India Against CPEC: A Critical Analysis

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India is against the CPEC initiative since it is seen as violating India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) faces several challenges in Pakistan, including longstanding neglect among the Baloch population, political tensions due to perceptions of Punjab’s dominance in the project and security issues highlighted by recent attacks in the region. Despite these challenges, CPEC is a cornerstone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), envisioned as a transformative infrastructure project linking China to the Arabian Sea. This paper delves into the multifaceted impact of CPEC, exploring its potential for economic development, security challenges, and broader geopolitical implications.

Introduction

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched in 2015 and aims to transform Pakistan’s infrastructure and boost its economic growth. This ambitious project, valued at over $65 billion, is a central component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The multifaceted project connects Kashgar in the north-western Chinese province of Xinjiang with Pakistan’s Gwadar port in Balochistan through an immense network of roads and other infrastructure projects. The CPEC is designed to advance connectivity across Pakistan with a network of highways, railways, energy, industrial, and other infrastructural development project.

This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of India’s opposition to CPEC: A critical analysis by addressing the following research questions: –

What are the economic opportunities for Pakistan and China in CPEC?
What are the geopolitical dimensions and strategic concerns driving India’s opposition to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor?
How does CPEC influence regional security in South Asia, and how does India counterbalance these through its regional initiatives?

Historical Significance

The idea of linking Pakistan and China was not a sudden development; it first emerged in the 1950s. The development of the corridor was expressively quick with the construction of the Karakoram Highway in 1959 representing the cooperation between China and Pak and helping in trade and transport from one region to the other though crossing difficult Mountain Ranges. China rediscovered its interest in Gwadar in the early of twenty-first century which paved the way for the construction of the port in 2006. was in 2013 after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the concept of BRI popularly known as the Silk Road Project. The official signing of CPEC took place in Late 2013 but its execution began in 2015 when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan. Investment deals of several billions of US dollars were sealed, thus preparing the ground for a gigantic infrastructural enhancement plan.

China Investment Policy

China’s policy is multifaceted. It includes assertiveness in the projection of naval power, questioning of the status quo in the Pacific region, and healthy economic relationships based on commerce. This economic strategy, which is presented in the framework of the” Maritime Silk Road “initiative developed by Xi Jinping, is designed to establish China as the axis of integration. After the “Go Global” campaign coined in 2001 the legal framework on FDI has been liberalised considerably in China. In this case, private companies are allowed to invest in foreign companies thus there will be high investment internationally. Chinese MEs are mainly state-owned and dominate the resource sectors such as construction, telecommunication and so on, however, private players of Chinese origin like Lenovo are also foraying into the international market.

In the past years, China has begun to pay more attention to the South Asian region. It is not very clear as to why such motivations are being held. It could be purely economic, perhaps to obtain new markets and trading posts. But perhaps there are geopolitical reasons as well. China makes use of these relations as diplomatic bargaining chips or military power. This creates further apprehensions and considering frequent Chinese military intrusions in the border areas, a strategy to maintain India on the back foot.

CPEC-Interest of China and Pakistan

This investment is a tool that suits lots of purposes in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for China. The situation in Pakistan often described as corrupt, militant, and unstable is still not an issue that prevents China from investing large sums. Some incidents were reported in which Chinese employees have been targeted; the Baluch separatists and the Pakistani Taliban have both stepped up their threats. Naturally, one such attack carried out by Baloch rebels on Gwadar port opposed a Chinese president’s visit. This also supports China’s security claims mainly against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement which it alleges is launching attacks in its territories. China’s objective to find a solution to probable terrorist threats from Uyghur separatists is realised by accepting financing and development near Pakistan and Afghanistan’s underdeveloped regions.

Thus, there is an observed real security threat perception partaking by China and Pakistan. For the protection of the CPEC-related projects, Pakistan will create a new security force of 12 thousand personnel. This division would be commanded by a Maj. Gen. and will include army battalions and certain elements of paramilitary organisations. The training meant for such troops would be in security, counter-terrorism and amassing intelligence.

In addition, CPEC has additional facets which give China numerous economic benefits, it gives China easy access to the Indian Ocean and prolongs China’s political plan concerning influence in Central Asia and South Asia. In 2014, President Xi Jinping pointed out that China would focus on what is referred to as “neighbourhood diplomacy”. Many of these dynamics emphasized the focus on neighbourly relations operating over the primary relations with countries such as the US.

Pakistan’s major success story through CPEC is to bring China on board in addressing its persistent energy woes. The project is to address the fact that Pakistan’s power infrastructure has been failing badly; a situation scholars believe is cutting Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product by at least 2 percent per year. The power generation capacity of CPEC will be increased to 10400MW through the different projects mainly on coal, nuclear, and renewable resources. Pakistan and China inked other agreements of $28 billion to start the early harvest packages of the CPEC. These are a 1000 MW solar power generation plant, hydel power projects, windmill farms, highways development and Gwadar port development.

One of the most vital segments of the CPEC is the Balochistan province of Pakistan, which has long-standing separatist demands. With close ties to the infrastructure of this area concerning the establishment of the project, the economic growth and stability as well as the demographic character of the zone will be impacted significantly.

Research Methodology

This research paper explores the multifaceted impact of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and relies primarily on secondary research. The following sources and methods were used to prepare it –

Data Collection:

Academic Literature: A comprehensive review of academic journals, scholarly articles, and books on CPEC formed the foundation of the research. Databases like JSTOR, ScienceDirect, and Google Scholar were utilized to identify relevant and credible sources.
Policy Documents and Reports: Official government reports, policy documents, and research papers published by reputable institutions that provided insights into the economic and developmental aspects of CPEC.
News Articles and Media Analyses: Articles and analyses from reputable news sources and think tanks offered current perspectives on the project’s progress, challenges, and regional implications.

Data Analysis:

Thematic Analysis: The collected data was subjected to thematic analysis to identify recurring themes and categorize the impact of CPEC across various domains – economic, social, security, and geopolitical.
Comparative Analysis: Existing research comparing CPEC to similar large-scale infrastructure projects in other developing countries provided valuable insights into potential pitfalls and best practices.

Limitations of Secondary Research:

The reliance on secondary data acknowledges limitations. Access to primary data, such as conducting interviews with stakeholders or field studies in project areas, could offer deeper insights. However, the extensive body of existing research on CPEC allows for a robust exploration of its multifaceted impact.

Ensuring Research Credibility:

Triangulation of Sources: Verifying information by cross-referencing data from various sources like academic journals, government reports, and credible news outlets ensured the research’s accuracy and reliability.
Transparency and Citation: Citations were meticulously included to acknowledge the sources used and allow readers to trace the research trail for further exploration.

Literature Review

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the central pillar of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), envisioned as a transformative infrastructure project linking China to the Arabian Sea. Given the project’s scale and multifaceted nature, a comprehensive understanding necessitates a thorough examination of existing research. This literature review delves into various scholarly perspectives on CPEC’s economic potential, security challenges, and broader geopolitical implications.

Economic Promises and Challenges

Several studies explore CPEC’s potential to unlock economic prosperity for Pakistan. Hassan and Khan (2020) analyse the project’s ability to boost infrastructure development, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors, potentially leading to increased trade and foreign investment. However, concerns regarding project transparency and debt sustainability are highlighted by Afridi and Zhao (2021), who emphasize the need for careful financial management to ensure long-term economic benefits for Pakistan. Additionally, Asad et al. (2022) examine the issue of equitable distribution of benefits, arguing for strategies that ensure all regions of Pakistan experience positive economic outcomes from CPEC.

Security Concerns and Regional Stability

The security landscape surrounding CPEC is a key area of scholarly inquiry. Li (2023) explores the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan and the presence of extremist groups, highlighting the significant threat they pose to the project’s safety. Furthermore, Yao (2022) delves into the complexities of CPEC’s route through Gilgit-Baltistan, a disputed territory claimed by Pakistan and India. This territorial aspect, as argued by Ahmad (2019), exacerbates regional tensions and necessitates diplomatic efforts to mitigate potential conflict.

Geopolitical Implications and the BRI’s Shadow

The broader geopolitical significance of CPEC is another key theme within existing research. Wang (2021) examines CPEC as a microcosm of China’s BRI ambitions, highlighting how the project strengthens China’s economic and strategic influence in the region. However, concerns regarding “debt-trap diplomacy” are raised by Baldauf et al. (2023), who urge a critical evaluation of the project’s long-term sustainability and potential for creating dependence on China. Lin (2020) offers a comparative perspective, analysing how CPEC’s impact on regional power dynamics resonates with other BRI projects globally.

Geopolitical Dimension of CPEC

Gwadar port

Pakistan’s Gwadar Port holds significant strategic and economic importance due to its location. Situated on the Arabian Sea, Gwadar acts as a bridge connecting South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia. This strategic position grants China direct access to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), while also enhancing Pakistan’s geopolitical standing in the region. Furthermore, Gwadar’s proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz allows Pakistan to effectively monitor vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs). This strategic advantage, compared to Pakistan’s other ports provides leverage in the region

Naval cooperation between India and Pakistan

The demand for crude oil in China has also been on the rise and doubled from the year 1995 to the year 2006 and is expected to go up in subsequent years (Kaplan, 2009). This has spurred China’s investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to achieve two key goals: presenting a diversification strategy from the state of Malacca for oil transport and enhancing its positions in the Indian Ocean to guarantee crucial segments of the SLOCs. The development of this project resulted in greater operation of the navies of both countries in the Indian Ocean, particularly the Arabian Sea. This cooperation is noticeable in the 2015 cooperation deals for the expansion of CPEC alongside the enhancement of bilateral ties to the AISCP (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

The CPEC may also be viewed as the way for China to build its naval base in the IO while, at the same time, enhancing Pakistan’s role in the IO. Therefore, both countries would probably boost maritime security and protect the developments of CPEC and their geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean region.

Countering the US and India in the Indian Ocean

Increased activities in the Indian Ocean region of maritime nature have played a major role in diminishing the hegemonic role of the United States. To this situation, the US has cultivated strategic cooperation with India, for instance, the formation of a joint naval steering committee and carrying out of Malabar naval exercises. This cooperation may further increase to a four-sided cooperation with Japan and Australia and hence, emerging the QUAD. China has observed the United States’ containment in the Pacific through policies such as the “Asian Rebalance Strategy” and amplified through commerce policies consequently shifting its strategic focus to the Indian Ocean (Khurana 2016). This region enables China to fill perceived weak stringencies in the Pacific in which situation the US has constant partnering and military hubs. India eyed China’s expansionism in its vicinity thus the country has been considering America as an insurance policy. The two have even talked about distributing information concerning the People’s Republic of China’s navy in the Indian Ocean (Mishra, 2017).

China has other plans in the Indian Ocean besides the CPEC project as it lays out to be a global power. It aims to use this as a base to increase political and economic interactions with other regional states to entrench its stay permanently. Nevertheless, due to his perceived geopolitical advantage of the project, China largely considers the project important despite its costliness (Garlick, 2018). In conclusion, China’s participation in the Indian Ocean can be justified in the background of the key goals of Chinese foreign policy, namely, to increase its influence, determine regional policies, gain access to information and seize the opportunities for strategic development (Khurana, 2016).

Pakistan Policies

Pakistan’s strong support for the CPEC stems from its geopolitical and economic benefits. Geopolitically, the project has the potential to elevate Pakistan’s status as a key player in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The corridor would facilitate the development of trade and political ties with Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East (Hussain & Hussain, 2017). Extra-regional powers like Russia and Turkey, along with Central Asian Republics and neighbours like Afghanistan, have expressed interest in CPEC, offering Pakistan opportunities to strengthen its foreign relations.

Economically, Pakistan is expected to see a significant boost from Chinese investments. This inflow of capital will likely improve the country’s infrastructure sector, a crucial area for national development. The CPEC also aims to address the economic vulnerabilities of Balochistan, a region historically facing challenges. The project promises development and employment opportunities for local residents, though some have raised doubts about these guarantees (Salik, 2018)

Energy

Thus, the CPEC provides prospects or solutions to China and Pakistan’s energy insecurity. Today, about 80 percent of China’s energy imports pass through this chokepoint guarded by the US and Indian Navies (Shaofeng, 2010). Currently, the energy crisis in Pakistan is one of the most severe that the country can face. This energy-deficient nation is a magnet for over 22 million people and a significant detriment to the Pakistani economy, which loses two percent of its GDP per year to energy shortages. Lack of proper governance, lack of adequate investment, and pathetic structural development in the infrastructure sector are the root causes for the same.

Accordingly, Pakistan sees the CPEC’s energy projects as the answer. Out of the total project investment that costs $50 billion, the energy sector constitutes $35 billion of investment (Dadwal & Purushothaman, 2017). These projects intend to provide 10400MW to the Pakistani grid by using coal, nuclear and renewable energy (Government of Pakistan, 2016). The projects are spread across four phases with relevant timelines. However, some of the problems that have overshadowed project actualization have included delays in the project and shifts in the initial plans because of costs as well as feasibility. The analysis of the current literature also reveals that most of the CPEC projects in Pakistan are behind schedule (Rana, 2019). The current ruling party of Pakistan, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf under the flagship of Imran Khan has also put a hold on a major energy project that was underway. While presenting in a cabinet meeting held in December 2018, Pakistan put forward a new plan to exclude the 1,320 MW Rahim Yar Khan imported fuel power project from the CPEC plan (Kiani, 2019). This decision therefore leaves one to wonder what the fate of other CPEC energy projects is.

Challenges of CPEC

Topography

Another threat is the geographical conditions of CPEC’s major route – the Karakoram Highway – being mountainous and rather severe. This highway is 1,300 kilometres stretching Pakistan to China and this highway has an elevation of more than 5,000 metres there are many precautions for landslides as well as other natural disasters. It is quite possible to upgrade and or redesign the infrastructure to resolve these problems; however, the high costs associated with construction can severely limit how much CPEC would be able to reach its potential (Khan & Liu, 2018).

Political instability

Pakistan mostly faces challenging dynamics in its current political settings by citizen unrest of both military and civilian powers, conflict among political parties, and demand-supply recurrences of CPEC. The change in leadership might stop progression because new leadership comes with new ideas that may not be supportive of the project, lack of political support might also be a sign of illegitimacy which will turn investors away.

Issues of ethnic minorities

China, along with Pakistan, is working on an economic project known as the CPEC and these two nations have their domestic issues that are aggravated by ethnic unrest. In Pakistan, ethnic groups in Balochistan province have taken arms against the government and are fighting in the form of guerillas. Equally, there is tension in Xinjiang province where the Uyghur Muslims rebel against the Chinese rewarded to the Han majority. The problem, therefore, for CPEC is that these unstable areas: Balochistan, and Xinjiang are central to the success of the corridor. This puts the stability of CPEC and the safety of workers on the project in constant danger due to the continuous exercising of the option of violence by the Baloch. These regions, which are important for the corridor’s viability for several reasons, continue to experience social unrest over concerns of marginalisation and exploitation of resources. The Baloch insurgents and the Uyghur uneasiness against Chinese authorities endanger the lives of the workers and the stability of the CPEC.

Security Implications of CPEC

Terrorism and insurgency

Pakistan has a long history of terrorism, and Balochistan, a province through which CPEC passes, is a hotbed of separatist insurgency. These groups view CPEC as a threat to their autonomy and have targeted Chinese workers and infrastructure in the past. Recent attacks in March 2024 further highlighted this risk, suspending work on crucial hydropower projects.

Political instability

Pakistan’s political landscape is complex, with frequent shifts in power. This instability can affect the long-term commitment to CPEC’s security. The change in leadership might stop progression because new leadership comes with new ideas that may not be supportive of the project, lack of political support might also be a sign of illegitimacy which will turn investors away.

Regional tension

CPEC cuts across Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-run Kashmir. India and Pakistan fight over this land. India claims all of Kashmir belongs to it. It sees Pakistan’s control of the western part as unlawful. India calls this area Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Pok). This spot acts as a vital link between China and Pakistan for CPEC. In 1963, Pakistan and China struck a deal. Pakistan gave China thousands of square km of land India says is it’s own in Pok. India rejects this agreement. The inclusion of China into the historic dispute becomes increasingly more troublesome for India. There have also been reports of an increased presence of Chinese troops in the disputed area of Kashmir or what India refers to as the Pok

Tension in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is one of the most significant aspects of India’s interest and its diplomatic strategic policy. India has made course corrections on its policies towards the region and wants to become more proactive to consolidate its position as an important player. India’s assertion of power in the Indian Ocean makes it think that the Indian Ocean is “India’s Ocean” (Scott 2006, 99). Besides, the construction of Chinese and Pakistan naval ships and joint naval exercises in the Arabian Sea add security concern for India which has been brought by CPEC. India feels threatened by military cooperation between China and Pakistan particularly in the Indian Ocean. Such activities pose the likelihood of upsetting the IOR’s tranquillity and comprehensively testing India’s security and energy stakes. If this is continued the same as the current expansion of Chinese naval capability in the Arabian Sea, it translates to controlling the straits of Hormuz through the seaport of Gwadar. Further, the CPEC also possesses the aspect of military significance which can turn into a fully-fledged military installation of China. However, Beijing attempts to dismiss such controversies by branding its undertaking as commercial, and India continues to be wary of the long-term China’s move in IOR. Thereby if the Gwadar port would be transformed into a military base of China, then it would be summing up a permanent marine navy base for China in the Indian Ocean. This would emerge as a threat to India’s regional diplomatic and military strategy (Kanwal 2018)

India’s Response to Counter CPEC

India has been actively countering CPEC and its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indian Ocean. This approach involves economic, military and diplomatic strategies.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

QUAD formation has helped India in enhancing its strategic cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia. It should also contribute to the freedom, openness and inclusivity of the Indo-Pacific region. India has not acted against China directly but it has sided with Australia under the framework of Quad in order to ensure the welfare and security of the region. The India-Australia-Japan-Tripartite Mechanism covers the relations between India Australia and Japan while Australia–India–France trilateral deals with the assertiveness of China in IOR as well as the South China Sea. However, Beijing sees the Quad as a strategy to counter it.

India- US relations

The relations between the two countries are relatively good after the Cold War and they enjoy cooperation in some areas as economic cooperation, trade cooperation in aspects of nuclear and cooperation in missiles and defence assistance. Some of the areas consist of military, technology, and logistics acquisition deals such as the Letter of Agreement concerning the Acquisition of Logistic Support which is abridged as LEMA, General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) that coordinates the exchange of geospatial intelligence besides offering a platform for logistical support

Also On 23 May 2022, signed a membership at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). In addition to India, the United States, Australia Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Chabahar Port, Iran

India is developing the Chabahar port as a counter to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which is a key component of CPEC. Chabahar Port will provide India with a strategic position in the region and a direct trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. Both India and Iran have signed a 10-year contract for Chabahar port on 13th May 2024. The IPGL Ltd will be operating in the Chabahar port.

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was established in 2000, it was further expanded by its three founding members are Russia, India, and Iran in 2002. This corridor aims to reduce transport costs and time compared to traditional routes through the Suez Canal.

Act East Policy

Changes in the global scenario forced the Indian foreign policy to transform numerous times, of which the Look East Policy (LEP), which the present government has further renamed Act East Policy (AEP). Since the LEP was started, there have been significant geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, the AEP is to assist India in aligning itself to this new order. The AEP aims to create trade connections between ASEAN members and According to The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Establishment of India has also begun various connectivity projects like the Trilateral Highway with Myanmar & Thailand, Kaladan with Myanmar and the construction of a port at Sittwe in Myanmar.

Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

It is an international organisation formed for the main purpose of enhancing trade and integration of nations that are along the Indian Ocean. The IORA member states have been involved in multinational consultancy in the areas of trade, investment and sustainable development in the IOR.

India’s Necklace of Diamonds Strategy

United by China’s String of Pearls strategy India initiated Necklace of Diamonds whereby India focused on the circles strategy of encircling China by increasing its naval blue water presence and looking for ways and means to extend its military base and diplomatic ties with the founding nations of this region. An area of focus in this strategy is to dismantle China’s string of pearls and the influence of its military in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean

Conclusion

Hence, India views the project as a strategic Chinese plan that will encircle India with a view of reducing India’s regional and global power. Besides, according to several Indian analysts, China’s policy in the region is to balance Indo-US strategic cooperation. Significantly, the USA and India have common objectives to counterbalance China; as a result, an efficient strategic partnership with the USA is a suitable approach to counter threats by China that pose a threat to India’s interests due to China’s rise as a hegemonic power in the region.

However, the String of Pearls strategy makes India anxious at the centre due to China’s cooperation for the development of a string of strategic naval bases in the region that includes Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh.

Even though CPEC offers better cooperation opportunities mainly in the field of trade and economic ventures, it has the potential to negatively influence the stability of the region due to hostile activities of the South Asian countries, especially India and Pakistan. Thus, India has well-planned strategies to counter the CPEC initiative of China.

Title image courtesy: PressTV

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India and Defence Research and Studies

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