Russia and Ukraine have been globally recognized to share a tremulous relationship ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This relationship was at its worst in early 2022 when the Russian forces invaded a large portion of contemporary Ukrainian territory. This geopolitical development yielded a diverse array of theories and speculations. While some speculated Russia’s actions to be born out of the best interests of the country’s national security, others dwelled deeper into the historical context to uncover underlying vulnerabilities. The following paper aims to analyse these speculations and probable theories to gain a comprehensive understanding of the events that contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine.
Introduction
Russia and Ukraine are known to share extensive historical relations which date back to the era of the Ancient Rus. Both states have found their origin from the principality of Kiev and share several historical events up until the year of 1991 when the two countries saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union and resumed the identity of two separate states.
Despite their separation, both Russia and Ukraine maintained cordial ties with one another and saw an interdependent alliance amongst themselves for over a decade. The alliance involved the Ukrainian dependence on Russia for the development of their economy alongside the Russian dependence on Ukraine for the usage of its port of Sevastopol within the region of Crimea for housing its naval fleet.
While the continuum of this interdependence amongst the two neighbour-states continued, the progression of the 21st century saw the development of hostility in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. The divide was seen widening further until it reached its breaking point in the year of 2022 which marked the beginning of the ongoing Russia – Ukraine war.
Considering the pre-existing ties between the two countries, several questions are raised in wonder of how and why the relations amongst these two neighbour states saw its decline within the modern era.
Literature Review
A wide variety of papers can be found that delve deep into the core of Russia – Ukraine relations. Not only do these papers discuss several phases of the two countries’ relations but they also study the timeline as well as the significant aspects integral for deciding the state of their intertwined relations.
When I was asked about Russian Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I, therefore, feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today’s situation. (Putin, 2021)
These words are defended within President Putin’s article, which describes the Russia-Ukraine relation of the prior and during the era of the Soviet Union. The article finds its support within papers such as ‘Russia: A Timeline’ (History.com, 2019), which highlights the integrated history shared by the two countries till the era of 1991. The pre-existing ties of Kiev and the Russian Empire may also be highlighted within the same. The paper ‘Soviet Ukraine in a Nutshell’ (Fowler, 2022) further highlights the artistic importance held by Ukraine SSR in the former Soviet Union. Apart from that, the paper discusses its thriving industrial and energy sectors within Donbas, Zaporizhzhia and Mariupol. While the former points showcase Ukraine SSR’s position as the second most powerful state of the USSR (after Russia SSR), the paper also underlines the brutal treatment faced by Kiev under the reign of Joseph Stalin.
This shared history of the countries also sets the stage for their interdependence post disintegration of the USSR. Papers such as (Olszaƒski, core.ac.uk, 2001) discuss greatly upon the economic and trade ties alongside the military and co-independence showcased by both Russia and Ukraine. The paper also highlights Ukraine’s dire economic situation and its extensive dependence on Russia for its development and growth. The paper discusses the shift in the two countries’ relations caused by Ukraine’s efforts to ally itself with the US to counterbalance its heavy dependence on Russia.
Moving on to the modern day, while both Russia and Ukraine maintained economic ties, the souring of relations between the two countries remains vastly debated on several forums. Yet, several papers, including Hills (2023) as well as the Guihai (2024) attribute the western influence over Ukraine as one of the key factors for Russia – Ukraine diplomatic disintegration. The papers view the implications of growing Western influence over Ukraine and the potential threats the shift may bring upon Russia. Several factors, such as the impact on Russia’s economic ties with the West, alongside the looming threats over its military operations, are discussed in both the papers.
Russia – Ukraine: Historical Relations
Pre-Disintegration Era
The Romanov Dynasty, also known as the Russian Empire, found its roots in the ancient principality of Kiev after the Mongol invasion (1237 – 1480 BCE). The dynasty, throughout its reign and until its collapse against the Russian revolution, saw the rise of several rulers. At its peak, the Romanov Dynasty wielded control over a large region which, post-1917 1917 was renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Following the downfall of the Romanov Dynasty and the Russian Revolution, the states of Russia and Ukraine experienced cracks within their relations as the unification of the territories to be identified as the USSR took force. The relations seemed to stabilise briefly until the rise of Joseph Stalin in 1929. Under his rule, several million citizens of the USSR suffered casualties. Out of the impacted states, Ukraine SSR remained one of the most devastated regions of the Soviet Union. Suffering crises such as the “Great Famine”, the relations of Ukraine SSR further deteriorated with the central government until the end of Stalin’s reign.
Post the year of 1953, the Soviet Union worked towards mitigating and reversing the damages suffered by the nation. This timeline was denoted as the era of De-Stalinization. The era was characterised by several reformative changes to the government policies and initiatives to mend damages and gaps created under Stalin’s government.
One of the major initiatives was the transfer of three Russian territories—Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk—from the Russian SSR to the Ukrainian SSR. This transfer also included control of the Russian year-round port of Sevastopol, placing it under Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initiative was intended to symbolise the unification of Russian and Ukrainian territories in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav.
Furthermore, the central Soviet regime also shouldered 18% of Ukraine SSR’s economic cost while aiding the region with recovery and rebuilding projects after the Second World War. The collective initiatives seemed to work in favour of repairing the relation shared by the Soviet Union and the Ukraine SSR as the nation witnessed internal stability and harmony to a large extent.
The relations amongst the two of the largest Soviet Union states maintained this acquired stability until the 1980s. Under the new regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union witnessed several transformations of how the country functioned at its core.
Gorbachev brought about several changes, including attempts towards transitioning the Soviet economy into a hybrid form that was reported to replicate the modern Chinese economy, alongside which, his regime also introduced relaxations in regulations, including freedom of speech.
These changes, however, backfired as several sections of the Soviet Society began using these changes to protest and criticise the government. The momentum of the protests only grew until 1991, when the Soviet Union finally witnessed its disintegration.
Dubbed as the “New Era” by the former president, Mikhail Gorbachev himself, the disintegration of the Soviet Union sowed the seeds for the birth of 15 independent nations, amongst whom stood the countries of Russia and Ukraine.
Post-Soviet Era (Modern Russia)
After the collapse of the USSR, the globe saw the rise of several new independent countries. Amongst these newly formed nations, Russia, the largest and strongest of the 15 countries, remained successful in maintaining its economic and national stability to a large degree through necessary reforms and global exports of natural gas.
The young nation of Ukraine, however, struggled to gain stability and fell dependent on its neighbour state- Russia for support in rebuilding its economy.
Despite its pain and discontent with the disintegration of its mother state, Russia stepped up in providing great monetary aid to its former Soviet Brother. This monetary aid was provided to Ukraine through several trade contracts amongst the two countries as well the statutory leasing now Ukraine controlled Sevastopol port to Russia. The lease agreement allowed Russia to use the port in exchange for a monetary fee payment to the Ukrainian government.
Among the agreements mentioned above, Russia also committed to paying a contractual fee to Ukraine in exchange for allowing Russian natural gas to pass through Ukrainian territory via one of its three major gas pipelines.
With Russia’s aid, Ukraine was able to steadily build its economy and achieve a majority of its national stability. However, despite its ties with Russia, Ukraine sought to further ally itself with its Western counterpart. This change of perspective pressured the Russian – Ukraine relations, built on multifaceted interdependence, to grow distant.
Despite its reservations with the growing influence of the West, especially the US upon its former Soviet brother, Russia remained largely impassive towards Ukraine’s efforts to further ally itself with the west.
The dawn of the 21st century, however demarcated the addition of further complexities within the Russia – Ukraine relations.
To begin with, the start of the 2000s saw a growing unrest amongst the civil population of Ukraine which propelled several revolutionary movements, including the “Orange Revolution” of 2005 as well as the Ukrainian civil war of 2013. Strikingly, both the “Orange Revolution” of 2005 and the 2013 Ukrainian crisis were both largely attributed towards public dissatisfaction. The civil protests during both movements were also largely supported by the West.
In response to the growing tensions with its neighbour and former Soviet ally, Russia engaged in the 2008 NATO talks with Ukraine. During these talks, Russia formally addressed its stance on the growing relations between Ukraine and the West and underlined its unwillingness to accept Ukraine’s admission into NATO as a member country.
While the talks seemed to halt Ukraine’s efforts to join NATO, the revolution in 2013 brought about the revival of Ukraine’s efforts to admit itself as a member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This renewal spark was met with strong Russian resistance, which came in the guise of the Russian annexation of Crimea.
The annexation process consisted of a largely bloodless requisition and reintegration of Crimea back under Russian territory.
Following the annexation, the geopolitical situation between Russia and Ukraine deteriorated rapidly. The West was quick to condemn Russia, while the escalating situation also provided the European Union with the opportunity to strengthen its ties with Ukraine.
Furthermore, the integration of Crimea into Russian territory compelled the pro-Russian separatist group across eastern Ukraine to launch operations and spark conflict, calling for legitimate referendums as well as efforts to separate the Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. This development steadily intensified and yielded several casualties, including the unfortunate shooting of a civil Malaysian Airline. The incident resulted in the death of 298 passengers and crew all aboard the flight- MH17.
With the accelerated intensification of the movement across its eastern sector, the Ukrainian government worked to ratify the First Minsk Agreement. The agreement was signed on 5th Sep 2014 and was set to end a 5-month-long conflict, aiming to bring peace. The agreement, however, collapsed soon after, leading to the signing of the Second Minsk agreement.
Tensions within the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, however remain at a boiling point as the territories later find themselves to transform into independent statelets. Despite not finding international recognition, leading rebels within these regions formed self-governing bodies. This development had already demonstrated significant popularity during the earlier stages of the conflict, as evidenced by the head of the de facto electoral commission, who reported that 89% of voters in Donetsk and 96% in Luhansk supported self-rule. (Walker, 2023)
The sustenance of tensions within its eastern regions further drove the Ukrainian government to rely upon the EU and NATO for aid. This strengthening in alliance resulted in the endorsement of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine on 9th July 2016. The formation and implementation of the package resulted in the provision of even greater assistance from NATO to Ukraine.
Following the endorsement of CAP, Ukraine’s parliament also voted for integrating and enacting national laws which underlined Ukraine’s commitment to join the ranks of a NATO member.
The ratification of Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU follows the engagement of CAP with 2017, which was followed by further strengthening of Ukraine’s relations with the West. The year also marked approval of the largest commercial sale of lethal arms to Ukraine since 2014 by the United States under the Trump administration.
The year 2019 brought more changes to the Ukrainian national policies, aligning the country further towards the West. That year witnessed the election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine’s new President, under whose leadership the country deepened its alignment with Western partners.
The succeeding years of 2020 and 2021 saw further development of Ukraine’s ties with the EU, NATO and the US with the country being granted NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) status in the year of 2020.
Throughout decades, while Ukraine worked to constantly ally itself with the west, it also strained its ties and relations with Russia. While Ukraine began its alliance with its Western counterparts to counter its high dependency upon Russia, its processing ties pulled it further from its Eastern neighbours. The growth of the Western influence within Ukraine’s grounds also worked to agitate Russia due to the US and NATO’s hostile past with the country. The deterioration of the Russia – Ukraine relations peaked when Ukraine reignited its efforts to join the ranks of NATO as a member country. Agreements such as the CAP and the EOP further impaired the relations and added to Russia’s fear of NATO’s expansion towards the east.
It can be speculated that Ukraine’s persistent actions to strengthen and solidify its alliance with the West alongside the growing support of the EU and NATO towards Ukraine cornered Russia to react to protect itself against what it perceived as a major threat to its national security.
This reaction translated to Russia performing one of its largest military exercises since the Cold War, holding joint manoeuvres with Belarus close to the Belarus/Ukrainian border alongside stationing over 110,000 troops across the Russia/Ukraine border.
Finally, prior to escalating its military exercises into a full-scale operation, Russia proposed its conditions for de-escalation of the political tensions. Among its key conditions were a guaranteed prohibition on Ukraine joining the NATO alliance and a halt to NATO’s military activities within Ukrainian and eastern European territories.
Russia- Ukraine Interdependence (Post-1991)
The end of the 20th century saw the fall of the Soviet Union alongside the formation of new geopolitical alliances and interdependence. Amongst these raising changes, Russia and Ukraine too, saw immense development of their geopolitical co-dependency.
The symbiosis portrayed by the two countries was multifaceted, covering a large domain of trade, economic and global relations. This cooperation also cultivated several treaties between Russia and Ukraine.
Economic Interdependence
The split of the Soviet Union resulted in the birth of several countries. This event, however, also resulted in massive geopolitical instability amongst the newly formed states.
To cope and recover from the state of instability, Ukraine found itself largely reliant upon the Russian alliance. This reliance manifested itself in Ukraine’s heavy dependence on Russia for strategic supplies while Russia’s counter-dependence on Ukraine remained far lighter.
In terms of trade, Ukraine was majorly dependent on supplies of raw material.
Reportedly, the country imported large quantities of natural gas (over 80% of its supplies), oil (approx. 90%), alongside timber and cellulose (approx. 60% and 80% respectively) (Olszaƒski, core.ac.uk, 2001). Ukraine also depended on Russia for the supply of all its nuclear fuel.
Contrary to its reliance upon Ukraine, Russia found its neighbour to be far lighter. It was noted to be able to find replacement sources for a major amount of its strategic supplies within its own economy or the international market. The supplies which stood as an exception to this were the import of food and metallurgic products.
Trade of raw materials is not the sole source of revenue in the Ukrainian economy that comes from Russia. Before 2022, Russian gas pipelines, which were responsible for transporting large amounts of natural gas and energy resources, were also reported to provide a huge portion of Kiev’s revenue. Reportedly, Moscow provided Ukraine a sum of approx. $1 billion (per year) in exchange for allowing Russia to transit its natural gas through Ukrainian territory.
In addition, Russia was also recorded paying Ukraine a compensation of $526 million for its division of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Furthermore, Moscow was also documented remunerating a sum of $97 million annually for leasing naval facilities of the Crimean port.
Military Interdependence
While the economic relations between Russia and Ukraine were asymmetrical, their military interdependence remained relatively balanced. Drawing from their shared history with the USSR, both nations became deeply interconnected in various aspects of the defence sector. This included industrial collaboration, shared military doctrines, joint military projects, the Black Sea Fleet Agreement, and allied nuclear disarmament treaties, among other areas.
Upon achieving independence in 1991, Ukraine inherited several key defence manufacturing industries, including the renowned Yuzhmash missile manufacturer and the Motor Sich engine plant. These facilities played a vital role in supplying Russia with intercontinental ballistic missiles and engine technology for various helicopters and aircraft. In return, Russia played a vital role in this partnership by providing these industries with access to markets and raw materials essential for their operations.
Dwelling further into past Russia – Ukraine military cooperation, similarities within the military structure and training pattern can be noted amongst the defence forces of both the nations. Due to the shared past of nations as former Soviet states, Russia and Ukraine share familiarity within the facilitated framework of their military doctrines.
Building on the previous defence alliance between the two nations is the Black Sea Fleet agreement which was ratified by Russia and Ukraine in 1997. The agreement essentially leased the facilities provided by the Sevastopol port of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian defence forces. This arrangement allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain stationed at the Crimean port and utilize its facilities in exchange for an annual payment of $96 million for the duration of the agreement.
Further adding, Russia and Ukraine have also shown military cooperation in terms of energy fuel. Reports have indicated Russian aid with the supply of energy fuel, including natural gas and oil to Ukrainian military operations.
Interdependence with Maintaining International Relations
The extent of Russia-Ukraine interdependence isn’t limited to the nations’ military and economic cooperation, but it expands into the diplomatic avenues of both the countries.
This is evident in several international agreements, such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Signed on December 5, 1994, the memorandum facilitated the transfer of Ukraine’s nuclear stockpile—previously the third largest in the world—to the Russian Federation, enabling Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It remains a notable example of geopolitical collaboration between Russia and Ukraine.
More of Russia – Ukraine diplomatic alliance can also be seen within the previously mentioned Black Sea Fleet agreement of 1997 as the treaty not only played a major role in bolstering Ukraine’s national GDP, but it also enabled the country to fulfil specific goals with regards to further strengthening their geopolitical ties with the west.
Ukraine’s Developing Ties with the West
The deepening interdependence between Russia and Ukraine, as previously discussed, was not the sole geopolitical shift resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to significant geopolitical changes, including the emergence of newly independent states, the end of the Cold War, and the reconfiguration of international alliances.
Within the following shift of the global status quo, a key realignment within the interstate collaboration- the strengthening of Ukraine’s alliance with the United States of America and the Western world.
Ukraine SSR’s Relations with the West
As a part of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine had few geopolitical contacts with Western nations before attaining independence. The central government in Moscow was mostly in charge of managing Ukraine’s foreign policy and international relations. The Soviet government did, however, implement reforms in 1944 that gave the Ukrainian SSR more freedom to build bilateral ties with certain countries. This change made it possible for Ukraine to join the United Nations (UN) as a founding member in 1945.
Following Ukraine’s entrance into the UN as a founding member, the state’s participation saw an increase with the former Soviet state becoming a member of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1945 as well. Subsequently, within the succeeding years, Ukraine also joined multiple international agencies including: the World Health Organization (1946), the Universal Postal Union (1947), the World Meteorological Organization (1948), the International Labour Organisation ( ILO) (1954), UNESCO (1954), the Economic Commission for Europe (1956) and the IAEA (1957) (MFA History, 2019).
Health of Ukraine with the West after Independence
The geostrategic collaboration portrayed by Ukraine and the international world, especially the West during the reign of the Soviet Union, only grew more robust after the fall of the USSR.
Post the year of 1991, the Ukrainian government, alongside the nation’s foreign ministry, began ramping efforts to further strengthen the alliance between Ukraine and the Western world. Beginning from the year of the USSR’s disintegration, Kiev’s relation with the European Union (EU) and the United States developed rapidly and foresaw a breakthrough within the year of 1992 with the signing of the Bilateral Agreement on Humanitarian, Economic, and Technical Cooperation. The agreement was signed between Ukraine and the US and aimed to aid the Ukrainian market and support democratic reforms.
Within the subsequent 2 years, Ukraine entered the Partnership and Cooperation treaty with the EU within the year of 1994, which was followed by the signing of the Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement (TICA) and the Charter on Strategic Partnership between the US and Ukraine in the year of 2008. The same year also foresaw the signing of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements between the EU and Ukraine.
Several other agreements including: the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (2014), Common Aviation Area Agreement (2021) and the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM) (2022), were also signed and functioned as stepping stones for bolstering Ukraine’s ties with the West and the United States.
Ukraine’s Initiatives to Integrate with The West
Since becoming an independent nation (and even during its time as a soviet state), Ukraine has displayed great enthusiasm to ally itself with its Western European counterparts. This enthusiasm portrayed itself within the realignment of Ukraine’s foreign policy after the disintegration of the USSR. While the country recognized the necessity of its dependence upon Russia for the sustenance and positive evolution of its national economy, it felt the need to also lean upon the United States and the EU to counterbalance its dependency upon Russian aid.
For achieving its renewed national goals, Ukraine took several initiatives including joining the North Atlantic Cooperation in 1991 and subsequently becoming the member of the Partnership for peace (PFP). in 1992 to bring itself closer to becoming a member-state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Further, Ukraine invested in substantial reformation and modernization of its defence forces to appease NATO’s military standards. Following the reconfiguration of its military forces, Ukraine also reportedly amended its constitution to enshrine its aspirations for NATO and EU membership as strategic foreign policy objectives.
Apart from its endeavours to join NATO, Ukraine also showed a great desire to continue to participate in a number of international accords, such as the EU’s Eastern Partnership program (2009) and the Association Agreement (2014), among others.
Implications of Ukraine’s Ties with the West on Russia
Ukraine’s determination to integrate with the EU and the United States grew stronger with each passing decade. However, this enthusiasm was not mirrored by its neighbouring state, Russia. Unlike Ukraine and the West’s heightened interest in this geopolitical shift, Russia exhibited significant hesitation and discomfort with the idea of its former satellite state joining an alliance historically associated with adversarial relations toward itself.
Russia’s apprehension was further fuelled by the significant impacts resulting from Ukraine’s strengthening alliance with the EU and the United States. These developments carried repercussions across various areas, including military, economic, and international relations.
Economic Implications
The increased closeness between Ukraine and the west held various consequences for the Russian economy.
To begin with, the influx of Ukrainian exports to Russia dipped drastically from $29 million in the year of 2011 to approximately $5 million within the subsequent years. Ukraine’s membership within trade agreements such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as well as the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM) reportedly placed further pressure upon the weakening economic conditions between the two nations.
Further, Ukraine, with its newfound alliance was also recorded to be pulling away from the Russian market in terms of trade dependency. The following was largely witnessed in the year of 2014 when Ukraine halted the direct purchase of Russian gas. Instead, the country opted for importing gas from European markets through reverse flow mechanisms via Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
The growing gap between the Russia Ukraine relations also resulted in the increased economic sanctions upon Russia. The greatest example of the following can be noted in the year of 2014 when the US, accompanied by the EU, imposed several sanctions upon Russia for its bloodless and majorly non-violent acquisition of the Crimean Peninsula. The move intriguingly also placed challenges for the Ukrainian market due to the loss of its traditional Russian market and the need to adapt to stringent EU standards.
The following implications, coupled alongside several others held painful results for the Russian economy.
Before the heightening of Ukraine’s alliance with the West, Russia and Ukraine maintained significant trade agreements. Additionally, they made substantial investments in each other’s import and export deals, fostering simultaneous growth in their respective economic markets. However, upon the realignment of the country’s coalition with the EU and the US, Ukraine seemingly began pulling further way from its partnership with Russia.
This decision not only caused Russia to lose one of its largest trade partners but also limited the country’s international trade options. Additionally, Russia experienced a significant setback in its natural gas exports due to Ukraine’s decision to suspend direct energy trade with the country.
Ukraine’s decision to prioritize its alliance with the West also led to the alienation of Russia from the European market. Positioned as a buffer state between Russia and the West, Ukraine played a crucial role in transporting Russian natural gas to the Western world, facilitating smooth energy trade. However, Ukraine’s refusal to allow the transit of Russian natural gas could disrupt this flow, potentially closing off multiple international markets for Russia’s energy exports.
Military Implications
The military and security implications can be noted to be the most painful for Russia. Ukraine’s fervour for integrating itself with the Western world held several national security threats towards Russia.
To start off, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been historically recorded to hold an anti-Russia policy. Ukraine’s integration within the NATO shall thus present itself as a major security threat to Russia’s national security as the move shall bring a hostile entity right next to the Russian border. Further, Ukraine’s participation within the organization should allow the west to station the NATO forces close, if not right next to the Russian border. This strategy shall not only enable the EU and US to monitor Russia’s defence movements, but it shall also potentially grant the West the ability to hinder Russian military drills and operations.
The potential eastward expansion of NATO forces into Ukrainian territory also presents a risk to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This is because of the strategic location of the Crimean Peninsula, which, if NATO were to establish a presence in the region, could potentially block Russia’s access to the Sevastopol port (in the event of war) and, by extension, its elite defence unit. Such a move would also restrict Russia’s access to one of the few year-round ports in the region.
In addition, NATO’s expansion towards the isn’t the only threat to the Russian defence infrastructure. Ukraine’s increased dependence upon the West also poses a threat to Russia’s military industries. As previously discussed, before the strengthening of Ukraine’s relations with the West, the country found a major portion of its defence industry to be deeply intertwined with its Russian counterparts. This deep-rooted interdependence also faces a risk of a complete breakdown, which shall result in the loss of another major market avenue. Glimpses of this can be seen within the current state of the Russia– Ukraine defence market.
Impact on Russia– Ukraine Relations
With the looming threat of significant upsets to its economic, military and geopolitical health, Russia has remained less than pleased with the shift in Ukraine’s foreign policies.
Yet, despite the multitude of negative repercussions the country has and could potentially face, Russia hasn’t portrayed significant resistance against Ukraine’s initiatives to further attach itself to the Western world. On the contrary, Russia has been reported aiding Ukraine in its quest to diversify its international relations as seen within its role in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 which directly enabled Ukraine’s accession to the NPT.
Regardless of the implications of Ukraine’s realignment of its economic alliances and policies, Russia showed relatively limited resistance to its neighbour’s participation in West-oriented trade agreements. However, this shift did have some negative effects on both nations’ trade relations, resulting in a significant decline in the import and export of various commodities, including defence products and natural gas, over the years.
Russia, however, expressed significant resistance and dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. Moscow’s strong opposition stemmed from the numerous security threats it would face if Ukraine were recognized as a NATO member. It is widely speculated that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was largely driven by Ukraine’s determined push for NATO membership, despite Russia’s vocal objections and the United States’ discouragement during the 2008 NATO, Ukraine, and Russia conference.
Throughout their geopolitical relationship, Russia’s primary source of discomfort can be traced to Ukraine’s repeated attempts to join the NATO alliance. This is evident in the recurring pattern of conflicts between the two nations following Ukraine’s increased efforts to align itself with NATO. A notable example is the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which occurred shortly after Ukraine’s policy shift in 2013 to prioritize NATO membership. This shift, along with Ukraine’s growing ties with NATO, sparked heightened Russian agitation.
Conclusion
The deterioration of Russia- Ukraine relations serves as a crucial case study in understanding the complexities of modern geopolitics. What began as a historically close alliance unravelled due to conflicting national interests, shifting foreign policies, and deep-rooted security concerns. Ukraine’s pursuit of closer ties with the West clashed with Russia’s strategic objective of maintaining its sphere of influence, leading to economic disruptions, diplomatic estrangement, and regional instability.
At the core of this geopolitical shift was Russia’s apprehension over Ukraine’s potential NATO membership, which heightened fears of military encirclement, the weakening of its strategic foothold in the Black Sea, and the loss of critical assets like the Sevastopol port. These concerns not only fuelled tensions between the two nations but also reshaped broader global alliances, with long-term consequences for regional security and international power dynamics. As geopolitical rivalries continue to evolve, the Russia- Ukraine conflict highlights the urgent need for diplomatic engagement and strategic policy responses to prevent further instability and escalation.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies
Image Courtesy: Newsweek
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