Geopolitics Military Affairs Strategic Technologies

Information Warfare and Cyber Security: NATO’s Challenges

ByAjay Kumar

Aug 17, 2024 Cybersecurity, Information Warfare, NATO, Russia, Ukraine

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Amidst the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe and the US have provided substantial assistance to Ukraine, including the transfer of Technology, and expertise. Real-time cyber involvement by US and UK cyber agencies, as well as private player support, is critical. Moscow’s information warfare and cyber offensive over Ukraine was unprepared due to the original hope involving a short war; devastating Western economic sanctions as well as the impact of Russian IT expertise. The cyber retribution from NATO or significant cyberattacks accidentally leading to direct military confrontation, has led to a ‘Cyber–Cold War’ standoff between Western Dominance and Russia. However, one shouldn’t underestimate the risk of cyber escalation, particularly in case Russian military initiatives on terrain fail and the Kremlin believes it is in a corner. Along with strengthening its cybersecurity laws and policies, the EU must also take more action to combat misinformation. This is particularly important when it comes to resolving the problem of weak links resulting from varying standards among Member States.

Accountability for Cyber War Crimes

A subset of cyber operations that took place during the armed struggle in Ukraine that come in under the legality of war crimes is being examined by the ICC (International Criminal Court) and certain State authorities. Even though the ICC, or International Criminal Court, has declared that it will prosecute such crimes as a matter of policy, there are still many details that need to be ironed out before holding fair and rigorous criminal trials. These include how the ICC would obtain evidence from States, share it with defence teams, and assess whether or not it can safeguard its cyber defences in light of the recent International Criminal Court hack. Any organization that undertakes this will need to learn from States’ experiences developing their capacity to look into and prosecute comparable cybercrimes that are sponsored by the federal government to face these hurdles.

The Function of Private Actors in Cyberspace

An important part of the conflict has been fought by private actors. This panel discussed how businesses have supported Ukraine, but it also discussed what individuals are doing to support both Russia and Ukraine. Private enterprises have been instrumental in aiding the country to transition its data, which constitutes one of their most important jobs. Ukraine quickly enacted new legislation allowing the migration of Ukrainian data to foreign servers shortly after the invasion. This prevented the destruction of information against reactive operations upon cyber architecture as well as allowed multinationals like Google and Cisco to protect the Ukrainian army’s data against Russian cyber-attacks. By 2014, which was Cisco had further helped Ukraine detect Russian cyber threats and strengthen its networks to withstand the ongoing assault. A significant part of the conflict was additionally undertaken by private citizens. Regarding International Humanitarian Law, these people raise the question of whether or not their activities qualify as active involvement in hostilities. Nearly every person in Ukraine owns a cellphone, making the country a sensor-rich battleground. In Ukraine, as well as targeted programs that let citizens tell the Ukrainian military about Russian military moves and spots, have become uncommon. This makes it possible for those civilians to be attacked whenever they have been determined to be directly involved during hostilities. Additionally, organizations like the IT Army of Ukraine, which consists of non-military hackers, carry out operations against Russia. (Jackson Colling 2024)

Human Rights in Cyber Conflict

State examination of the interaction between corporations and the principles of human rights has increased as a result of changes in international law about human rights, particularly the extension of jurisdiction to extraterritorial operations. Despite forcing companies to reevaluate their conduct in cyberspace during times of war, this scrutiny has increased the scope of international human rights law and monitoring agencies’ jurisdiction over these kinds of organizations. The problem permeates the connection between international human rights law and IHL. The potential expansion of the obligation of continual attention to protecting privacy suggests that the committee considered the two courts of law to be complimentary at times. The tension between the prohibition on revealing prisoners of war to the general public and the right to freedom of speech and knowledge, nevertheless, serves as a prime instance of how they might clash. Certain State statements on cyber operations recognize that human rights law, like international humanitarian law, applies to cyberspace, whereas other States express broad perspectives on extraterritoriality and affirmative duties under human rights law.

Cyber Neutrality

This panel noted that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is putting the rule of impartiality to the test. The United States and other nations giving military assistance to Ukraine may face difficulties if neutral nations agree to limits on their military engagement with warring parties. The qualified neutrality theory is used by the US to defend its military backing. This idea allows States that are not involved in the conflict to give deadly support to States that are being attacked unlawfully.

While general neutrality principles apply to all domains, regulations of neutrality are specific to land, air, and sea. As it relates to cyberspace, the law of neutrality upholds States’ obligations to stop attacks from being launched from their territory when they become aware of such behaviour. The panel concluded that states are not required by neutrality laws to stop non-state actors from acting when they are on their territory, including their citizens. Nor, since it would be extremely difficult, are States required by neutrality laws to stop hostile actors from using their networks to support cyber activities. Given that it has specifically urged Ukrainians and others to participate in cyber operations against Russian targets, the duty to prohibit presents a possible problem for Ukraine.

Overflow of Cyberspace

Many processes and behaviours carry a danger of collateral effects. Because of the interconnection of the web, cyber presents particular threats in this regard. Like with NotPetya in the year 2017, ransomware used on one or more systems has the potential for dissemination to networks and systems worldwide. The main concern with cyber spillover is when a physical reaction is appropriate. Because States are hesitant to adopt stances before they are in a position to take action in a situation like this, this question is largely theoretical. The panel established a consensus that the response analysis takes into account what was meant behind the spilled-over action. The response opportunities may be limited if the corresponding proportionality estimate was accurate because it could indicate that a specific effect was what was supposed to happen. Nonetheless, intent is frequently hard to establish. Concepts like urgency and protection are additionally crucial. The United States adopted the stance that kinetic reaction requires a force that moves earlier on. This may change to account for non-kinetic force. Strong respondent used an illustration of the United States knocking an approaching missile out of the atmosphere to support the need for a kinetic reaction. The intention behind the missile’s launch is what counts, even though this hypothetical missile has no direct repercussions on US soil. Additional instances of circumstances that may warrant taking defensive action were significant economic harm or election meddling that would have altered the result. (Jackson Colling 2024)

Regional Perspectives

Regional and state perspectives on cyber concerns vary greatly. It is critical to comprehend these varied points of view to get to an agreement and guarantee that the global community plays by the same rules heading forward. To that aim, this panel addressed viewpoints from China, Japan, Singapore, India, and Latin America.

The Chinese panellist asserted that China has adopted globally agreed-upon ethical norms that prevent cyberspace from becoming a new battleground, as well as providing a definition of “cyber operation” that excludes information operations.

The Japanese panellist pointed out that since Russia invaded Ukraine, Japan has seen a significant rise in malware assaults. Japanese law enforcement has also disregarded Japanese hackers taking action in Ukraine and Russia because they see extraterritorial effects not requiring a law enforcement response. The Singaporean panellist stated that IHL pertains to cyber operations while outlining how Singapore views some computer attacks as armed attacks and that it retains the right to respond with force. This is because Singapore governs in a tech-centric manner, and some cyber-attacks might have disastrous consequences for Singapore.

The Indian panellist highlighted India’s neutral stance on the situation in Ukraine as well as cyber issues. India has not taken a position on the application of IHL in armed conflict. This is partly owing to India’s neighbours and its desire to avoid constraints in future operations. Finally, a Latino panellist emphasized the lack of community agreement on cyber concerns, even though Costa Rica and Brazil have released key public comments. (Jackson Colling 2024)

Cyberspace Attacks

Cyberspace is constantly contested as bad actors strive to undermine the Alliance through harmful cyber actions and propaganda. Potential enemies want to undermine our essential infrastructure, disrupt government functions, harvest intelligence, steal intellectual property, and interfere with our armed forces missions. Russia’s assault against Ukraine has emphasized the prevalence of cyber operations in modern conflict. Russia has also increased its hybrid measures against NATO partners and allies, including hostile cyber activity. China’s avowed goals and coercive methods threaten NATO’s interests, security, and values. China’s harmful hybrid and cyber activities, as well as its aggressive rhetoric and misinformation, target Allies and jeopardize NATO security. Allies are aggressively addressing the rising number of significant and chronic cyber-attacks. This includes their electoral systems and essential infrastructures, as well as hybrid campaigns that incorporate this activity. (nato.int, sep.2023)

NATO’s Policy on Cyber Defense

At the twenty-first NATO Summit in the Belgian capital, Allies approved an Integrated Cyber Defense Policy to support NATO’s three main missions, as well as its comprehensive deterrence and defence posture. Allies reiterated NATO’s defensive mission and vowed to use all available capabilities to aggressively discourage, defend against, and defeat the full range of cyber hazards at all times, especially when contemplating collective actions. Responses must be constant and rely on aspects from the whole NATO arsenal, which includes political, diplomatic, and military instruments. Allies also agreed that the impact of major cumulative hostile cyber actions may be regarded as an armed attack in some situations, prompting the North Atlantic Council to enact the fifth article of the North Atlantic Treaty on an individual basis. The nature of cyberspace necessitates a holistic response involving cooperation at the political, military, and technological levels. The 2021 policy and action plan drive actions at all three levels. (nato.int, sep.2023)

NATO’S Alliance

NATO is still working in line with multiracial law, particularly the United Nations, humanitarian law worldwide, and the multiracial rights of people Ordinance when appropriate. NATO keeps advancing a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace, as well as measures to improve stability and minimize the danger of war, by upholding international law and promoting voluntary standards of responsible state conduct in cyberspace. Furthermore, during the Vilnius Summit, Allies reaffirmed and strengthened NATO’s Cyber Defense Pledge, as well as committed to aggressive new national targets to prioritise national cyber defences, especially key infrastructures. Allies have established NATO’s Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC) to support national mitigation efforts in response to large harmful cyber activity. Allies also decided to explore mutually advantageous and effective collaborations where needed, including with partner nations, international organizations, businesses, and academia, to support NATO’s efforts to improve international cybersecurity stability. (Alika Guchua, Thornike Zedelashvili,2022)

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Cyber Defense Strategy of NATO

It must be emphasized that in the present day, economic, political, energy, military, social, and other activities have actively migrated into cyberspace. The migration of criminal proceedings to cyberspace has rendered information technology a major challenge in current global security. Conflicts and wars have seen Russia employ its cyber-offensive capabilities extensively, most notably in cyberattacks on Georgia and Ukraine. This is demonstrated by the fight between Russia and Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022, and shows how important it is to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Alliance to keep stability in the digital realm and match military objectives with modern combat tactics. All of this offers belligerents a benefit over the opponent in modern-day conflicts. During the NATO Madrid meeting, it was underlined that Russia is aggressively employing cyber assaults alongside more traditional weapons to acquire an advantage over its adversaries. During the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, there have been several cyber-attacks against Ukrainian government agencies and crucial infrastructure. A cyber-attack took out against the American corporation Space-X, which offered satellite assistance to Ukraine while providing a significant edge in terms of private communication (Howell, 2022). Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, world bodies and leading governments have been prepared to assist Ukraine in the event of hybrid war threats. The US, NATO, and even the European Union adopted cybersecurity measures. (Stephane DUGUIN, Pavlina PAVLOVA,2023)

EU Counter

The primary goal was to protect the essential critical infrastructure. The European Union has created cyber security fast reaction teams as part of their Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative. Private hackers launched counterattacks against Russia’s security, financial, and media infrastructure. The European Union’s High Commissioner (or HR) denounced the mission targeting KA-SAT, which caused communication failures for people as well as public and commercial Ukrainian enterprises, on May 10. According to Przetacznik and Tarpova (2022), the Russian cyber-attacks against Ukraine are yet another instance of their irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace. These attacks could have a systemic impact, putting European citizens’ security at risk. NATO, naturally, actively participates in Ukraine’s cyber security processes. However, the alliance’s posture remains cautious, as does that of other governments and international organizations. The caution derives from the reality that the war has not escalated and involved other countries. Russia is attempting to frighten several European governments into not assisting Ukraine in combating cyber threats. Alika Guchua and Thornike Zedelashvili. NATO has been researching and developing technology to safeguard allies and member nations for almost 70 years. Defence ministers from the Alliance agreed on an emerging and disruptive technology strategy in February 2021. (Stephane DUGUIN, Pavlina PAVLOVA,2023)

NATO – Technological Impact

NATO is working alongside the European Union effectively the United Nations to develop and deploy destructive technologies to completely address the issues. NATO has several hurdles in this area, with combining cyber into joint activities and warfighting being one of the most essential concerns for success. NATO has to have an understanding of the direction it is heading and what it hopes to accomplish. In reality, cyber technology should play a larger role in collaboration. Furthermore, complying with standards is one of the most essential challenges in the field of cyber and information security. It should be mentioned that NATO operates quite effectively in this area. NATO is helping both Georgia and Ukraine develop its cyber defence and security capabilities. As these two countries move closer to NATO norms regarding cyber security strategy, they will be far better prepared to withstand cyber-attacks from Moscow and other countries. The organization in charge of organizing NATO’s standards efforts, the NATO Standardization Office, has restated its 2021 commitment that a cyberattack might trigger the North Atlantic Treaty’s fifth article. It also agreed to collaborate with the business sector to tackle risks, to explicitly identify cyber challenges presented by Russia and China, and to upgrade NATO’s leadership structure to reflect emerging cyber dangers. NATO’s new plan would also include more than $1 billion in funding for research into future technologies like as quantum computers as computational intelligence.

A contemporary army, in addition, to an innovative defence tool for worldwide Cooperation, needs to utilize, Secure, store, analyze, and exchange vast volumes of data from anywhere. The state is also becoming more aware of the importance of cybersecurity. The recent events in Ukraine, in addition to cyber-attacks on other nations, notably Georgia, have shown the reality and gravity of the situation at hand. The nation of America is the world leader (in cyber technologies). It gives tremendous help to Ukraine at this tough moment. This state’s cyber security budget is enormous; it adds cash for the enhancement of cyber capabilities. In March 2022, the Biden presidency unveiled its FY 2023 budget, which included $11 billion for civilian cybersecurity investment, an 11% increase over the previous year. Cybersecurity challenges within the context of current global security. In 2009, the USA of America formed the Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), which symbolizes the unified combat command and is the topmost division in the country’s army. They are alleged to have participated in actions such as retaliatory cyber strikes towards the Islamic State of Iran and the Russian Government It is hard to tell with certainty at this point, but there is speculation that Iran is also assisting Russia in launching a cyber war on Ukraine. This is already under investigation, and the American special services will most likely investigate it. (Stephane DUGUIN, Pavlina PAVLOVA,2023)

Developing NATO’s Cyber Defense Capacity

Centralized and 24/7 cyber defence assistance is provided by the NATO Cyber Security Center, which is housed at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (shape) in Mons, Belgium, to safeguard NATO’s networks. This competence grows continuously, keeping up with the continuously changing threat and technological environment. (Alika Guchua, Thornike Zedelashvili,2022) The NATO alliance has set up a Cyberspace Center in Belgium. The Centre supports military leaders with knowledge of the situation to help advise the Alliance’s actions and missions. Additionally, it organizes NATO’s digital activities, guaranteeing its freedom of action and strengthening its defences against cyberattacks.

NATO establishes goals for Allied nations to deploy their national cyber defence capabilities through NATO to promote an Alliance-wide unified approach to cyber defence capacity development through the Military planning process.

NATO helps its Allies strengthen their cyber defences by promoting the idea of sharing data and the transmission of best practices, as well as conducting cyber security exercises to increase national competence. In a comparable manner particular Allies will, voluntarily and with NATO’s assistance, help other Allies build their national cyber defence capabilities. The NATO Alliance Cyber Swift Response Forces remain on standby at all times of the day to help Allies when asked and authorized by the NATO North Atlantic Council.

Cooperating with Partners

Digital dangers transcend state and organizational borders; thus, the NATO alliance collaborates variety of allied nations and other worldwide organizations to improve security. Collaboration among other nations is based on similar principles and methods to cybernetic defence. Collaboration regarding the Associations is addressed on an individual basis. NATO also collaborates with the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Conclusion

International collaboration is necessary to address the worldwide problem of cyber security. Ukraine and Georgia’s new cyber security plan should align with contemporary norms. Consider best practices from partner nations, which is a key element of collective defence. To guarantee compliance with EU, NATO, and Alliance member nations for cyber defence. Ukraine focuses on early threat detection and engagement with partner governments and organizations to improve global security. While the dispute between Russia and Ukraine has strengthened links between China and Russia and highlighted the effectiveness of drones in combat, the entire world has returned to a nuclear-fear strategy. The conflict has resulted in global fuel and food crises, an alteration in the global security architecture, and the formation of an entirely different world order (among other things).

Title image courtesy: Acer Corner

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies