Executive Abstract

This paper addresses the strategic asymmetry India faces in deterring Pakistan’s sub-conventional aggression under the cover of nuclear escalation threats, particularly as framed within Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) posture. This doctrine aims to deter threats across the entire conflict spectrum, from conventional to sub-conventional, using both strategic and tactical nuclear signalling. While India adheres to a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, anchored in a declared No First Use (NFU) policy, Pakistan deliberately blurs the lines between conventional, sub-conventional, and nuclear thresholds. India’s response doctrine promises massive retaliation against any nuclear use. Yet, this posture faces a key dilemma: it may appear too extreme to be believed in the face of limited or tactical threats. This disconnect, sometimes referred to as a credibility paradox, risks weakening deterrence by making adversaries doubt India’s willingness to act.

India’s shift toward calibrated kinetic responses against Pakistan began with the 2016 surgical strikes following the Uri attack, and evolved further after the Pulwama bombing and Balakot airstrikes in February 2019. These actions demonstrated political resolve but remained tactically bold and doctrinally isolated. Pakistan, meanwhile, continues to rely on a mix of:

• Proxy operations.
• Cross-border infiltration.
• Strategic ambiguity supported by Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)¹ and first-use doctrine.

This strategic landscape is further shaped by China’s coercive posture on India’s northern frontier, which reinforces Pakistan’s confidence while diffusing India’s strategic bandwidth. India requires sharper strategic alignment and more deliberate signalling to convert military strength into credible deterrence. Although its conventional forces are substantial, they are constrained by chronic underinvestment, piecemeal modernisation, and a lack of integrated posture-oriented planning.

Key Recommendations

1. Publish a National Security Strategy (NSS) to codify thresholds, response options, and doctrinal coherence.
2. Declare a calibrated escalation ladder, integrating conventional, cyber, and hybrid response frameworks.
3. Invest in deterrent and denial-based capabilities, including rapid-reaction forces, ISR, and precision systems.
4. Reclaim narrative space through legal framing, strategic communication, and assertive diplomacy.
5. Institutionalise civil–military wargaming and scenario-based decision rehearsals.
6. Conduct quiet diplomacy and signalling, especially through Track II channels and key partnerships.
7. Build doctrinally aligned conventional capabilities that move beyond tokenism. forces that are structured, equipped, and exercised to credibly deny, degrade, or dominate across the sub-nuclear spectrum².

India must move from being a restrained actor to a structured deterrent power. It must turn doctrinal clarity into strategic credibility, and restraint into resolve backed by posture. Only then can it counter the asymmetric leverage of Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and ensure regional stability on its terms. Ultimately, India’s deterrence credibility will depend not only on its capacity and intent but also on the clarity of its objectives. It must articulate a concept of victory suited to its strategic environment, where stability is maintained not through overreaction, but through visible posture, bounded escalation, and credible adversary deterrence³. Victory must not be measured by conquest, but by credibility—where the adversary doubts the benefits of provocation, not India’s ability to respond. To confront Pakistan’s playbook of bluff and influence, India must craft a deterrence strategy by design, not by default.

I. Introduction

This paper is written in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack (2025) and India’s calibrated military response through Operation Sindoor. Together, these events mark a critical inflection point in India’s strategic posture, demonstrating intent, capability, and political resolve. At the same time, they underscore the need to revisit doctrinal clarity, escalation management, and institutional preparedness. In doing so, they compel a fresh examination of India’s deterrence framework, particularly in confronting sub-conventional threats under a nuclear overhang.

The stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is increasingly precarious. What was once a bilateral rivalry has evolved into a triangular contest involving India, Pakistan, and China, each with distinct doctrines, signalling styles, and risk thresholds. Among the three, Pakistan is unique in weaving nuclear signalling into the full spectrum of conflict, from strategic deterrence to conventional brinkmanship and even sub-conventional provocations. Its doctrine, Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), is deliberately structured to deter not only nuclear retaliation but also any conventional response to terror attacks, border incursions, and proxy operations. It leverages the global fear of escalation to freeze India’s hand, relying not just on weapons but on narrative dominance, ambiguity, and psychological manipulation.

India, by contrast, adheres to a doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), anchored in a No First Use (NFU) policy and a restrained strategic vocabulary. This posture has earned it international credibility, but also created a doctrinal gap when dealing with a neighbour that is willing to exploit ambiguity and raise risk at lower thresholds.

Complicating this dyadic rivalry is China’s expanding assertiveness⁴. Although it professes NFU as a policy, China maintains deliberate doctrinal opacity and persistent military pressure on India’s northern frontier. This posture not only stretches India’s strategic bandwidth but also emboldens Pakistan’s asymmetric provocations, creating a two-front deterrence dilemma in which escalation risks are diffused across multiple thresholds, actors, and domains.

This paper examines the strategic basis of Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, the doctrinal and psychological levers it exploits, and the institutional inertia it generates in Indian decision-making. The central argument is that India’s challenge lies not in capability, but in posture: how to structure, signal, and apply strength without triggering uncontrolled escalation, and how to counter a Pakistani playbook built not on parity, but on bluff, narrative manipulation, and strategic influence.

By examining doctrinal evolution, risk manipulation, and the narratives that shape international response, this study aims to map a path forward, one where India’s restraint becomes structured deterrence and where ambiguity is met not with alarm but with clarity and control.

II. Strategic Doctrines in the Triangle

The strategic architecture of South Asia is shaped by the intersecting doctrines of three nuclear powers, India, Pakistan, and China. While all three maintain nuclear arsenals, their approaches to deterrence, escalation control, and signalling diverge significantly. This doctrinal dissonance contributes to regional instability, not only in the potential use of nuclear weapons, but also in how each state perceives and manages crises.

India: Credible Minimum Deterrence with Doctrinal Restraint

India’s nuclear doctrine, publicly articulated in 2003, is anchored on three core tenets⁵:

• Credible Minimum Deterrence.
• No First Use (NFU).
• Massive retaliation in response to any form of nuclear attack.

India maintains a retaliatory posture with emphasis on centralised political control, second-strike survivability, and transparency. It avoids tactical nuclear weapons and instead invests in survivable platforms across land, sea, and air.

While this posture enhances India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear power, it also limits its ability to engage in coercive signalling. In the context of sub-conventional or grey-zone provocations, especially those that fall below the nuclear threshold, India’s strategic clarity may inadvertently reduce its deterrent ambiguity.

Pakistan: Full-Spectrum Deterrence as Strategic Theatre

Pakistan’s doctrine, though undeclared in detail, has evolved into what it calls Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD)⁶. This approach seeks to deter not just strategic threats but also conventional and sub-conventional Indian responses. FSD incorporates:

• First-use policy with no commitment to NFU.
• Tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., Nasr missile).
• Ambiguity about thresholds and red lines.

FSD’s purpose is not to fight a nuclear war, but to paralyse Indian decision-making by making any retaliation appear potentially escalatory. Under General Asim Munir, elevated to Field Marshal after Operation Sindoor, FSD has matured into an institutional posture that blurs the line between military deterrence and strategic messaging. His leadership reflects a fusion of military doctrine and narrative control, particularly in shielding proxy operations behind the threat of nuclear risk⁷.

China: Opacity, Capability, and Strategic Leverage

China professes a No First Use policy but maintains strict doctrinal opacity. It has steadily modernised its arsenal, investing in:

• MIRVs⁸.
• Hypersonic systems.
• Sea-based deterrents.

Although not a direct participant in the India-Pakistan crisis, China affects the regional dynamic in two ways:

• It provides psychological and strategic backing to Pakistan,
• It occupies India’s northern frontier, forcing strategic dispersion and complicating military planning.

By never articulating thresholds while signalling resolve, China imposes a second axis of deterrence pressure. It remains the only peer competitor with both nuclear credibility and conventional superiority on India’s borders.

Doctrinal Asymmetry in the Indo–Pak–China Triangle

The Strategic Cost of Doctrinal Mismatch

In a bilateral nuclear dyad, miscommunication or doctrinal ambiguity is dangerous; in a triangular setup, it can be paralysing. India finds itself bound by the declaratory obligations of a responsible power while facing two adversaries who actively benefit from ambiguity and asymmetry.

• Pakistan blurs the lines between terrorism and warfare, between conventional and nuclear domains.
• China practises strategic opacity, never articulating thresholds, yet consistently signalling resolve.
• India declares its doctrine, but struggles to translate that clarity into flexible signalling below the nuclear threshold.

This asymmetry creates a credibility paradox: India is powerful but restrained; Pakistan is weaker but audacious; China is ambiguous yet coercive. Unless India recalibrates its deterrence posture, doctrinally and operationally, it risks being out-signalled, not outgunned.

The Credibility Paradox of Nuclear Deterrence

In strategic deterrence, credibility is everything. A threat must be believable to deter. But when a doctrine promises an extreme or disproportionate response, such as massive nuclear retaliation, it can trigger a credibility paradox.

The paradox:

The more catastrophic the declared response, the less believable it becomes in practice. Adversaries may begin to see it as a bluff.

In the South Asian context:

India’s policy of massive retaliation aims to deter any nuclear use. But if Pakistan were to deploy low-yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on its soil, would India truly escalate to full-scale nuclear war? Both Pakistan and the international community may doubt it. Such doubt weakens deterrence. A rigid doctrine may project strength, but if perceived as politically or morally implausible, it loses coercive value. Resolving this paradox requires:

• Flexible and scalable response options.
• Demonstrated capability to operate below the nuclear threshold.
• Narrative clarity that portrays restraint as a strategic choice, not enforced passivity.

III. The Strategic Utility of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD)

Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) is not a technical innovation but a strategic manoeuvre designed to lower the nuclear threshold into the conventional and even sub-conventional space. It represents a calibrated bluff, one that exploits Indian political caution, international crisis sensitivity, and psychological ambiguity. It is a deterrence doctrine not of capability, but of perception.

1. Origins and Evolution of FSD

FSD emerged in direct response to India’s conceptual development of the Cold Start Doctrine, envisaging swift, limited conventional incursions following a provocation. In 2013, Pakistan’s National Command Authority formally acknowledged its adoption of a “full spectrum” posture, declaring its intent to deter threats across the conflict continuum_⁹.

Key features of FSD include:

• Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) like the Nasr missile (Hatf-IX).
• An explicit first-use policy, rejecting NFU.
• Ambiguity about thresholds, geographic, operational, and doctrinal,
• Institutional messaging that even limited Indian strikes could invite nuclear retaliation.

This was not about deterring a strategic attack; it was designed to deter any meaningful Indian retaliation.

2. FSD as a Strategy of Perception, Not Just Capability

Unlike classical deterrence models rooted in mutual vulnerability, FSD thrives on perception manipulation. Its power lies in the psychological, not the kinetic.

It leverages:

• Risk inflation: projecting that even a surgical strike could provoke nuclear use.
• Narrative engineering: casting Pakistan as a vulnerable actor compelled to rely on nuclear tools.
• Third-party pressure: exploiting the global impulse for crisis de-escalation to constrain India.

FSD functions as a “threat that leaves something to chance”, Thomas Schelling’s formulation, where the unpredictability of escalation itself becomes a deterrent tool. It thrives not on battlefield feasibility, but on political fear¹⁰.

3. The Tactical–Strategic Blur

FSD deliberately collapses the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear thresholds:

• TNWs complicate proportionality: Would India respond with massive retaliation to a low-yield strike?
• They blur response options: limited actions appear riskier, making calibration difficult.
• They raise command-and-control concerns, particularly under pressure or in battlefield dispersion scenarios.

The result: every rung of India’s escalation ladder appears fragile, adding instability to even low-intensity provocations.

4. FSD’s Psychological Edge

FSD exploits India’s democratic constraints and international normative expectations:

• India is expected to justify its actions in legal and moral terms.
• Western actors consistently urge restraint on New Delhi, irrespective of the trigger.
• Pakistan, under centralised control, communicates threats without internal friction.

This asymmetry creates a perception mismatch: India appears restrained and reactive; Pakistan appears resolved and daring, even when its actual capacity is inferior.

5. Strategic Implications for India

FSD’s real danger lies not in warfighting, but in its paralytic effect on Indian decision-making.

India faces three poor choices:

• Retaliate conventionally and risk global censure or uncontrolled escalation.
• Do nothing and invite repetition.
• Rely on a massive retaliation doctrine that lacks proportional credibility in TNW scenarios.

Unless India articulates a graduated, visible, and repeatable response posture, the FSD bluff will continue to deter without being tested.

IV. Why the Bluff Still Works,  Fear, Narratives, and Perceived Escalation Traps

At the heart of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) is a paradox: its deterrent power lies not in operational credibility, but in the danger of being wrong. Even those who doubt Pakistan’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) remain deterred, not by certainty, but by risk. FSD works because it turns ambiguity into armour, paralysing response through fear of escalation.

1. Deterrence as Psychology, Not Arithmetic

Classical deterrence theory is rooted in capability, communication, and credibility. Pakistan lacks the conventional capacity to win a sustained war with India. But it excels at risk manipulation.

Drawing on Thomas Schelling’s insight, “The power to hurt is bargaining power”, Pakistan:

• Inflates risk perception to paralyse Indian decision-making.
• Invites premature international crisis intervention.
• Transfers the burden of restraint onto New Delhi.

This is not mutual deterrence; it is asymmetric coercion.

2. The Bluff Endures Because the Cost of Miscalculation Is Unacceptable

Indian strategists may assess that Pakistan will not employ TNWs unless facing existential defeat. Yet no Prime Minister wants to gamble on that assumption and be proven wrong. This caution, despite India’s conventional superiority, creates a deterrence freeze.

Even when intellectually discredited, the bluff endures behaviourally. The result is a strategic limbo: Pakistan provokes, India hesitates, and deterrence is upheld by fear, not clarity.

3. Western Narratives Reinforce the Trap

International reactions, particularly from the United States and other ‘western’ nations, routinely urge India to “exercise restraint” and avoid “escalation,” irrespective of the provocation’s nature or origin. This pattern:

• Validates Pakistan’s brinkmanship strategy.
• Undermines India’s escalation credibility.
• Makes Indian restraint appear obligatory rather than strategic.

Thus, Pakistan gains diplomatic protection while India, bound by transparency and legality, appears cornered, even when it responds lawfully. As Krepon and Dowling (2018) observe, third-party crisis diplomacy in South Asia has consistently focused on de-escalation over accountability, often freezing the conflict at the point of provocation¹¹. This reinforces asymmetric incentives, where the initiator of risk (Pakistan) escapes cost, while the responder (India) is diplomatically restrained. Without a clearly articulated and consistently signalled escalation posture, India remains vulnerable to external narrative shaping that equates its calibrated responses with escalation itself.

4. The Perception Gap: Capability vs Credibility

India’s growing capabilities, be they precision strike, ISR, or joint operations, are well acknowledged. Yet:

• It is perceived as reactive rather than proactive.
• Key retaliatory actions (e.g., 2016, 2019, 2025) appear isolated, not part of a doctrinal whole.
• Strategic messaging often follows action, rather than preceding it.

This leaves a gap between potential and posture, eroding the deterrent effect.

5. The Escalation Trap: Pakistan’s Calculated Gamble

Pakistan’s gamble rests on a cycle:

• Indian retaliation sparks fears of escalation.
• Global actors step in to mediate.
• Diplomatic pressure stalls Indian momentum.

So far, this gamble has worked. But it’s a dangerous game:

• It assumes perfect crisis management.
• It gambles on control over TNWs.
• It bets India will never recalibrate its doctrine.

When deterrence is built not on discipline but on doubt, the risk of misjudgment or loss of control grows exponentially.

V. India’s Challenge,  Deterrence Without Escalation, Doctrine Without Paralysis

India does not suffer from a lack of power; it suffers from a lack of coherent posture. Its conventional and nuclear capabilities are formidable. Yet, its ability to translate capacity into structured signalling and strategic restraint into deterrent credibility remains underdeveloped.

Repeated terror attacks, Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), Pahalgam (2025), have triggered forceful but episodic cross-border responses. The underlying problem persists: India lacks an integrated escalation architecture that can deny provocation without risking overreach.

1. Strategic Restraint: Strength or Liability?

India’s doctrine, No First Use (NFU), credible minimum deterrence, massive retaliation, projects moral authority and predictability. But it also imposes doctrinal rigidity:

• Limited flexibility at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder.
• Strategic patience is mistaken for strategic passivity.
• Adversary confidence that provocation will not be met with a structured response.

While restraint garners international goodwill, it has not prevented Pakistan from testing India’s red lines with sub-conventional aggression.

2. The Absence of a Public Escalation Ladder

India has yet to publicly codify red lines or articulate a structured escalation ladder for calibrated retaliation below the nuclear threshold. In the absence of formal doctrinal codification, successive governments have relied on elite signalling, through speeches, interviews, press briefings, and selective media leaks, as a modus operandi for deterrence messaging¹². Prime Minister Modi’s responses post-Uri, Balakot, and Pahalgam reflect this trend of declaratory signalling rather than doctrinal articulation.

While such signalling can indicate political resolve, it suffers from episodic ambiguity and institutional discontinuity. This presents three core challenges:

• Limited ability to shape adversary expectations with strategic consistency.
• Potential internal uncertainty during fast-moving crises.
• A perception gap that erodes long-term deterrence credibility.

In contrast, Pakistan leverages doctrinal ambiguity to amplify risk, employing TNWs and flexible deterrence postures to reinforce its FSD strategy. China, meanwhile, combines doctrinal opacity with structured institutional signalling, where the absence of red lines is itself a calibrated tool of strategic ambiguity, backed by credible force modernisation and centralised political-military command.

India’s reliance on elite signalling, however authoritative, is insufficient as a long-term framework. A publicly communicated, tiered escalation ladder, principled in articulation, rehearsed in execution, and grounded in legal and institutional structure, is essential to close this gap and dissuade adversaries from assuming India will always respond with restraint.

3. Institutional Gaps: The Missing Jointness

India’s civil–military structures remain fragmented:

• Strategic planning is dispersed across ministries/departments/services.
• National Security Council remains policy-focused, not execution-oriented.
• Military theatre commands are not fully empowered with pre-cleared options.

Without a published National Security Strategy (NSS), India’s political and military leadership lacks an integrated strategic framework to guide a calibrated response.

4. Narrative Control: Who Frames the Escalation?

India’s restraint has inadvertently ceded the narrative initiative to Pakistan. Often:

• Indian retaliation is portrayed as escalation.
• Provocations go unacknowledged diplomatically, weakening the international narrative¹³.
• Strategic messaging is reactive, not anticipatory.

This imbalance lets adversaries weaponise perception. India must move from narrative absorption to narrative control by framing its doctrine, actions, and rationale before the crisis unfolds.

5. Political Hesitation and Public Expectation

India’s democratic environment introduces additional complexity:

• Public demand for retribution can spike rapidly.
• Electoral cycles influence risk appetite.
• Media discourse can distort or preempt strategy.

This makes it harder to institutionalise predictable deterrence. Doctrine becomes politicised, and strategic calibration is replaced by tactical improvisation.

In summary, India’s deterrent strength lies not in matching provocation, but in designing a structured and credible posture that absorbs, deters, and outmanoeuvres it. To avoid the binary of massive retaliation or passive restraint, India needs:

• A graduated doctrine of calibrated escalation.
• Joint rehearsals across military and diplomatic chains.
• Strategic communication that prepares the ground, not just explains after the fact.

Restraint must now signal structured will, not hesitation. Deterrence must be designed, not improvised. That is how India reclaims the initiative, without compromising stability.

6. Bridging the Gap: Integrating Conventional Deterrence into Strategic Posture

India’s credibility as a nuclear power does not rest solely on its second-strike capability. It also depends on the strength, responsiveness, and coherence of its conventional forces. These forces are not a subordinate tier, they are the operational scaffolding that gives nuclear posture strategic traction. Without visible and reliable conventional responses, the threat of nuclear retaliation risks becoming a hollow deterrent, rhetorically strong but strategically inert.

India’s responses to major crises, whether Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), or Pahalgam (2025), have been forceful yet episodic. While politically resonant, these actions have remained disconnected from a structured doctrinal framework. Despite the size of its military, India’s conventional forces suffer from chronic underinvestment in rapid-response units, integrated theatre commands, and modernisation geared toward denial-based operations. This weakens deterrence, creating space for adversaries to exploit perceived gaps in India’s escalation ladder.

Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine is calibrated to take advantage of this very gap. By signalling a readiness to escalate, including the threat of tactical nuclear use even in response to conventional operations, Pakistan aims to paralyse Indian decision-making. The real risk lies not in Pakistan’s capabilities, but in the perception that India lacks credible, scalable conventional options that can operate below the nuclear threshold and still achieve strategic effect.

To bridge this credibility gap, India must:

• Embed conventional force planning within national strategic doctrine.
• Equip and train for calibrated, cross-domain, time-sensitive operations.
• Synchronise military, diplomatic, and informational signalling for full-spectrum deterrence.

Conventional deterrence is the connective tissue between intent and doctrine. When structured coherently, it transforms restraint into a strategic asset rather than a perceived weakness. And when calibrated precisely, it offers India manoeuvre space to act decisively without triggering uncontrolled escalation. This forms the operational basis for India’s concept of strategic victory, not through conquest, but through credible denial, narrative dominance, and escalation control. In such a framework, deterrence becomes sustainable because it is visible, bounded, and purpose-driven¹⁴.

In sum, a credible Indian deterrent is not built solely on nuclear firepower; it is shaped by the strategic utility of conventional forces, which gives meaning to restraint and structure to resolve conflicts.

VI. From Tokenism to Posture,  Building Deterrence Credibility Below the Nuclear Threshold

Strategic assessments by scholar Christine Fair provide a compelling diagnosis of Pakistan’s military posture. Fair argues that the Pakistan Army operates as an ideological institution that uses sub-conventional warfare as a deliberate instrument of state policy, shielded by its nuclear doctrine. This creates a structured environment in which proxy operations are not aberrations but calculated tactics, conducted under the protective veil of nuclear ambiguity. Fair contends that unless India internalises this reality and responds with a similarly structured deterrent posture, particularly one that includes denial-based capabilities and integrated cross-domain planning, it will remain vulnerable to calibrated provocation. Her work underscores the need for India to develop a doctrine that is not only declaratory but demonstrably executable, one that transforms strategic restraint into enforceable deterrence¹⁵.

India’s responses to sub-conventional threats have often been episodic and reactive, bold in execution but detached from a coherent, repeatable doctrine. The 2016 surgical strikes, 2019 Balakot airstrikes, and Operation Sindoor (2025) demonstrated political resolve, but not an institutionalised framework for deterrence. In the absence of doctrinal integration and rehearsed escalation architecture, such actions risk being perceived as symbolic rather than as elements of a sustained deterrent posture.

This phenomenon, deterrence tokenism, arises when displays of strength are ad hoc, unanticipated, and disconnected from a larger escalation framework. To move from tokenism to posture, India must develop a structured, scalable, and internally rehearsed response doctrine for sub-conventional aggression under the nuclear shadow.

1. Calibrated Response Frameworks: Standing, Not Spontaneous

India requires a tiered set of pre-planned response options across domains, sub-conventional, conventional, cyber, and information operations. These must be:

• Internally codified and decision-ready.
• Publicly signalled in doctrine or policy statements.
• Backed by legal, diplomatic, and military coordination.

Without such a calibrated escalation ladder, India remains trapped between full restraint and disproportionate escalation, a binary that emboldens adversaries. A visible posture enables measured signalling without risking loss of control.

2. Invest in Denial-Oriented Capabilities

Deterrence must go beyond punishment and incorporate denial, the ability to prevent or blunt aggression. This includes:

• Rapid-response and theatre-specific force packages.
• Persistent ISR and precision long-range strike systems.
• Hardened infrastructure for C4ISR resilience.
• Capabilities for cross-border interdiction, drone warfare, and cyber defence.

Such investments enhance not just warfighting potential but also credibility of resolve by demonstrating operational preparedness.

3. Legal and Normative Signalling

India must reclaim strategic narrative space through rules–based signalling:

• Assert its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
• Issue interpretive declarations affirming adherence to international humanitarian norms and proportionality, even in the absence of formal treaty ratification¹⁶.
• Frame retaliation as lawful and limited, especially in response to repeated provocation.

This not only pre-empts international criticism, but also aligns India’s posture with its image as a responsible power.

4. Strategic Communication: From Reaction to Pre-emption

India must build a centralised strategic messaging architecture, inter-ministerial, anticipatory, and resilient¹⁷. This unit should:

• Issue pre-emptive warnings and red-line clarifications.
• Integrate messaging with military and diplomatic timelines.
• Prepare both domestic and international audiences for calibrated action.

As Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones observed, “effective national strategy is shaped as much by institutional design and inter-agency coordination as by military capability”¹⁸. Strategic communication is not theatre; it is a tool for escalation, control and perception dominance.

5. Institutionalise Escalation Management

Deterrence credibility cannot rest solely on hardware. It demands institutional readiness. India must:

• Conduct civil–military crisis rehearsals across government and military structures.
• Empower theatre commands with pre-authorised mission sets.
• Link military action with diplomatic sequencing and legal framing.

Escalation ladders must be governance-ready, not theoretical constructs, but rehearsed realities that can function under crisis pressure.

India must graduate from gestures of resolve to a doctrinally aligned posture, one that is structured, scalable, and pre-communicated. The goal is not to provoke, but to deter by clarity. Only by integrating capability with signalling, legality with force readiness, and structure with political resolve can India respond decisively without risking uncontrolled escalation.

VII. Recommendations

India’s strategic restraint has ensured stability, but it has not deterred repeated sub-conventional provocations under Pakistan’s nuclear shadow. The challenge is not only to preserve peace but to regain initiative, restore credibility, and establish control over the escalation ladder. This requires a shift from episodic responses to a deliberate and structured deterrence strategy.

The following recommendations aim to strengthen deterrence posture below the nuclear threshold, while preserving strategic stability and political legitimacy.

1. Publish a National Security Strategy (NSS)

India must articulate and release an official National Security Strategy that:

• Defines national security objectives, threat priorities, and doctrinal principles.
• Specifies red lines across nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional levels.
• Integrates India’s strategic communication, legal rationale, and political intent.

An NSS would not only provide clarity to adversaries but also coherence across Indian institutions.

2. Develop a Calibrated, Public Escalation Ladder

India must declare a graduated response doctrine that includes:

• Clearly defined consequences for sub-conventional attacks.
• Proportional conventional response options (e.g., limited-objective operations, cross-border interdiction, or cyber disruption).
• Pre-planned escalation management tools (e.g., diplomatic sequencing, backchannel signalling).

A visible posture gives adversaries reason to reconsider, and reassures allies and citizens of coherence.

3. Invest in Deterrent and Denial-Based Military Capabilities

Capability must match doctrine. India should:

• Prioritise rapid-deployment Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs).
• Expand persistent ISR and long-range precision strike capabilities.
• Improve C4ISR survivability and redundancy.
• Enhance cyber resilience and space-based deterrence architecture.

Posture must reflect preparedness such that India deters even before punishment begins.

4. Reclaim Strategic Narrative Space

India must lead in shaping international and domestic perceptions by:

• Reaffirming adherence to IHL and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (self-defence).
• Proactively communicating the legal rationale for calibrated responses.
• Establishing a strategic communication unit spanning the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).

Narrative dominance is no longer optional; it is integral to deterrence.

5. Institutionalise Crisis Planning and Deterrence Rehearsals

India needs peacetime structures to reduce wartime confusion:

• Conduct civil–military wargames involving political and military decision-makers¹⁹.
• Build a national crisis management grid tied to theatre commands.
• Pre-authorise limited mission envelopes under doctrinal oversight.
• Integrate scenario-based planning into political and military training curricula.

Decisiveness cannot be improvised. It must be rehearsed.

6. Engage in Quiet Signalling and Strategic Diplomacy

India must communicate red lines with discretion where it cannot do so publicly:

• Use Track II and backchannel diplomacy to communicate deterrence thresholds.
• Brief key international actors to build understanding of India’s posture and options.
• Strengthen bilateral partnerships that reinforce conventional deterrence credibility (e.g., QUAD, France, Israel).

Strategic diplomacy must support posture without diluting resolve. India must no longer be a power defined by what it avoids. It must now be known for what it can credibly signal, coherently structure, and consistently apply. That is the essence of deterrence by design, not rhetoric, not improvisation, but structured resolve.

VIII. Conclusion:  Deterrence by Design, Not Default

India does not suffer from a lack of military strength; it suffers from the absence of a structured posture that connects capability to credibility. Its forces are significant, but not yet agile; powerful, but not yet prepared for calibrated deterrence²⁰. This gap between potential and preparedness must now be closed through deliberate investment in conventional readiness, joint integration, and doctrinal clarity. Capability without posture is inert; posture without capability is hollow. Credible deterrence demands both.

Pakistan’s institutionalised nuclear bluff, embodied in Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), paralyses Indian decision-making not through credible operational capability, but by exploiting ambiguity, risk inflation, and the fear of escalation. China’s strategic opacity and coercive posture further compress India’s manoeuvring space. Together, these pressures shape an environment where India, despite its superior capacity, remains disproportionately constrained by declaratory doctrine, fragmented institutions, and international expectations of restraint.

This paper argues that India’s deterrence must evolve from declaratory commitments to a consciously designed architecture. Strategic restraint should not be mistaken for inaction, and doctrine must become a framework for calibrated, scalable, and anticipatory action.

India must therefore undertake a strategic shift that includes:

• Articulated escalation ladders that deter without inviting instability.
• Public signalling of red lines across conventional, sub-conventional, cyber, and informational domains.
• Integration of legal justifications, military posture, and strategic communication;
• And, most critically, a doctrinal ecosystem that is rehearsed in peacetime and responsive in crisis.

In this environment, India’s deterrence credibility will be defined not by firepower alone, but by its ability to act purposefully, signalling intent, responding proportionately, and escalating judiciously. This is what it means to move from deterrence by default to deterrence by design: not rhetoric or reaction, but posture reinforced by capability, rehearsed in institutions, and structured to restore initiative.

Such a shift will not only re-establish strategic equilibrium in South Asia, but it will reaffirm India’s role as a responsible power defined by both resolve and restraint, by structure as much as sovereignty.

Title Image Courtesy: https://english.aaj.tv/news

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

Appendix A: Doctrinal Comparison – India, Pakistan, and China

The following table presents a side-by-side doctrinal comparison of India, Pakistan, and China across key strategic dimensions:

This comparative matrix underscores the doctrinal asymmetry facing India between transparency and opacity, clarity and coercion, political restraint and strategic bluffing.

Appendix B: Theoretical Frameworks Relevant to South Asia

1. Classical Deterrence Theory (Schelling, Brodie, Wohlstetter)
   • Emphasises capability, credibility, and communication.
   • India’s doctrine of massive retaliation aligns with this view.
2. Extended Deterrence
   • Deterrence provided to allies via nuclear umbrella.
   • Pakistan indirectly benefits via Chinese alignment and international pressure on India.
3. Stability–Instability Paradox (Glenn Snyder)
   • Strategic nuclear stability enables sub-conventional conflicts.
   • Highly applicable to post-1998 India–Pakistan dynamics.
4. Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) vs. Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD)
   • CMD: India’s NFU-based strategic deterrence.
   • FSD: Pakistan’s ambiguity-based, all-spectrum approach.
5. Escalation Dominance
   • Seeks control at every level of conflict.
   • Pakistan claims this through TNWs and aggressive narrative framing.
6. Second-Strike Capability
   • Survivability ensures stable deterrence.
   • India emphasises this via SSBN fleet and canisterised missiles.
7. Brinkmanship and Risk Manipulation (Schelling)
   • Deterrence through calculated irrationality.
   • Pakistan uses this to deter even measured Indian responses.
8. Deterrence by Denial vs. Deterrence by Punishment
   • Denial: blocking aggression (e.g., ISR, cyber, interdiction).
   • Punishment: inflicting unacceptable costs (e.g., massive retaliation).
9. Rational Actor Modelvs. Political Decision-Making
   • Ideal deterrence assumes rational calculation.
   • Real crises (e.g., Kargil, Balakot) show distortion from ego, miscalculation.
10. Deterrence Failure and Escalation Ladders
    • Focus on misreading signals, command breakdown, or unintended escalation.
    • Pakistan’s TNW posture increases such risks at lower thresholds.

These frameworks help contextualise why deterrence in South Asia remains fragile and why India’s shift toward structured, credible postures is imperative.

References

1. Pakistan’s so-called tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are widely viewed by analysts as tools of psychological coercion rather than battlefield instruments. As Narang (2010) argues, the absence of robust command-and-control structures undermines their operational credibility. Clary and Narang (2018) further suggest that these weapons serve primarily to generate escalation anxiety and inhibit Indian retaliation, thereby functioning as deterrent symbols more than warfighting assets. Narang, V. (2010). Pakistan’s nuclear posture: Implications for South Asian stability. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved from https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/pakistans-nuclear-posture-implications-south-asian-stability

Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2018). India’s counterforce temptations: Strategic dilemmas, doctrine, and capabilities. International Security, 43(3), 7–52. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00336

2.  Pillai, Sudhir. (2025, Apr 129). What Operation Parakram taught us—deterrence requires more than just mobilisation or rhetoric. The Print. https://theprint.in/opinion/operation-parakram-taught-deterrence-requires-more-than-mobilisation-rhetoric/2607794/ The author critiques India’s symbolic approach to defence modernisation and argues that credible conventional deterrence cannot be achieved through token upgrades. Instead, deterrence requires capabilities that are structured, exercised, and matched to doctrinal aims, particularly to deny adversaries the freedom to escalate under the nuclear threshold.

3.  Bounded escalation refers to a deliberately limited and calibrated use of force intended to impose costs without triggering uncontrolled conflict. In the context of India’s deterrence strategy, it denotes the capacity to retaliate to sub-conventional threats or provocations proportionately, escalating just enough to deter, but staying below thresholds that could lead to strategic or nuclear confrontation. The term aligns with broader doctrines of escalation management and limited war theory.

4.  In strategic studies, a dyad refers to a two-party system, typically a pair of adversarial states whose interactions form the primary axis of deterrence analysis. In the South Asian context, the India–Pakistan dyad has traditionally framed nuclear stability debates, particularly post-1998. However, the increasing strategic involvement of China has evolved this into a more complex triangular deterrence structure. In such a triad, signals, thresholds, and escalation risks are harder to isolate, and deterrence becomes less stable.

5.  Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2003, January 4). The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalisation of India’s nuclear doctrine: Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian nuclear doctrine. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine

6.  For a foundational account of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine, see: Ahmed, M. (2020, September 10). The evolution of Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/10/evolution-of-pakistan-s-full-spectrum-deterrence-pub-82611

7.  General Asim Munir’s elevation to the ceremonial rank of Field Marshal can be interpreted as a symbolic consolidation of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) under military stewardship. Given his previous role as Director-General of the ISI, Munir represents a fusion of intelligence and military authority, suggesting tighter institutional control over both nuclear and sub-conventional deterrent strategies. While no formal doctrinal shift was announced, the elevation possibly reflects institutional recognition of Munir’s role in sustaining Pakistan’s concept of victory under FSD, defined not by tactical success, but by narrative control, escalation manipulation, and the ability to deter or neutralise Indian retaliation even while facing up to what are, by most conventional measures, significantly superior Indian force levels.

The Wire. (2025, May 21). Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir elevated to Field Marshal rank. https://thewire.in/security/pakistan-army-chief-asim-munir-field-marshal

Reuters. (2025, May 21). Pakistan COAS made Field Marshal in rare move. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-army-chief-asim-munir-be-promoted-field-marshal-rank-2025-05-20/

8. MIRV stands for Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle. A MIRV-equipped ballistic missile carries several nuclear warheads, each capable of striking different targets independently. This enhances strategic deterrence by increasing target coverage and complicating missile defence. India is reportedly developing MIRV capabilities for its long-range platforms, particularly Agni-V, to strengthen its second-strike posture.

Kristensen, H. M., & Korda, M. (2024, September). Indian nuclear weapons, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-09/indian-nuclear-weapons-2024/

9.  Ahmed, A., Hashmi, M. J., & Kausar, S. (2019). Pakistan nuclear doctrine from minimum deterrence to full spectrum credible minimum deterrence (FSCMD). Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 3(2), 87–100. https://pssr.org.pk/issues/v3/2/pakistan-nuclear-doctrine-from-minimum-deterrence-to-full-spectrum-credible-minimum-deterrence-fscmd.pdf

10.  Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict (pp. 187–203). Harvard University Press.

11.  Krepon, M., & Dowling, L. (2018). Crisis Intensity and Nuclear Signaling in South Asia. Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories, 187-218.

12. Indian strategic elites have occasionally hinted at greater doctrinal flexibility than India’s publicly declared No First Use (NFU) and massive retaliation posture suggests. Shivshankar Menon, former National Security Adviser, has argued that in scenarios involving credible nuclear threats, India might consider a pre-emptive counterforce strike. Shyam Saran, former Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, similarly asserted that any use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) against Indian forces, even on foreign soil, could elicit a massive response. These statements have been widely interpreted as forms of strategic signalling that preserve ambiguity while deterring adversaries. However, scholars like Rajesh Rajagopalan have cautioned against treating such elite remarks as evidence of policy shifts, reaffirming the strategic logic and consistency of NFU. The Arms Control Association’s analysis and Christopher Clary’s synthesis of these perspectives highlight how Indian nuclear doctrine deliberately blends declared restraint with latent ambiguity, signalling without formally codifying escalation ladders.

See:

Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of India’s foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Saran, S. (2013, April 24). Is India’s nuclear deterrent credible? India Habitat Centre Public Lecture Series. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_05/India-Former-Official-Discusses-Nuclear-Doctrine

Arms Control Association. (2017, May). Is India shifting nuclear doctrine? https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-05/news/india-shifting-nuclear-doctrine

Rajagopalan, R. (2019, August 20). The strategic logic of No First Use nuclear doctrine. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/strategic-logic-no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-54911

Clary, C. (2023, October). Twenty-five years of overt nuclear India. Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-10/features/twenty-five-years-overt-nuclear-india

13.  Some have even described this as a failure of Indian diplomacy to gain international support for its restraint and calibrated actions against terrorism, and for projecting itself as a state committed to stability and international norms—particularly when responding to a neighbour widely perceived to tolerate cross-border militancy, blur escalation thresholds, and leverage crisis dynamics to shape global reactions.

14. India’s evolving nuclear posture reflects a growing recognition that deterrence credibility cannot rely solely on second-strike assurances. Analysts such as Narang and Clary have argued that without integrated, scalable conventional options, even a robust nuclear arsenal lacks deterrent traction. Their work underscores how credible conventional force structures are essential for signalling restraint as strength and enabling bounded escalation as a strategy of controlled dominance.

Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2018). India’s counterforce temptations: Strategic dilemmas, doctrine, and capabilities. International Security, 43(3), 7–52. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340

Freedman, L. (2004). Deterrence. Polity Press.

Menon, S. (2016). Choices: Inside the making of India’s foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press.

Narang, V. (2010). Pakistan’s nuclear posture: Implications for South Asian stability. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press.

15.  Fair, C. C. (2014). Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s way of war. Oxford University Press.

16. As argued by the author in a forthcoming paper on India’s legal positioning and deterrence signalling, and in papers presented at Rashtriya Raksha University and CMR University School of Legal Studies, India’s normative stance can be proactively asserted through declaratory statements that affirm compliance with humanitarian principles, thus framing calibrated military responses within a lawful, rules-based structure.

17. Comparative models include the UK’s 77th Brigade, Israel’s IO Division, and the US DoD’s Office of Perception Management, each integrating narrative strategy into deterrence.

18.  Neville-Jones, P. (2021). Strategy’s Human Dimension [Podcast episode]. In Talking Strategy (Episode 21). Royal United Services Institute. https://rusi.org/podcasts/talking-strategy/episode-21-strategys-human-dimension

19. General K. Sundarji, India’s Chief of Army Staff from 1986 to 1988, was one of the earliest military leaders to promote civil–military wargaming that included civilian decision-makers. He initiated tabletop exercises simulating nuclear and conventional escalation scenarios, especially in the context of Operation Brasstacks and the evolving China threat. These efforts represented a serious attempt to expose political leaders to the realities of high-stakes military decision-making. Despite these early efforts, India has yet to institutionalise civil–military wargaming at the strategic level. Since Gen Sundarji, such simulations have remained episodic rather than integrated into national decision-making routines. Raghavan, V. R. (2002). Siachen: Conflict without end. Viking. Chari, P. R., Cheema, P. I., & Cohen, S. P. (2007). Four crises and a peace process: American engagement in South Asia. Brookings Institution Press.

20.  In this context, “agile” refers to the capacity of India’s conventional forces to respond rapidly, flexibly, and in a calibrated manner to sub-conventional and conventional threats. It includes institutional readiness, joint operational integration, time-sensitive planning, and doctrinal alignment for deterrence below the nuclear threshold.