With an emphasis on common definitions, legal frameworks, and institutional processes supporting their strategic relationship, this research study examines the interagency collaboration between France and India in the fight against terrorism.  Both nations share the necessity of zero tolerance for terrorism, and they acknowledge the contribution of transnational financing—including the narco-terror nexus—to the upkeep of extremist networks.  The study emphasises political unity but limited practical results through case studies such as the reactions to the 2008 Mumbai and 2015 Paris attacks, as well as the difficulties in extraditing suspects with ties to the diaspora.  Divergent legal traditions, administrative roadblocks, and technical incompatibilities are some of the main issues noted.  To help both India-France better address the evolving global terrorist threats, the study recommends practical measures to institutionalise collaboration, enhance the sharing of digital evidence, and standardise legal processes.

Introduction

One of the biggest risks to the world in the twenty-first century is terrorism, which threatens the security, sovereignty, and democratic ideals of countries on all continents. Following fatal terrorist assaults like the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2015 Paris attacks, France and India have stepped up their bilateral collaboration in the fight against terrorism. Although their strategic relationship was established in 1998, both countries are now seeking greater inter-agency cooperation in this area due to recent advancements in digital radicalisation, transnational terrorism, and geopolitical changes.

A collection of operational channels and structures that connect law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, courts, and cybersecurity task forces forms the basis of this collaboration. With strong judicial monitoring and a sophisticated domestic counterterrorism system headed by the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI), France contributes to the discussion. The National Investigation Agency (NIA), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are just a few of the specialised agencies that India uses to coordinate threat detection, interdiction, and investigation both domestically and abroad.

Literature Review

1. Strategic Evolution of the India–France Counterterrorism Partnership

With frequent high-level meetings like the Strategic Dialogue and the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, which held its 16^th meeting in Paris in January 2024, the India-France strategic partnership has placed a greater emphasis on security and counterterrorism since it was formally established in 1998 (MEA, 2025; French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs).

2. Legal and Operational Instruments

India and France have signed many agreements that allow for collaboration in cybercrime, marine security, and judicial coordination, according to the Ministry of External Affairs (2025).  The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967, serves as the foundation for India’s counterterrorism legislation, whilst Article 421-1 and later of the French Penal Code are used.  The Observer Research Foundation (2022) points out that despite high strategic alignment, there are still practical difficulties because of disparate legal systems, bureaucratic cultures, and extradition laws.

3. Cybersecurity and Digital Radicalisation

Radicalisation on the internet poses a threat to both countries. Under the India–France Digital Partnership, France and India have initiated communication through Pharos, an online platform for monitoring extremist content, and its Cyber Coordination Centre. However, according to the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS, India, 2023), operational data-sharing is still in its infancy and coordination in this area is still restricted to policy-level exchanges.

Research Gaps

There are still many unanswered questions regarding the institutional and operational dynamics unique to the India-France alliance, despite the growing body of research on international counterterrorism cooperation.  Current research frequently ignores the technological, legal, and logistical obstacles that prevent real-time interagency cooperation in favour of concentrating on broad diplomatic alignment and shared political will.  For instance, little empirical research has been done on the practical effects of different legal traditions (civil law vs. common law) on mutual legal assistance or extradition procedures.  Comparably, nothing is known about how bilateral frameworks handle new issues like diaspora-linked radicalisation, cryptocurrency-based terror financing, and cyberterrorism.  Lastly, there is a dearth of evidence-based suggestions for institutional reform and capacity-building since the majority of the literature currently in publication does not systematically assess policy results beyond high-level joint declarations.

Research Objectives

This research project is driven by the following core objectives:

1. To explore the existing frameworks and channels of inter-agency coordination between India and France on counterterrorism.
2. To identify institutional, legal, or procedural barriers in inter-agency cooperation.

Existing Common Grounds

1. Shared Core Definition and Legal Standpoint

Regardless of the intellectual, political, or religious motivations behind terrorism, India and France share a complete, zero-tolerance stance. According to their definition, terrorism is the illegal use of force or threat of force against citizens or public institutions to threaten or compel governments or people, usually to forward ideological goals.

• India’s Position: India emphasises that no act of violence against civilians in peacetime can be justified, citing domestic legislation such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and Supreme Court rulings. Additionally, India is a strong supporter of the United Nations’ Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), which seeks a universally accepted definition of terrorism that is enforceable by law.
• France’s Position: Under Articles 421–1 to 421–6 of the French Penal Code, terrorism is defined as serious acts (such as murder, kidnapping, and sabotage) carried out intending to gravely disrupt public order using terror or intimidation. Definitions from UN Security Council resolutions and EU regulations are also incorporated into French law.
• Common Ground: Both countries reject distinctions such as “freedom fighters” vs. “terrorists,” insisting on a unified international framework that criminalises terrorism in all forms.

2. Converging Threat Perceptions and Real-World Experience

India and France both view contemporary terrorism as a cross-border threat, despite their different internal issues.  While India fights separatist insurgencies and cross-border terrorism, primarily from Pakistan, France experiences lone-wolf Islamist assaults by radicalised citizens and returning foreign fighters.  Major urban attacks occurred in both cities (Paris in 2015 and Mumbai in 2008), which led to a move toward preventive measures.  Additionally, they acknowledge diaspora-linked extremism, online radicalisation, and terror funding as common challenges and back one another’s counterterrorism initiatives at the UN and FATF.

3. Alignment through Multilateral Institutions

Through multilateral forums that facilitate interagency alignment, intelligence sharing, and cooperative normative frameworks, India and France have strengthened their counterterrorism collaboration.  Both participate in the CTED and CTC at the UN, conducting cooperative assessments and exchanging intelligence.  In order to facilitate joint financial investigations, they have ratified important accords such as the 1999 Convention on Terrorism Financing.  Their Financial Intelligence Units, Tracfin and FIU-IND, collaborate under the Egmont Group through the FATF and adhere to international norms, such as Recommendations 5 and 40. Red and Blue Notices, joint task force participation, and the sharing of biometric and travel information via I-24/7 are all examples of Interpol collaboration, which most recently helped India track down suspects in France.  Both countries supported darknet monitoring, the use of AI for early detection, and the interruption of online radicalisation in 2023, when India was the G20 president.  Notably, the Delhi G20 Action Plan called for a global security cloud to streamline cross-border intelligence processing, with France and India serving as co-leaders.

4. Converging Definitions and Funding Patterns of Terrorism between France and India

One of the most significant areas of convergence is the recognition that drug trafficking is a shared funding source for terrorism in both nations. This connection has been flagged by:

• India’s Ministry of Home Affairs
• France’s Ministry of the Interior
• Interpol, UNODC, and FATF

 4.1. India’s Experience:

• The drug crisis in Punjab has revealed how Pakistan-based organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Khalistani separatist networks use heroin smuggling from Afghanistan through Pakistan to finance militant activities. 
•  Narco-money has been used to purchase weapons and finance radicalisation initiatives, according to NIA investigations.
• The Indian Navy’s drug seizures in the Arabian Sea, such as INS Talwar operations, have shown connections to the funding of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere.

4.2. France’s Experience:

• French intelligence services, specifically DGSI and Tracfin, have monitored how Islamist networks implicated in the attacks in Nice (2016) and Paris (2015) utilised hashish and cocaine trafficking profits to fund underground cells, weapons, and logistics. 
• Salafist networks and organised drug gangs in French suburbs are increasingly overlapping, according to reports from Europol and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).
• Like networks found in India, criminal proceeds are frequently laundered using cryptocurrencies or hawala systems.

4.3 Multilateral Recognition of the Narco-Terror Nexus

Both countries actively advocate for international attention to narco-terrorism in platforms like:

• FATF, where they push for tighter scrutiny of non-bank financial systems.
• UNODC, where India and France have supported frameworks linking drug cartels and terrorism in South Asia and North Africa.
• Interpol, which coordinates cross-border drug interdiction efforts involving both countries’ narcotics bureaus.

4.4 Way Forward: Joint Action Against Narco-Terrorism

1. The Joint Intelligence Task Force examined the financing of terrorists through narco-finance.
2. Establish a Joint Strategic Dialogue Working Group on the Drug-Terror Nexus between France and India.
3. Track offshore accounts, cryptocurrency wallets, and dual-use transactions by utilising Interpol and FATF data integration. 
4.  Strengthen naval cooperation between France and India to stop drug smuggling routes in the Indian Ocean that could finance extremist organisations in Europe and South Asia.

Extradition Policies for Reform

One of the most important legal instruments for international counterterrorism cooperation is extradition. It makes it possible for nations to prosecute suspects and fugitives internationally, particularly in situations involving cybercrime, radical networks, and transnational terrorism. Extradition between France and India is a realistic test of interagency coordination, including judicial, diplomatic, and investigative collaboration, as well as a bilateral legal process.

1. Existing India–France Extradition Treaty (2003)

The Extradition Treaty between the Republic of India and the French Republic, signed on 24 September 2003 and in force since 2005, provides the legal basis for surrendering individuals charged with extraditable offences.

Key Provisions:

• The act must be illegal in both jurisdictions, according to the dual criminality clause.
• In accordance with international anti-terror conventions, political offences related to terrorism are not subject to rejection.
• Human rights protection: If there is a possibility of cruel treatment or the death penalty in India, France has the power to refuse extradition. 
• Mutual Legal Assistance: Under the treaty, testimonies, documents, and temporary custody may be shared. 

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which forbids extradition in situations where torture, humiliating treatment, or the death penalty are feasible, applies to France and many other EU nations.

2. Operational Challenges in Implementation

Despite the treaty, practical cooperation is often slowed by legal, procedural, and political obstacles.

A. Human Rights and Death Penalty Concerns

Like many other EU nations, France has abolished the death penalty and is hesitant to extradite suspects to nations where the death penalty is still an option.

For example, In cases involving suspects in major attacks (e.g., 26/11 conspirators or IS-linked individuals), extradition has been delayed until India provides assurances of commutation of death sentences.

B. Bureaucratic and Judicial Delays

• Appellate courts and possibly the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) are among the several levels of judicial review that French extradition cases go through.
• Inconsistencies in documentation, diplomatic backlogs all reduce productivity.

C. Inconsistent Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Procedures

• Incompatible evidence formats or a lack of EU-standard forensic paperwork frequently result in the procedural denial or delay of India’s requests for judicial cooperation through the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

D. Digital and Cyber Evidence Lag

• In cyber-terror investigations, collaboration between France’s DGSI or digital enforcement divisions and India’s NIA is slowed down by the absence of established methods for exchanging encrypted digital evidence (such as social media chats or blockchain-based terror financing).

3. Policy Recommendations for Enhancing Extradition Cooperation

• To make extradition more effective, predictable, and aligned with modern terrorism challenges, several reforms and institutional enhancements can be considered:

A. Bilateral Fast-Track Protocol for Terrorism Cases

• Only offences related to terrorism could trigger a special procedure under the current treaty.
• To oversee deadlines and direct submissions, a designated contact officer from the central authorities of both nations—such as the Ministry of Justice in France and the NIA in India—would be involved.

B. Death Penalty Assurances Framework

• To expedite French judicial clearance, India can write standard legal documents guaranteeing life in prison or a modification of sentences in extraditable terror cases.
• This would eliminate a significant bottleneck and satisfy European human rights compliance.

C. Digital Evidence Treaty Addendum

• To conform to the EU’s e-Evidence Directive, amend the 2003 treaty or add a Protocol on Digital Cooperation.
• Emphasis areas include secure cloud-based transfer systems, chain-of-custody protocols, and metadata sharing.

D. Joint Extradition Monitoring Committee

• Create a bi-national oversight system that periodically assesses outstanding extradition requests and looks into hold-ups.
• The India-UK Extradition Review Mechanism might serve as a model.

E. Common Training Modules for Judicial Officers

• Hold training aimed at enhancing the legal and procedural expectations of each nation for magistrates, investigators, and prosecutors.
• Make use of forums such as the EU-India Legal Affairs Forum and the India-France Strategic Dialogue.

Challenges in India France Inter Agency Coordination

The practical application of inter-agency coordination is still unequal, notwithstanding significant progress in bilateral counterterrorism collaboration between France and India. The full potential of this strategic collaboration continues to be hampered by a number of issues, from technology gaps to legal incompatibilities. These obstacles impact everything from digital investigations and real-time responses to information sharing and extradition.

1. Legal and Constitutional Barriers

A. Differing Legal Systems and Traditions

France has a civil law system based on codified statutes, while India has a common law system that mostly relies on case law and judicial precedents. This discrepancy results in contradictions in:

• Evidence admissibility standards.
• Types of prosecutable offences (e.g., France does not recognise sedition).
• Scope of preventive detention.

B. Human Rights Constraints on Extradition

• It is illegal for France to extradite anyone to nations where they might be subjected to torture, cruel treatment, or the death penalty because of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
• Despite overwhelming evidence, extradition has been delayed and denied since India still possesses the death sentence for terrorism and other uncommon offences.

C. Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Hurdles

• Non-standardised formats, a lack of translation, or inadequate accompanying documents are the main reasons why MLA requests from India are routinely delayed in France.
• The lack of an automated legal exchange mechanism slows down judicial collaboration, which is mostly dependent on ad hoc contact and diplomatic correspondence.

D. Solutions

• Extradition Safeguards Agreement: In order to fulfil France’s human rights commitments, negotiate a bilateral protocol wherein India guarantees the commutation of the death penalty in extradition situations.
• Pre-approved Offence Lists: In order to expedite proceedings under Article 3 of the 2003 Extradition Treaty, a mutually agreed-upon list of extraditable and non-extraditable offences should be created.

Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) Annexe: Create an addendum that standardises MLA submission guidelines, translation formats, and request templates.

2. Technological and Cybersecurity Limitations

A. No Common Digital Evidence Protocol

• There is currently no mutual framework for:
  • The admissibility of digital forensics
  • Chain-of-custody agreements for electronic evidence
  • Legal interception or decryption of encrypted apps

This limits the utility of shared cyber-evidence in prosecutorial processes, especially in terrorism-financing and social media radicalisation cases.

B. Interoperability Gaps in Surveillance Infrastructure

• France and India employ distinct systems for facial recognition, cloud storage, and digital surveillance. 
• Unlike the EU’s Schengen Information System, there is no interoperability with watch lists, blacklists, or biometric data-sharing systems.

C. Cyber-Sovereignty and Data Localisation Conflicts

• France is governed by EU GDPR laws, while India has introduced its own Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023). These laws have different mandates on:
  • Cross-border data flow
  • Data anonymization
  • Consent architecture

This legal divergence restricts the free flow of data and digital evidence in counterterrorism cases involving social media, encrypted apps, and cryptocurrency wallets.

D. Solutions

• Digital Evidence Exchange Protocol: Create a bilateral agreement that complies with India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) and the EU GDPR, permitting the safe transfer of:
  • Metadata logs
  • Cloud records
  • Encrypted communication evidence
• Create a Joint Digital Forensics Lab: Co-develop a cyber-lab for simulation, training, and secure data analysis for terrorism-related digital evidence.
• Interoperability Upgrades: Collaborate to ensure watch lists, biometric databases, and AI surveillance tools are technically compatible with API-level access.

3. Political and Diplomatic Limitations

A. France’s Alignment with EU Norms

• France must abide by EU-wide regulations on data protection, human rights, and security cooperation as a member of the EU. This occasionally clashes with India’s bilateral demands, particularly with regard to counter-radicalisation and extradition.

B. Diaspora-Linked Pressure Groups

• Some political factions within the Indian diaspora, such as right-wing supporters or Khalistani sympathisers, have lobbied inside French civil society, making collaboration on delicate extradition and surveillance demands more difficult.
• In democracies, governments may be cautious about perceived overreach or discrimination against religious or ethnic groups due to political caution.

C. Solutions

• Democratic Oversight Mechanism: Establish a system of oversight with impartial judicial observers to examine delicate activities, allaying political worries about monitoring or extradition.
• Joint Public Statements & Policy Messaging: Organise coordinated press conferences to counteract disinformation or lobbying that hinders cooperation and to increase domestic political support.
• Track Diaspora-Linked Radicalisation Together: Establish diaspora intelligence mapping cells with civil society participation to identify fundraising channels and signs of radicalisation.

4. Limited Joint Training and Legal Familiarity

• Regular training modules involving investigative staff, cybercrime analysts, and judicial authorities from both countries do not exist.
• This results in poor understanding of each other’s legal thresholds, Misinterpretation of procedural steps in MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) requests and causes Friction in the interpretation of Red Notice justifications under Interpol.

Solutions

• Joint Capacity-Building Programs:
  • Annual India–France Counterterrorism Training Week, rotating between Delhi and Paris.
  • Specialised training on cyber laws, case building, and digital evidence handling.
• Legal and Investigative Exchange Program: Permit top officers, judges, and prosecutors to be temporarily deputised to monitor activities in the partner nation.
• Develop Joint SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures): For handling extradition, cybercrime evidence, diaspora surveillance, and inter-agency meetings.

Mutual learning in Countering Terrorism

What France Can Learn From India

• Handling Cross-Border State-Sponsored Terrorism: India has decades of experience fighting proxy conflicts and state-sponsored terrorism from nearby regions.  France can learn from India’s intelligence-driven border surveillance, diplomatic pressure tactics, and military preparedness to combat cross-border infiltration, since France is becoming more and more concerned about external influences on internal radicalisation (such as those from crisis zones in the Middle East and North Africa).
• Managing High-Intensity Urban Attacks: France should use India’s multi-agency crisis management and other coordinated response systems to complex assaults like 26/11 as a model to improve its rapid response procedures.
• Countering Diaspora-Linked Extremism: India’s approach to monitoring overseas funding streams for separatist movements offers insights into controlling external support for domestic radical groups.

What India Can Learn From France

• Counter-Radicalisation and Rehabilitation Programs: India can learn from France’s strong community involvement, de-radicalisation facilities, and focus on social integration to stop radicalisation at its root to combat domestic extremism more forcefully.
• Cybersecurity and Privacy Balancing:  As its cyber monitoring grows, India may adopt the sophisticated systems France has created to track online radicalisation while balancing privacy rights under EU rules.
• Legal Oversight and Human Rights: France provides a helpful model for India’s developing legal systems by demonstrating how to preserve democratic ideals while ensuring security through its judicial review procedures and commitment to human rights standards, especially in cases involving terrorism.

Conclusion

Democratic countries like France and India have been forced by the changing face of international terrorism to shift from traditional bilateral diplomacy to more extensive interagency counterterrorism cooperation. As this paper has demonstrated, both nations reject the idea that there is a difference between “good” and “bad” terrorists. They also reaffirm their commitment to combating new threats such as cyber terrorism, lone-wolf actors, and the financing of terrorism through the drug trade.

Effective operational cooperation is nevertheless hampered by major legal, procedural, and technological barriers, even in spite of their strategic congruence. Institutional innovation is desperately needed, as seen by issues like the death penalty’s obstacle to extradition, the bureaucratic hold-ups in legal aid, and the incompatibilities in digital forensics. With few successful cooperative investigations, sluggish extradition, and little field-level intelligence fusion, the real impact on the ground is still small despite the great diplomatic unity that was demonstrated during the 2008 Mumbai and 2015 Paris attacks.

Nonetheless, the frameworks for more robust collaboration are already established. A foundation that can be expanded upon is offered by the India–France Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism, their involvement in Interpol, FATF, and the G20, and their growing participation in naval and cyber exercises. There is an obvious opportunity for focused cooperative action given the mutual awareness of narco-terrorism, in which the drug trade funds extreme forces in both countries.

To realise the full potential of their partnership, India and France must:

• Develop specialised extradition protocols for terrorism-related cases.
• Align their cyber laws and digital evidence-sharing mechanisms.
• Institutionalise liaison frameworks, joint task forces, and real-time intelligence platforms.
• Commit to joint capacity-building programs that bring together investigators, prosecutors, and digital analysts.

India and France have the strategic need and moral authority to set an example in a world where dangers are becoming more fragmented, transnational, and technology-driven. Enhancing interagency coordination benefits both parties and contributes to international peace and security.

Title image courtesy: https://www.civilsdaily.com/

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

References

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