As William Clay had said “This is quite a game, politics. There are no permanent enemies, and no permanent friends, only permanent interests.” (Forbes, ND). This is evident from the current engagement between the US and China, post assumption of office by Donald Trump. The recent exchange of words between US Secretary of Stare Marco Rubio and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi are certainly indicators for the times to come. Turmoil in US-China bilateral relations will undoubtedly impact the global geo-political situation, especially for India. This article explores that aspect. 

Introduction 

US-India-China Relations are important for global geo-political stability. Similarly, the US-China bilateral relations have a bearing on stability in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean region, and any turmoil in them affects many countries, including India. The US-China relations have historically gone through a ‘Blow Hot-Blow Cold’ pattern. During the Trump 1.0 era, the relations between the two countries had reached a new low. They had shown a semblance of improvement during the Biden era. But with the Trump 2.0 administration taking charge, apprehensions about deterioration have resurfaced. The show has started with a bang if the current statements of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and a retaliatory response to those from China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi are considered indicators for the future (MFA-PRC, 2025). 

Trump has been a strong supporter of ‘Made In America’, and even before he assumed office he had consistently advocated the Make America Great Again (MAGA) initiative. His views on the deportation of immigrants, curbs on granting US Visas, and imposition of a 25% trade tariff, have already created enough ripples in the global political scenario (Tao,2025).  Marco Rubio too, has been a staunch supporter of MAGA and a known critique of China. He has shown enough signs to China, leaving it without doubts about what to expect, in the coming days (USDS,24 Jan 2025). 

US-China bilateral relations gravely impact the geo-political situation for India- as it plays an important balancing role in the US-India-China conundrum. Keeping in mind the unfolding US-China power game, India needs to be prepared to maintain an equilibrium between the two giants, if it wants to avoid becoming a sacrificial pawn in the US-China power chess game. 

This article accordingly focuses on the unfolding US-China relations, personalities involved, impacts on the US and China, specific impacts on India and viable measures it could institute to protect its national interests. 

US-China Bilateral Relations- Historical Perspective 

Words of Graham Allison: “Never before in history has a rising power ascended so far, so fast, on so many different dimensions”, aptly explain the meteoritic rise of China as a global power. That rise has been a root cause of fierce strategic competition between the two giants, the US and China.   

Churchill had observed that the further back one can look, the farther ahead one can see. To understand US- China’s current strategic competition, it would be necessary to look at the history of this great power rivalry, to comprehend its future.

The dramatic downturn in the US-China power equation in the post-Cold War era was quite disturbing for the US. That change saw a tectonic shift in China’s capabilities and an unprecedented change in its relative potential in a short time. China had realized Xi Jinping’s dream of “making China great again,”  and that encroached upon positions, prerogatives and strategic dominance of the US, which were taken for granted by it for ages. It has alarmed the US, and there is a strong US pushback against China. 

The US-China equation can be deciphered, based on the Greek historian Thucydides’ analysis of the Peloponnesian War.  He has postulated a theory that: when an overly ambitious rising nation threatens the dominance of a more powerful nation, the two are likely to go to war.  China is seen to be heading for the classic Thucydides Trap, and dangerous dynamics are building up between them. The said dynamics is being driven by three factors: material reality, psychology, and politics. At the material level, China has now risen to heights good enough to challenge the American might. The psychological level takes into account both perceptions and misperceptions, dealing with emotions and identity pride, generating what Thucydides called ‘fear’ in the ruling power and ‘arrogance’ in the rising power. The third driver is politics, where in the struggle for leadership, the US wants to prevent China, its significant geo-political competitor, from acquiring might and capabilities enabling it to threaten the US’s national security (Belfer Center, ND). 

It would be interesting to note that at the end of the Cold War in 1991, China was barely on the fringes of the power dynamics, but over the years it has soared to overtake the US in gross domestic product at purchasing power parity, or GDP (PPP), a measurement that  both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) regard as most important yardstick for comparing national economies (Fig. 1) 

Fig-I: GDP-PPP Balance:  US-China

Image Coursey: Aspin Institute 

The impact of this unprecedented power shift between the US and China has been felt not only by the US but by other countries also (Allison,2020).

The situation on the US-China Military Balance also is not much different. Here, the Taiwan issue has played a major role. A March 2019 study conducted by the Center for New  American Security (CNAS), on the military balance in the Pacific, has brought out that: US warfighting capabilities would degrade to unfavourable levels, after the first five days from the commencement of the hostilities (Lewis, 2019). A New York Times feature story also supported this view, by indicating that out of the last eighteen Pentagon war games, involving China in the Taiwan Strait, the US lost a majority of them. These results have raised questions about the might of America’s combat experience, which has not been against an almost matching adversary, since WW II (Kristof, 2019).

In addition,  RAND conducted and well-acknowledged ‘US Operational Balance Study’ results which are depicted in the ‘US-China Military Scorecard’ also reflect this aspect.  The report (Fig-II) brought out that since 2017, China has had an ‘advantage’ or ‘approximate parity’ in multiple areas of conventional capabilities, in conflicts related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, most likely theatres for confrontation.

Fig-II: US-CHINA MILITARY SCORECARD

Image Courtesy: Aspen Institute

The RAND report ( RAND, ND) predicted that Asia would see a progressively reducing sphere of US military dominance, which seems to be happening now and affecting many countries worldwide. Thus, it is clear that the status of US-China bilateral relations gravely impacts the global politico-military scenario and, along with it, many countries, including India.

US-China Bilateral Relations – Current Status 

Bill Gates had said that: “Every change forces all the companies in an industry to adapt their strategies to that change.” (Indeed,2024). This is equally applicable to geopolitics. Foreign Policies and Geo-political gamut changes based on the personalities involved. The world is now witnessing dramatic changes in the US, post Donald Trump assumed Presidential Office, on 20 Jan 2025. 

Two important things have happened since then. At first, Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, changed the geopolitical priorities of the US administration, especially those concerning China. While speaking to China’s Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Commission and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Rubio stated that the Trump Administration will pursue US interests first and honour its commitments to its allies in the region (USDS, 2025a). Second, China issued a harsh retaliatory response through a press statement countering US views and advising Marco Rubio to behave himself, setting the tone for a turbulent future (MFA-PRC, 2025a). 

This change in US-China bilateral relationship dynamics has already started impacting Indo-Pacific and QUAD frameworks, and the Indo-US-China relationship. It would, therefore, be important to analyze Rubio- Wang’s backgrounds- to decipher US-China relations, impacts on India and remedial measures. 

Marco Rubio- US Secretary of State

Rubio has always been passionate about the Great American Dream. Rubio served as a City Commissioner in West Miami and as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives. In 2010, he won a seat in the U.S. Senate and served as U.S. Senator until 2025.

During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Rubio was committed to ensuring America remained a strong, resilient nation for generations to come. Rubio was a Senior Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vice Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a member of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, as well as the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (USDS, 21 Jan 2025). He has been a known China critic and was earlier sanctioned by China.  

As Secretary of State, Rubio recently advised China’s Foreign Minister Wang that the US will follow a policy which advances US interests and puts the American people first. He also expressed the United States’ serious concerns over China’s coercive actions against Taiwan and against Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia in the South China Sea, which China claims as its fiefdom. He, jointly with Japan, India and Australia warned China against coercive actions in Asia as well as those at sea (USDS, 24 Jan 2025b). Surely,  signs of a tempest in the coming days.

Wang Yi – Foreign Minister of PRC 

China under Xi Jinping, even to date, is a complex puzzle to decipher, and China’s foreign policy has been dependent on his direction. For example, China’s previous foreign minister Qin Gang was known to be a staunch wolf gang warrior, but his successor Wang Yi is not. Wang’s appointment as the foreign minister signalled China’s shift away from ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. 

Chinese foreign policy now seems to be moving toward more traditional foreign policy approaches. This opinion is based on the fact that Wang has displayed an increasingly adaptive approach to foreign policy, depending on the audiences and policy objectives. Wang’s responses though had ranged from aggressive language to constructive approaches, and some awkward misses, but were away from the Qin’s style of diplomacy (Deshmukh, 2023).  His stylistic approach and personality have made a difference in China’s dealings with many countries. His newfound multinational diplomacy has the potential to particularly affect US-China-India dynamics, where substantive diplomatic engagements rely on the personalities and approaches of the top leaders.

Foreseeable Trajectory for US-China Relations

Post Trump’s assumption of office, President Xi has comprehensively elaborated on China’s policy toward the US, emphasizing that the US and China need to work together to solve many existing problems in the world.

In response to Marco’s vision of US-China relations as mentioned above, Wang, through a press release, elaborated on Xi’s outlook and stated that the two heads of state had indicated a direction to move and also set the tone for China-US relations. He stressed that both sides would need to implement their strategically collaborative ideas, maintain effective communication, manage differences and expand cooperation, as this was essential for maintaining mutual respect and mutually beneficial coexistence and promoting steady, sound and sustainable development of China-US relations, in the new era.

While maintaining a conciliatory approach, Wang also cautioned Rubio, by stating that major countries should act in a manner befitting their status, shoulder their international responsibilities, maintain world peace and help other countries realize their developmental aspirations. His words “I hope you will act accordingly and play a constructive role for the future of the people of China and the United States, as well as for the peace and stability of the world” sounded like a veiled warning, which was interpreted by many analysts as Wang’s advice to Rubio to behave himself (MFA-PRC, 2025b), creating a piquant situation. This could be an indication that the road ahead may not be smooth. 

The narrative above clearly points towards the emerging US-China confrontation, which will have repercussions for India, and it must have a holistic plan to minimize the impacts. 

US-China-India Relations and Imperatives for India

US-China-India Triangle

Analysis has shown that the US-China bilateral relations and Indo-US relations are intrinsically linked. Historically, US-India relations have been influenced by The People’s Republic of China, since its inception. John F Kennedy’s year 1949 statement (when he was Massachusetts Senator) is important in this regard: “Struggle between India and China is for the economic and political leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better” (JFK Library, ND). 

He had also asserted that WE needed to help India win that contest with China. The said objective was also reiterated in Eisenhower and Kennedy administration documents, which stated that it was in the American national interest to strengthen India, even if that country wasn’t always on the same page as the US. A sage advice which US tends to forget from time to time.

Today, both India and the U.S. maintain bilateral relationships- with China that display elements of cooperation, competition and conflict too, though in differing proportions. Those relationships exhibit their commingled approach to engaging with China while preparing for a worse turn in China’s unpredictable behaviour.  The US and India also see a role for each other in their China strategies as it would send a tangible message to China. At the same time, neither wants to antagonise China, for reasons of their own or be forced to choose between the other and China (Madan, 2014).

Indo-Pacific Conundrum 

many countries have strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region, However, those countries clearly understand that the India–US–China triangular relationship is crucial, for that region, for various reasons. The reasons include the US’s major stakes in the Indo-Pacific, China’s rapid modernisation of its Army and Navy, and its increasing power projections there, and India’s growing strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific, in line with its increased prowess, and enhancing diplomatic and economic outreach. Those countries also appreciate that any discord in the trilateral dynamics would impact economic and military stability and composition of the regional and international order, in the region. They are interested in a stable Indo-Pacific and are willing to extend their cooperation for the same. 

However, lately India–US–China triangular relationship has taken an alarming turn. The confrontational aspects involving Indo–China and US-China bilateral ties have intensified. The India–China bilateral relationship received a major jolt because of China’s nefarious activities in Galwan Valley (in May 2020), and despite some progress, relations are not yet normal. China has also been roiled by Indo-US’s balancing of relations to counter the dragon. Similarly, the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship has become more confrontational because of various issues including Taiwan, and can see a further downturn in future, especially in the Trump 2.0 era. It would be important here to examine what the future may hold for the Indo-US-China relationship.  

Traditionally, trilateral relations display some peculiar characteristics like:

1. ‘Ménage à trois’ which consists of symmetrical cooperative ties between the three powers
2. Romantic triangle’ where amity exists between one pivot player and two wing players but enmity between the latter
3. ‘Stable marriage’ where there is some amity between the two players, but hostility between each and the third.  

At this point, the triangular relations are displaying a ‘stable marriage’ pattern, comprising amity between India and the US and both sharing adversarial relations with China. Following India’s and the US’s fall-out with China over the Galwan Valley and trade war respectively, they have acted expeditiously to institutionalise the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD)-  in collaboration with Japan and Australia, and making concerted efforts for:

1. Resisting China’s coercive tactics in the Indo-Pacific
2. Reducing reliance on China-based supply chains 
3. Cooperating more closely on clean energy materials and technologies, to counter China’s rising economic and diplomatic clout

Other measures included:

1. India, the US and 12 more countries signed the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, in Nov 2023 (despite severe objections from China), to build supply chains and production centres for critical technologies, with a view to reducing dependence on China. 
2. US and India upgrading their defence ties by inking major agreements and holding dialogues on military and technology such as Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), Advanced Domains Defence Dialogue (ADDD) and India- US Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS X).
3. The US continues with the trade restrictions on China, especially concerning advanced technologies.

China, obviously unhappy,  retaliated by increasing its diplomatic outreach to South Asia, Pacific Island Countries (PIC) and South East Asia, declaring a no-limits partnership with Russia and reviving the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea. China is also expanding its military presence in the Indian Ocean Region. It is also strengthening its legal structure to counter foreign sanctions and trade wars, to resolutely defend its national interests (Panda and Sarkar, 2020, Banerjee, 2024)

All of the above have complicated the global political situation, and India would need to watch for the way it would move in the coming days. 

Plausible Trilateral Scenarios 

Analysts feel that India–US–China triad relations could pan out in three different schemas, in the foreseeable future: 

1. Three states arriving at a ‘modus vivendi’ to ensure collaborative development in an increasingly uncertain world. The threat of geo-economic and geo-strategic issues generated by climate change, resource scarcity, widespread displacement, and unregulated use of Artificial Intelligence and cyberspace could prompt the trio to foster a collaborative approach. Despite their differences, India, the US and China could work to mitigate the risks, involving limited agreements, information sharing, and joint ventures, ushering in a period of restrictive coexistence, driven by necessity.
2.  The US may become a pivot- both India and China have amicable relations with it, but continue to be on frictional terms with each other. Such a possibility is viable. While Sino-US and Indo-US ties could secure a breakthrough in bilateral relations, the possibility of Indo–China détente appears distant, as mutual distrust will continue to hamper them, despite some recent progress in the resolution of differences.   
3. The current state of India and the US confrontational dynamics vis-à-vis China, in the  Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific regions, could continue. The increasing nexus between China and Pakistan, China’s increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain and muscle-flexing at the borders, military power projection and rapid pace of armed forces modernisation will compel India and the US to move toward closer defence and economic relationship. 

Given the ongoing geopolitical ball game in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and the history of the Trump administration’s love-hate relationship with China, scenario ( c ) is above. seems to be more probable. That will certainly have both good and negative repercussions for India.   

It needs to be noted that the above scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and elements of each may intermingle with others, given the complex dynamics of the India-US-China trilateral relations. As it stands, the future remains uncertain and will depend on the choices made by these three major powers, within the constraints of mounting global challenges. Their approach towards cooperation, competition, or conflict will determine the future of security and stability in both- the regional and international structures (Banerjee, 2024a).  

Impacts on India and Remedial Measures 

US-India Concerns

Despite visibly displayed optimism about the strong U.S.-India relationship, in reality, they are considerably more fragile than they appear. The two countries have been and will continue to experience frictions in several areas which, if left unattended, could derail mutual cooperation, affecting not only India but also the Indo-Pacific region. 

The United States holds deepening concerns about India’s so-called less tolerance towards minorities and their religions, its abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, government policies that include curbs on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and other basic rights, curbs on media and Civil Society. Further, despite India’s support and participation in US initiatives, the US dislikes India’s desire for multipolarity, as it sees that as an anti-Western policy (Paul and Ganguly, 2024, Rand, 2024). India recognises the US’s reservations about its policies, but it too has its reasons-  like the US Deep state indulging in anti-India activities (which is a subject of separate research), to be unhappy with the US.  

In turn, the US and India, understand that China, with its uncertain behaviour, is partly moulding their relationship. There are three imperatives for their more robust relationship, namely strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. On the strategic front, US concerns about the nature of China’s rise are responsible for supporting India. India’s desire to strengthen itself both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and build a range of partnerships (external balancing), coupled with reputational gain, drives its relationship with the US. Reasons for relationships based on economic interests and democratic values would need no elaboration.   

Despite the above, India and the US have mutual concerns about their relationship with China. Both sides are sceptical about the other’s willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, India is also worried about both-  a US-China condominium (or G-2) and a US-China crisis.  It feels that the US could end up choosing China, because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship, and leave India in the lurch.

India’s concerns about the US-China conflict, are also understandable as it has the potential to destabilize the region and force India to choose between the US and China. Similarly, the US is worried about deterioration in Sino-Indian relations- which might force it to choose sides. 

However, both India and the US have a shared interest in managing China’s rise. Neither would like to see a dominant China; the US being forced to play second fiddle. This has resulted in both sides discussing issues related to China and the Asia-Pacific more willingly. They already have an East Asia dialogue in place. There is also a US-India-Japan trilateral dialogue, upgraded to ministerial level.  US-India is also interested in Japan’s regular participation in India-US maritime exercises (Madan, 2014a). 

In short, it can be said that though all is not well with Indo-US relations, it may have to be a marriage of convenience, because of existing compulsions. 

Indo-China

China’s ambitions of being the sole Asian Power and the only country capable of competing with the US are not hidden. The biggest hurdle in China’s path is India. India’s rising geo-political stature in the region, its rising economic and political might, its hard stance on the Galvan Valley episode and its strong relations with Russia are all sources of unhappiness for China. In addition, India’s tougher relationship with China’s close ally Pakistan, and its staunch opposition to joining the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) and ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact’ (RCEP), have riled China. India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) coupled with India’s ability to garner developmental projects in the neighbourhood, which are detrimental to China’s ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’, and finally, India’s open support to HH Dalai Lama have added fuel to the dragon’s fire. Thus, China has both a strong desire and motives to destabilize India (Deshmukh, 2024). 

Thus, all is not well with Indo-China relations too.

Interwoven Threads

The narrative above can also be connected with happenings during the previous Trump administration, when it branded China as a “strategic competitor” and reacted to the Indo-China rift, accordingly. US helped India during the Galwan Valley conflict, by providing intelligence and defence equipment. After the clashes, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation, a pact that improves interoperability between the US and Indian militaries.

The Biden administration too followed a similar approach. The 2022 National Defence Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy clearly defined US support to India vis-à-vis China, on the border issue and in the broader Indian Ocean region. The Biden administration also gave a boost to cooperation with India in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or ‘Quad’. 

China watched these developments with disdain and accused the US of destabilizing Asia and cajoling India into a coalition against China. China also lambasted India for siding with the United States and exploiting its strategic collaboration with Washington, against China.

Though India appreciated US support, it has been also trying to ease the tensions with China. In Oct 2024, it succeeded by arriving at a border patrol agreement with China. This defused the Sino-Indian military standoff that had persisted since 2020, to some extent (Scobell et al, 2024)

In summary, India seems to be in a most unenviable situation and is posed with difficult choices about both the US and China. It will surely need to have a strategic plan, to deal with both of them, in a pragmatic manner, to protect its global standing and national interests. 

Cogent Measures

The international security environment has recently witnessed a subtle power shift from the mono-lateral US, towards ma ultilateral world, with rising powers China and India significantly impacting global geopolitics. Historically, power shifts have never been peaceful and the challenge before the US-China-India triad, therefore, is to steer the triangular relationship in a manner to avoid security competition and conflicts and find ways to maintain peace and stability in Asia and Indo-Pacific, through constructive engagement. 

Further, the US-China-India triad is not ‘sui generis’, as there are other major powers like Russia, Japan and the EU, which cannot be ignored, as they too play an important role in the global strategic landscape. But, based on the Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) report- by Goldman Sachs (Goldman Sachs, 2003), China and India will join the US- as the three largest economies in the world, in the first half of the 21st Century, which would collectively give them greater clout than any other geo-metric configuration. These changes would largely guide India’s relationship with the major powers in the 21st Century 

Notwithstanding the above, it is evident that India is caught in the US-China crossfire, and will need to have a robust strategy to deal with this vexed issue (Raghavan, 2007, Madan, 2014b, Panda and Sarkar, 2020a). Based on the analysis above, it is recommended that India should consider instituting the following cogent measures, to mitigate the multiple risks: –  

1. India must remind the US of the constant Chinese threat and convince it to not only continue but also strengthen its broader relationship with India. As that will help in shaping and managing China’s perceptions and options. 
2. The US-India duo should also continue to engage with China, as it will not only benefit the three countries but also help global stability, which is the need of the hour. 
3. The two (US-India) countries should continue their consultations not only on China but also on Asia-Pacific, as well as Indo-Pacific regions. Both countries should appreciate that their regional strategies though aren’t all about China, it is a significant factor in them.
4. India must seek and ensure the US’s support in enhancing its relationships with its allies and countries in Southeast Asia while allowing India its strategic space so that efforts are not perceived as driven by the US. 
5. India, in turn, must display its ability to walk the talk, and strongly pursue its ‘Act East’ policy – deepening both strategic and economic cooperation with the countries in the region. While doing that, it may consider working with the US on shaping the strategic and economic options available to India’s neighbours, whose relations with China are becoming stronger.
6. India and the US should consider partnering with China to establish viable trilateral trade, for mutual benefits, as financial interdependence will help in strengthening the ternary bonds. The triad could extend trade cooperation to other countries also, as required. 
7. Pending the above, India and the US should collaborate in risk mitigation related to China’s global supply chain networks, and cooperate in providing capacity in the Indo-Pacific. This needs to be done to ensure an open, free and inclusive maritime domain, free of autocratic dominance by any one country. 
8. India US should consider China-India-U.S. trilateral dialogue, which would provide a formal platform to discuss issues of common concern and demonstrate to China that India and the U.S. aren’t interested in excluding it, provided it is going to be part of the solution. Secondly, It would also nullify India’s concerns about being left out of a new kind of potent power relationship, between the US and China.
9. While strengthening its relationship with the US, India should try to establish a cogent dialogue with China, to not only strengthen the Indo-China relations but also to develop a viable ‘Asian order’.
10. India should also attempt a dedicated dialogue with China to have a better interaction within the framework of emerging economies. It should effectively utilize platforms like the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO), the BRICS, ASEAN, and the AIIB, for the same.

Finally, Madan’s words (Madan, ibid) would aptly summarise the Indo-US-China triad situation: 

When it comes to China, however, India and the U.S. must have realistic expectations about each other. Every decision each country makes vis-à-vis China should not be seen as a zero-sum game. India shouldn’t expect to be treated as an ally (with all the assurances that come with that) if it isn’t one. And the U.S. has to recognize that India is likely to maintain other partnerships in its attempt to balance China—including one with Russia—that Washington might not like. Finally, policymakers and analysts in both countries need to keep in mind that an India-U.S. strategic partnership solely based on China is neither desirable nor sustainable.

Conclusion 

Undoubtedly, US-India-China cooperation is important for global geopolitics, and most of the countries in the world appreciate that fact. Further, Indo-US and Sino-US and Indo-China bilateral relations are important for stability in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Accordingly, we need to understand the whole gamut related to the US-India-China triad.

The US has enjoyed its mono-lateral dominance since 1945. For China, the US has always been an ideological challenge. But as China badly needed US technology and capital for its development, it accepted US hegemony- till it became strong enough to challenge the US. Today China poses a threat to the US’s global dominance and the US would like to counter that threat. At the same time, the US cannot discard its relationship with China, because of strong economic and trade interdependence. This is where India comes into play, as a counter to China. 

Talking about Indo-US relations, they may not have always held common positions, but both being large functioning democracies, their differences have never been ideological. Furthermore, India understands the US’s importance as a critical partner in its development and in offsetting China’s threats. 

The Indo-China relations, on the other hand, have had their ups and downs. China considers India as the only hurdle in its path of becoming a regional leader and bete-noire for the US. It is also worried about India’s geopolitical and economic rise and its good relations with most of the countries, at a diverse end of the spectrum, like the US and Russia.     

US-India-China is, thus, interlinked with both necessity-driven cooperation and traditional adversity, of differing degrees, and are compelled to maintain trilateral relations. As China prepares to challenge the US’s hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and India recasts its own military and economic policies, to address its domestic and strategic requirements, US-India-China triad relations become further important for stability and peace in the Asian, Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific regions.  

A good deal hinges on the US- as a pivot to Asia, and India’s greater focus on the maritime domain, on the one hand, and China’s expanding naval power and its push into the Indian Ocean, on the other. China believes that the common strategic objective of the US and India is to counter China in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific regions. 

Further, Trump’s return has sparked worries for China, over its political and economic prowess. Xi has expressed fears to that extent on one hand and has advised the US to be its partner for the global good.  

On the economic front US, EU, and India’s attempts to reduce their dependence on Chinese supply chains, shifting business out of China, the US trade war and Trump’s threat of imposing abnormal trade traffic have certainly riled China. But the fact remains these countries can not wish China away, as it is both a military and economic force to reckon with and has a major role to play in regional and global stability.  

While India can leverage this turmoil to its advantage, India too cannot break away from China. A question also remains about how much India can depend on the US if its previous experiences have anything to do with it. 

India is, therefore, left with the difficult task of maintaining good relations with both the US and China. While India and China have taken steps to address the military standoff -along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India needs to improve its defence capabilities, to bolster its deterrent potential. Through India’s participation in Quad and many other US initiatives, it must also engage with Trump- who is more receptive to India’s concerns. 

India can not afford to take sides in the US-China confrontation, as it would be detrimental to its national interests. Indian policymakers should, therefore, make a cogent strategy to deal with the US and China, on their terms, to avoid becoming pawns in the US-China power game. India should also make effective use of platforms like QUAD, SCO, BRICS, ASEAN et all, to build its capacities and capabilities. It must also make all efforts to become as self-sufficient as possible, on the security front, reducing its dependence on other countries, especially the US. 

It is well understood that the above is not an easy task. But as India is not left with much choice, it must be ready to undertake the proverbial tightrope walk, to protect its global prestige and national interests. 

The author would like to rest his case with apt words of India’s EAM, Dr S Jayshankar (Jaffrelo,2023): 

“This is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support.”- The India Way,

Jai Hind.

Title image courtesy: https://www.politico.com/

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

References:

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