profile” must not be used as justification for inaction on the issue of sovereignty. Following the incident China has ramped up its efforts to secure access and control in SCS. 

According to Wong (2024), The Philippines’ policy towards China and the U.S. has been subject to the will of their presidents and has been a slippery slope, trying to appease both the Superpowers in the region.

As a former U.S. colony the Philippines has enjoyed favourable relations with the States, particularly in terms of defence cooperation, this increased further after the Scarborough Shoal Standoff. The ever-growing involvement of the U.S in the region has made the military dynamics of the region very complex and tense with the signing of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) being an immediate response to the Scarborough Shoal standoff with China ramping up its military advancements on the artificial islands to counterbalance U.S influence in the region.

Conclusion

Overall, China’s military strategy in the SCS has been quite consistent, based in reason and relatively modest. When it comes to China’s territorial disputes in the SCS with other littoral nations, the premise of China’s argument is that historically SCS has been a Chinese territory and that the Nine-Dash Line predates most of the international maritime laws including UNCLOS. With the U.S. showing ever-growing interest in the region, China’s policy in the region has also become more assertive, more so after the Scarborough Shoal Standoff and the signing of the EDCA. The Scarborough Shoal standoff showcased China’s uncompromising stance on maritime sovereignty and insecurities as a great power through its assertive and escalatory behaviour, but it also showed signs of self-restraint. In this sense, the Scarborough Shoal standoff was more the exception than the rule. In both the friction over the Second Thomas Shoal and the dispute over the HYSY-981 drilling platform, China demonstrated notable self-restraint despite its clear advantage in terms of both material power and capability (Fangyin, 2016). 

The U.S still adheres to the principles of Gunboat Diplomacy and has its military bases in every part of the globe including China’s backyard, the SCS while framing China as an aggressor, China very cleverly employs the very same tactics used by America by building military bases and outposts in the SCS and elsewhere in a very same manner America does for the sake of power maximisation and security goals. If peace and stability are to be achieved in the region then both the superpowers would need to change their approach to how they pursue their security goals and try to solve issues as well as find common ground through peaceful means such as bilateral and multilateral channels.

Title image courtesy: TOI

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

References

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3. Erickson, A. (2016). America’s Security Role in the South China Sea. Naval War College Review, 69(1), 3.

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